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... the tale he had to tell could not be one of a final victory. It could be only the record of 
what had had to be done, and what assuredly would have to be done again in the never 
ending fight against terror and its relentless onslaughts, despite their personal afflictions, by 
all who, while unable to be saints but refusing to bow down to pestilences, strive their 
utmost to be healers. 
Albert Camus, The Plague 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is dedicated to all those who, resisting the terror of state violence, 
continue to do what has to be done. 
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Abstract 
 
How do Community Based Organisations (CBOs) in Burma and the Philippines participate 
in the construction of political legitimacy through their engagement in local and 
international politics? What can this tell us about the agency of non-state actors in 
international relations? This thesis explores the practices of non-state actors engaged in 
political resistance in Burma and the Philippines. The everyday dynamics of political 
legitimacy are examined in relation to popular consent, political violence, and the influence 
of international actors and norms. The empirical research in this thesis is based on a 
grounded theory analysis of in-depth semi-structured interviews with a wide cross-section 
of spokespeople and activists of opposition groups from Burma, and with spokespeople of 
opposition groups in the Philippines. The research covers community-based organisations 
with broad memberships, including women’s organisations, student and youth groups, 
ethnic minority and indigenous groups, and trade unions. The thesis demonstrates that 
CBOs exercise a range of tactics in forming political relationships in local and international 
contexts, and emphasises the role of learning processes in the interaction of local and 
international norms in the course of political change.  
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Introduction 
‘People power’ is a phrase that evokes images of sudden and dramatic political change – 
mass demonstrations in the streets of major cities, opposition leaders addressing the 
crowds, the crumbling of regimes that had previously seemed unassailable. These are the 
images of people power through which domestic political struggles become global events, 
broadcast by international news media, and eliciting public comment and even intervention 
by international political elites. In this mediated political narrative, people power 
movements of the kind that have challenged or toppled regimes in Burma and the 
Philippines appear to outside observers as sudden ruptures in the normal processes of 
international politics. International relations theories that have attempted to explain such 
events have tended to accept this representation and have sought explanations at the level 
of the international system for the vulnerability of domestic political elites and the potential 
for political change. Other academic studies of people power have reversed this approach, 
focussing on domestic structures of political opportunity as the primary explanatory 
framework. The purpose of this thesis is to show the links between political processes 
taking place in local and international contexts, starting with a focus on community based 
organisations (CBOs). 
 People power, by which we mean mass mobilisations that attempt to overthrow a state 
regime1, emerges out of the kind of political interactions which have not traditionally been 
considered the stuff of international relations. Yet the intended results of people power, 
regime change and/or broader reconfigurations of the constitutional basis of states, are 
core concerns of international relations theory and practice. Theories of International 
Relations that operate mainly at the level of the international system struggle to account for 
the emergence and spread of people power movements, even though participants share 
resources and information across national borders, and processes of political change may 
spread across regions. IR theory was famously unable, for instance, to predict or fully 
                                                
1 The term is used here without presumptions as to the type of mobilisation, political content or tactics 
involved. People power movements may incorporate political violence or non-violence, and a range of 
political ideas and motivations not necessarily confined to Western understandings of democratic or 
progressive ideology. The type and content of political activity that contributes to popular challenges to a 
given regime is a matter for empirical study.  
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account for the people power movements that contributed to the fall of the Eastern 
European communist regimes (Lebow 1994, Wohlforth 1998). This failing of IR theory 
cannot be entirely explained by the inherent contingency and complexity of the social 
forces at play in such events. The focus of IR theory on the elite level of inter-state politics 
has tended at times to obscure the development of political processes by which ordinary 
people organise to challenge the state. The central puzzle animating this thesis is to explain 
how relatively weak non-state actors have been able at times to organise in ways that 
overpower state regimes.  
 For participants and close observers, periods of revolutionary upheaval come as the 
culmination of long processes of political work to lay the groundwork for change. 
Although political activists may not be able to predict the timing of events which set off 
processes of regime change, they are able to offer insights into the social relations which 
shape the course of political change when it does occur. The research presented in this 
thesis is therefore based on the working hypothesis that activists in CBOs can offer 
valuable insight into the process and progress of people power. The central research 
question focuses on the issue of political legitimacy as a lens for understanding the 
motivations and forms of agency of CBOs challenging state power: 
 
• How do Community Based Organisations (CBOs) in Burma and the Philippines 
participate in the construction of political legitimacy through their engagement in 
local and international politics? What can this tell us about the agency of non-state 
actors in international relations? 
 
 This thesis situates the study of people power within an IR framework, based on the 
observation that opposition groups in local contexts are engaged in international activist 
networks and participate directly in the processes of international politics. This thesis 
makes three primary contributions which address gaps in the IR literature on people power 
movements. First, the thesis presents a detailed account of the emergence of people power 
movements and their processes of organising. Second, the empirical research presented 
shows that the contestation and construction of political legitimacy are key to this process. 
Third, the thesis argues that, contrary to common understandings of international norms as 
diffusing from the top down, the results of the research presented here point to the norms 
of political legitimacy being produced primarily in the interaction of Community Based 
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Organisations with the everyday politics of local communities.  
 People power movements matter for international relations in three significant ways. 
First, because they can lead to revolutionary situations in which state regimes are 
overthrown and new regimes, even new states, emerge. Second, because they provoke 
reactions from states, both within a country and internationally as foreign governments 
position themselves in relation to challenges to a regime. Third, because participants in 
people power movements forge their own international relations as they seek to mobilise 
support for their causes. This thesis focuses on the latter point, highlighting the agency and 
social relations of non-elite actors, while also presenting the results of the research in terms 
of the potential for non-state agency to effect change at the level of the state and 
international state system.  
 Studying people power could be approached from a number of different directions 
based on the established literature in International Relations. Some have emphasised the 
role of international actors in enabling ‘grassroots’ political opposition campaigns (whether 
the international actors include global civil society organisations or international institutions 
such as the United Nations) (see Keck and Sikkink 1998). In this approach the 
international is elevated above the domestic in terms of the relative priority and importance 
of political actors and types of political actions. Others have focussed more on domestic 
aspects of elite politics, assessing the effectiveness of different forms of political opposition 
in oppressive regimes (Lyall 2006). Such studies concentrate primarily on identifying 
variables that determine the success of the alternative political strategies used by elite non-
state actors. Other approaches work with existing ‘grand narratives’ of political transition 
while examining how particular cases fit within the assumed parameters of change. In this 
vein, scholars have sought to understand why remaining authoritarian regimes in Asia have 
yet to undergo a ‘democratic transition’ (Dukalskis 2009; cf. Rodan 1996, 3), or, more 
generally, how authoritarian regimes (as well as oppressive ‘democratic’ regimes) are able to 
maintain their grip on power (see Geddes and Zaller 1989; cf. Hale 2006). While the 
engagement with particular cases draws out contingent factors specific to each context, 
such approaches assume a teleological end-point for political change whereby all countries 
will, sooner or later, undergo democratisation (usually conceived simply in terms of 
competitive elections). None of these approaches are appropriate for our present purposes, 
since the research puzzle addressed in this thesis is concerned with the agency of non-elite 
groups in circumstances where the timing and chances of success of democratic change are 
far from assured. To address people power in terms of IR theory there is also a need to 
explain not only the specific phenomena of popular mobilisation, but also the relationship 
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of these phenomena to international politics and to existing theories of IR. 
 Realist theories of IR treat states as the primary units of analysis. By Realist accounts, 
the political environment within which opposition groups emerge is determined primarily 
by the sovereign actions of states, in both the domestic and international spheres of 
politics. The emergence of people power movements might be treated from a Realist 
perspective as a risk to the survival of established state regimes (Rotberg 2002), analysed as 
a factor in international conflict (Schultz 1998) or seen in terms of the foreign policy 
objectives of rival states (Eizenstat, Stuart and Porter 2005). In any case, a Realist 
perspective on people power would focus on the capacity of the state to contain and resist 
challenges to its sovereign authority. The prospect of successful mobilisations of people 
power is therefore associated in the Realist paradigm with the idea of ‘failed’ or ‘weak’ 
states (Eizenstat, Stuart and Porter 2005; Rotberg 2002). The rhetoric of the ‘failed state’ 
draws on the Realist assumption that the preservation and security of the state is the 
ultimate task of politics and a moral goal equivalent to the ‘national interest’ (Donnelly 
2000, 164). Realists may therefore fear the collapse of undemocratic regimes since, as 
Robert Kaplan (2006) put it in The Washington Post, they see dictators as ‘sit[ting] over a 
cauldron of anarchy’. Kaplan’s rather hyperbolic description reflects an image of politics 
that is common to the Realist tradition, in which non-state actors are seen solely in terms 
of the threat they may pose to the stability and security of states.  
 Neo-realist theories of International Relations place more emphasis on the international 
system (e.g. Waltz 1959; 1979) but still focus on states as the central actors and have little 
more to offer to an analysis of non-state agency in international relations. For Neo-realists, 
the most salient feature of international politics is the ‘anarchic’ nature of relations between 
states, in which there is no over-arching authority able to impose order. Neo-realist theory 
as espoused by Waltz aims to transcend the considerations of individual and domestic 
politics to focus on the ‘third image’ of the anarchic international system. The neo-realist 
approach would therefore exclude the entirety of the empirical research presented in this 
thesis as being unimportant for understanding international politics. Against neo-realism, 
and other theories of IR which focus attention exclusively at the level of the international 
system, this thesis argues that the emergence of people power movements is both 
significant within the study of IR and unable to be explained solely through reference to 
interactions between states or other features of the international system.   
 The limits of Realist and neo-Realist approaches to studying people power are clear. 
While Realist perspectives can be used to understand the potential impact of people power 
7 
 
on state regimes, and even used to argue in favour of regime change2, Realism is unable to 
shed much light on the processes by which people power movements are formed.  
 Liberal theories of IR share a concern with issues of democracy and human rights that 
would at least put people power movements on the research agenda. However, Liberal 
theories of IR share many of the state-centric assumptions of Realist approaches, often 
differing only in the extent to which states are assumed capable of cooperation in pursuit 
of collective interests and normative goals. Liberal Internationalism lies on a continuum 
between Realism and Cosmopolitanism in the degree of cooperation it allows for in 
international affairs (McGrew 2002), but this cooperation is understood almost exclusively 
as between state actors. While liberal internationalism as a theory of IR places emphasis on 
liberal values such as democracy and human rights, progress towards such goals is seen as 
requiring the leadership of western liberal states (Gardner 1990). This is where the grand 
narrative of liberal internationalism blurs into the subfield of democratisation studies, in 
which political developments towards democracy are seen as following a liberal teleology 
defined and championed by the West and international institutions (Petersen 2008). 
 Where the political organisations described in this thesis are concerned with furthering 
processes of democratisation and human rights protection, however these terms are 
defined in local contexts, there is considerable overlap with the core research agenda of 
Liberal IR. The empirical results presented in this thesis are particularly pertinent to the 
study of democratisation, which has emerged as a distinct specialisation within Liberal 
theories of IR. The bottom-up model of non-state international relations that emerges in 
this thesis is however alien to the Liberal focus on the spread of universal values at the 
international level, primarily through the agency of states.  
 The neo-Liberal variant of IR theory (e.g. Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 1971) 
shares with the neo-Realist approach a focus on the international system which precludes 
consideration of the close connections between community-based organisations in local 
and international contexts portrayed in this thesis. Neo-liberal approaches to IR are 
concerned with the operation of international institutions and actors in ways that broaden 
the scope of IR theory to include consideration of international political economy as well 
as the potential for international cooperation between states. Integrating the political 
agency of community-based non-state actors into understandings of the evolution of the 
                                                
2 For an example of Realist arguments for regime change in Burma, see the Tutu-Havel report (DLA Piper 
Rudnick Gray Cary 2005). This document, prepared with the terms of reference of the UN security 
council in mind, seeks to make a case that the situation of repression and conflict in Burma constitutes a 
threat to regional peace and stability (i.e. to the security of states in the region), due to the spread of 
refugees, narcotics trafficking and disease to surrounding countries. 
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international system has not been a concern of Liberal or neo-Liberal IR theories however, 
which remain focussed on the interaction of elite actors in the international system.  
 It seems at first that constructivist theories of IR would be more promising for studying 
people power movements. Constructivism after all is concerned primarily with the role of 
social agency and interaction in shaping the foundations of political life. In the particular 
variant of Constructivism to be found within IR theory however, there is both a focus on 
state actors and a privileging of explanatory models located at the elite levels of the 
international system. In the mainstream of Constructivist theory associated with the work 
of Wendt (1992), states are explicitly identified as the sole actors and units of analysis in IR. 
This ‘Conventional Constructivism’ (Hopf 1998) is presented as an alternative set of 
analytical tools to engage with the same problems of predicting and explaining state 
behaviour dealt with by realist and liberal forms of IR theory. Other versions of 
constructivism include non-state actors within a focus on the emergence of norms within 
the international system. The results of this thesis speak directly to the constructivist 
concern with norms of political legitimacy in the foundation and exercise of state 
sovereignty. In arguing that political legitimacy is grounded in the interactions of 
community-based organisations with the everyday politics of local communities however, 
the thesis departs from the explanatory framework of Constructivist IR theory.  
 Constructivists have tended to take a structuralist approach to questions of both 
political agency and international norms, assuming that political legitimacy operates at the 
level of an international normative structure (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 403). While 
political actors, usually states, are seen as having a role in constructing norms through 
processes of interaction, the structure of international norms is seen as the intervening 
force through which actors are able to act on others and through which legitimacy may be 
contested or conferred. For instance, Reus-Smit argues that ‘constitutional structures’ can 
be discerned at the foundation of international society, ‘comprising the constitutive values 
that define legitimate statehood and rightful state action’ (1997, 558). For Reus-Smit, these 
normative structures of legitimacy are formed through relational processes in that the 
values that define legitimacy are negotiated in a Habermasian process of communicative 
action by states at the international level. However, once established as norms, these values 
are seen as taking on a structural role, alongside norms of sovereignty and procedural 
justice. The role of relational processes, including non-state agency, in defining norms of 
state legitimacy is therefore restricted to the original establishment of a normative structure. 
For mainstream constructivists like Reus-Smit, it is still relations between states that are 
seen as decisive, with non-state actors playing at best an auxiliary role. 
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 Even when non-state actors are included in the analysis, Constructivism in IR generally 
subscribes to a ‘trickle down’ theory of norm diffusion from the international to the 
domestic levels of politics. Non-state agents have been seen by constructivists as playing a 
role in setting agendas and mobilising campaigns that influence international norms of state 
behaviour and legitimacy (Price 1995; Klotz 1995; Epstein 2008). The first phase of 
constructivist theorising in IR during the 1990s supplemented the dominant focus on state 
agency in the discipline with consideration of non-state agency to the extent that it could 
effect changes in norms at the inter-state level. Studies such as those by Klotz (1995) on 
the norm of racial equality in the anti-apartheid campaign and by Price (1995) on the 
‘chemical weapons taboo’ showed how non-state actors could influence international 
norms. As mainstream constructivist theorists have become more interested in non-state 
agency, the idea of norm diffusion, applied originally to explain convergence in state 
behaviour, has been applied to consider the influence of international norms on the 
behaviour of non-state actors (see Cortell and Davis 2000). The danger in these 
mainstream constructivist approaches is that by introducing a structure of international 
norms as an autonomous intervening force, non-state actors are reduced to one of two 
roles: either instrumental actors seeking changes in international norms or as the passive 
recipients of international norm diffusion at the domestic level. In other words, the 
theoretical framework of an international normative structure mirrors that of public choice 
theory, with non-state actors cast in the role of interest groups and norms as a proxy for 
international policy. Some constructivist scholars have found innovative ways around the 
limitations in this approach, such as Keck and Sikkink’s (1998, 221) “boomerang” model of 
transnational advocacy, whereby NGOs in an oppressive state work with NGOs in other 
states to persuade governments and international organisations to put pressure on the 
home government. But the emphasis on such forms of action highlights the extent to 
which mainstream constructivism brackets out the agency of non-state actors unless it 
involves direct interaction with states or international organisations.  
 Constructivist approaches have found common ground with critical theorists who 
emphasise the constitutive relations between knowledge and power in international 
relations (Price and Reus-Smit 1998). While some have argued that critical theories of IR 
share a commitment to a post-positivist epistemology (Lapid 1989), others have pointed 
out that there is more that divides than unites the theorists grouped under this label 
(Biersteker 1989). Critical theorists have nonetheless contributed to a relational view of 
power and non-state agency by opening the state-centric mainstream of IR theory to 
critique from broader political theory (Walker 1993). One form that this critical approach 
10 
 
has taken is the application of post-structuralist theory to the study of the role which both 
state and non-state actors play in shaping the discursive practices of international relations. 
Critical theories also offer some alternative paths to the study of people power and 
community based organisations in international relations. A notable example is provided by 
Bleiker (2000) whose study of popular revolt in the former East Germany utilises a 
discursive framework based around the concept of ‘transversal dissent’ (Bleiker 2000, 9-
14)3. For Bleiker, ‘A transversal interpretation ... implies that practices of dissent in global 
politics should be viewed in discursive terms’ (Bleiker 2000, 35) particularly concerned with 
the politics of language and ‘poetic dissent’ (Bleiker 2000, 43). Similarly, Epstein (2008) has 
used a Foucauldian approach to study the influence of NGOs in shaping anti-whaling 
discourse, showing how discursive processes are constitutive as well as expressive of the 
political legitimacy of certain practices. In focusing on the power of language to construct 
meaning, however, such studies tend to elide the role of non-linguistic elements of social 
practice and material reality within discourse. Language itself is a practice which engages 
with the performance of other social practices (Austin 1975) and takes place in a material 
world in which real objects and events are elements alongside words in the discursive 
construction of meaning (Wittgenstein 1969, Badiou 2007). The primary contribution of 
critical theories of discourse in international relations is to draw attention to the 
constitutive power relations which permeate social practice, of which linguistic practice is 
one aspect.  
 The theory of norm diffusion is a key aspect of constructivist accounts of international 
relations which must be addressed by any critical engagement with constructivism.  Norms 
define both what is normal and what is normative in a particular situation. To be accepted 
as a norm, a standard of behaviour must meet expectations of both normality and 
normativity, reflecting both general practice and accepted values. Although this definition 
of norms is compatible with common usage in International Relations theory the influence 
of constructivism has led many scholars who study norms to emphasise the normative over 
the normal, putting the focus on ideas rather than practices (Checkel 1997; 1998).  
 Constructivists like Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 888) associate the rising interest in 
norms in IR theory with an ‘ideational turn’ in the discipline and define a norm as ‘a 
standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998, 891). The focus on appropriateness certainly captures part of the power of norms 
                                                
3 Bleiker follows Ashley’s (1989, 270) interpretation of the term ‘transversal’ to refer to political processes that 
cross international borders. For a broader reading of Foucault’s political theory which emphasises the 
concept of the transversal see Deleuze (2006, 20). 
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although, as will be argued in the next chapter, compliance with norms may be based as 
much on consequences or habit as on value-based legitimacy. The requirement for a shared 
identity claimed by Finnemore and Sikkink, however, seems to set the mark too high for 
the successful adoption of a norm. While some degree of connection to shared values is 
clearly needed for a norm to become established, this can be negotiated in a given situation 
without the actors involved necessarily sharing a single identity.  
 As Acharya (2004, 242) argues, most paths to norm acceptance in local contexts lie 
partway between complete congruence with international norms and outright rejection. 
This formulation bears a striking similarity to Scott’s description of the political terrain 
‘between quiescence and revolt’ and suggests a role for everyday politics in explaining the 
process of norm localisation. Acharya’s (2004, 248) account of this process emphasises 
local initiative and agency in ‘borrowing’ ideas and practices from outside in ways that 
amplify particular aspects of existing social relations and processes of normative change. 
For instance, as Gurowitz’s (1999) study of migrant workers’ activism in Japan shows, 
international norms are localised by subordinate groups in support of their political claims 
and campaigns. In other words, political activism situated in local contexts involves the 
negotiation of international and everyday norms. 
 As will be argued in Chapter Five, everyday normative change occurs through learning 
processes which reconfigure the expectations, habitual practices and conceptual framing of 
actors. Constructivist accounts of international normative change have described learning 
process in the adoption of norms, but have tended to focus on the role of international 
actors as ‘teachers’ of norms (Finnemore 1993; see also Florini 1996; Reimann 2006). The 
approach in this thesis complements the attention such theorists have paid to the elite 
politics of international norms with a focus on the agency of everyday actors in 
determining their own priorities and processes of learning. A perspective that takes account 
of everyday politics adds a significant piece to the puzzle of explaining the dynamics of elite 
politics, as well as raising new questions based on the politics of non-elite communities.  
Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. The next chapter outlines the research process I 
followed in the preparation of this thesis, from the design of the project, through the 
fieldwork and analysis, to the formulation of the conceptual and theoretical frameworks 
that guided the writing of the finished product. Chapter Two introduces the first detailed 
discussion of the empirical material presented here, showing how CBOs in Burma and the 
Philippines engage in the production of political legitimacy in local contexts. The main 
argument advanced in this chapter is that CBOs not only challenge and contest state 
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legitimacy, they are actively involved in projects of political legitimacy on similar terms to 
those of state regimes. Chapter Three addresses the specific relationships between CBOs 
and state regimes in Burma and the Philippines, again addressing the issue through the lens 
of political legitimacy and the motivations of participants in CBOs for contesting state 
legitimacy and engaging in resistance.  The argument here is not only that state regimes lose 
legitimacy when they engage in oppression and fail to provide public goods, but that the 
political activities of CBOs play an important role in the social production of state 
legitimacy and, conversely, in its loss. Chapter Four engages more directly with the 
question of how non-state actors exercise agency in challenging state regimes, through a 
discussion of the politics of violence and non-violence among CBOs. In this chapter I 
argue, contrary to prevailing views of civil society as a space of non-violence, that CBOs 
exercise a range of tactics, including both armed and non-armed forms of resistance, in 
pursuit of popular legitimacy, and that there is evidence of armed and non-armed groups 
being able to work cooperatively as part of movements for political change. Chapter Five 
deals with the political importance of education and learning processes for the CBOs 
involved in this research. I argue that consideration of the dynamics of political learning in 
organisations engaged in both local and international contexts can provide insight into the 
process of international normative change. Contrary to top-down models of norm 
diffusion I demonstrate how local actors exercise agency in evolving their own forms of 
political practice through various forms of learning and change, including the selective 
incorporation of international norms. Chapter Six focuses further on the international 
relationships formed by CBOs from Burma and the Philippines, investigating the 
motivations of local groups for engaging in international connections. I argue that, 
although it is often in the interests of CBOs to learn the particular skills necessary to 
engage in international networking, lobbying and fundraising, these learning processes are 
as unequal as the wider terrain of international politics. Rather than advance an argument 
that Western organisations are engaging in cultural imperialism in their relations with CBOs 
in developing countries, I argue that CBOs are exercising agency in pursuing their own 
priorities and interests in international settings, and that in order to do so they must engage 
in processes of unequal learning. 
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1 
The Research Process 
The aim of this chapter is to make visible the process that was followed in the research 
presented in this thesis. 
 I began my doctoral research with an interest in international activism. I had been 
involved in political organising for several years, initially within student groups protesting 
rising tuition costs and then within anti-capitalist4 and anti-war movements. I was 
particularly interested in the connections between these movements in Western countries 
and the ongoing social struggles taking place in Asia and Latin America. From loose 
coalitions like Peoples’ Global Action, which came out of the Zapatista encuentros, to 
more institutionalised forms such as the Asian Students’ Association, I became aware of 
how movements in the ‘global south’ were taking on leadership roles in the coordination of 
globalised resistance. 
 My awareness of the struggle for political change in Burma was deepened through 
contact with Burmese trade unionists while I was working for the New Zealand Council of 
Trade Unions. The NZCTU had hosted a Burmese trade unionist in Wellington for several 
months and when he returned to continue his organising work with Burmese migrants on 
the Thai-Burma border it was decided that the New Zealand unions would try to help raise 
funds from NZAID to support this effort. With support from NZAID I travelled to the 
Thai-Burma border and discussed this possibility with the leadership of the Federation of 
Trade Unions of Burma (FTUB), and with Burmese migrant workers and union activists 
from a range of industries on the border. I heard the experiences of migrants who had 
come to Thailand fleeing persecution and poverty in their homeland, and I learned about 
the broad network of political organisations representing the diverse ethnic nationalities of 
Burma, who were working in various ways to challenge the authority of the military regime 
ruling the country. I was struck by both the determined efforts of Burmese activists to 
achieve political change within their home country, and their eagerness to find ways of 
working internationally to raise support and awareness.  
                                                
4 There has of course never been a unified anti-capitalist movement. I am referring here to the organisation of 
globally co-ordinated protests against the summits of the International Financial Institutions as well as a 
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 When I began work on my proposed doctoral research I realised that the activism of the 
Burmese groups would make an ideal case study for a project investigating the agency of 
non-state actors in international relations. Not only was Burma an under-researched area, 
and the activism of Burmese opposition groups even more so, but there were several 
aspects of the political activity I had observed that seemed to challenge the prevailing 
assumptions in the literature I was reading on global civil society and transnational social 
movements. Where the literature often assumed a western liberal basis for global civil 
society, the Burmese organisations appeared to be operating in a more culturally hybrid 
political space. Where the literature assumed that global civil society was a space of non-
violence, the Burmese organisations often carried arms or cooperated with armed groups 
for protection in areas of civil conflict. Perhaps most strikingly, where the literature spoke 
of a kind of social globalisation, characterised as an opening up of global public spaces, 
Burmese activists spoke of their profound difficulties in travelling and communicating in 
spaces regulated by foreign legal and linguistic codes. 
 My interest in studying Burmese activism in local and international contexts was 
primarily as a case study that could illuminate wider issues in the study of global civil 
society. In discussing the research design with my supervisors it was decided that adding a 
second case study would help to demonstrate which of the insights generated from the case 
study could be generalised more broadly, as well as to identify aspects that were specific to 
particular conditions in one of the cases. On reflection, the Philippines was identified as a 
country with enough in common with Burma historically to enable comparison, while with 
enough differences to make such a comparison worthwhile. As George and Bennett (2005, 
18) argue, the use of case studies for research in political science is strongest when methods 
combine analysis within cases with comparison between a small number of cases. Including 
research participants from the Philippines as well as Burma ensures that the results of the 
study cannot be simply dismissed as applying only to an extreme or outlier case. 
 As case studies of political resistance in Asia, Burma and the Philippines might at first 
glance seem to represent rather unusual case selections. One is formally democratic and the 
other strictly authoritarian, even to the extent that Burma is usually lumped in by the 
United States and its allies with a small number of ‘pariah’ regimes under the ‘rogue state’ 
label (cf. Homolar 2011). Moreover, the Philippines is the oldest independent democratic 
state in Asia (dating from 1946, although the country’s democratic rule was interrupted 
during the Marcos period from 1972 to 1987), while Burma is one of a small number of 
Asian countries that have not experienced at least some degree of democratisation in recent 
                                                                                                                                          
revival of anti-capitalist protests on May Day.  
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decades (Reilly 2006, 29-35). However, Burma and the Philippines both represent societies 
that are fragmented by sharp lines of political conflict between different social groups, have 
a high degree of ethnic heterogeneity, and continue to struggle with economic 
underdevelopment, a high level of income inequality, and high poverty rates (although the 
Philippines economy far outperforms the Burmese economy, as is discussed further in 
subsequent chapters). Each country gained formal independence from colonial rulers at 
almost the same time (1946 in the Philippines, and 1948 in Burma), and each has 
experienced multiple examples of broad-based political opposition movements during the 
post-colonial period of independence. In short, both country cases therefore have a long 
history of political resistance and popular mobilisation against ‘illegitimate’ rulers.  
 My interest was particularly in organisations based on organising large memberships in 
grassroots communities since it was these organisations that seemed to differ most from 
the prevailing stereotype of the professionalised international non-government organisation 
(NGO). In moving between local and international contexts these community based 
organisations (CBOs) came into frequent contact with the more recognisable kind of 
NGO, but also maintained their primary purpose and structure as mass organisations 
representing and organising particular sectors of the population. To cover the major CBOs 
operating within the diverse communities on the Thai-Burma border and in the Philippines 
I chose four sectors to focus on: ethnic organisations, women’s groups, youth and student 
groups, and trade unions or workers’ organisations. 
Community Based Organisations (CBOs) 
CBOs are particularly involved in everyday (non-elite, informal) politics, since they are 
based in particular non-elite communities and are actively involved in the informal politics 
of those communities. At the same time as they are involved in the everyday politics of 
their communities as activists and organisers, members of CBOs are able to mobilise their 
collective agency to engage with elite politics. This dual function is discussed by Appadurai 
(2001) in his study of an alliance of CBOs formed by communities of the urban poor in 
Mumbai. He describes the operation of the alliance as an example of ‘deep democracy’ 
because of the commitment of activists to ‘build on what the poor themselves know and 
understand’ (Appadurai 2001, 29). By situating themselves within the everyday politics of 
their base communities while focusing on building collective strength, and by maintaining a 
strategic approach to engaging with elites without being co-opted by any particular 
apparatus of elite politics, CBOs are able to constitute a non-elite democratic force. 
 However, translating between everyday and elite forms of politics is fraught with 
difficulties for CBOs. As Appadurai (2001, 28-9) makes clear, the process of building 
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democratic engagement at the level of everyday politics requires a ‘politics of patience’ to 
negotiate the contradictions of non-elite social relations as well as the impacts of elite 
forms of coercion and co-optation. There is no assurance that such a project will succeed 
or even that, given strong incentives for co-optation, leaders of CBOs will even maintain 
the goal of autonomy from elite politics. In this regard, Marwell’s (2004) study of CBOs in 
New York shows the conflicts and pressures introduced by policies of devolution and 
privatisation of state welfare functions. As CBOs become reliant on state funding they are 
drawn into the formal structures of bureaucratic control associated with contracts for 
service delivery (Marwell 2004, 272-4). Dependency on state contracts and funding also 
creates strong incentives for CBOs to integrate themselves into what Marwell (2004, 277-9) 
calls ‘machine politics’, mobilising volunteers and constituencies of voters for politicians in 
exchange for continued support.  
  The political space in which CBOs operate is stratified by status, style, and scale. In 
terms of their primary function, CBOs are located at the intersection of the local and the 
everyday within a political space that stretches from local to international in scale, from 
informal to formal in style, and from subordinate to elite in status. In choosing strategies of 
political engagement, community-based actors navigate this political space in a variety of 
ways. Members of CBOs engage horizontally with non-elites in other regions through 
informal activities such as learning exchanges, as well as through more formal processes of 
coalition-building (see Chapter 6). CBOs also engage vertically with elite politics at national 
and international levels to gain support, raise awareness, and lobby for change. Kenis’ 
(2000, 129-30) analysis of the role of CBOs in the global response to AIDS gives a good 
example of how the dynamics of both horizontal and vertical internationalisation can 
interact and evolve over time. Organisations first formed locally within communities 
affected by AIDS and then established networks with each other to exchange information 
and experience. As elite actors in government and international organisations began to 
recognise the need to respond to the crisis, CBOs combined to engage with the formalised, 
elite, and international politics of the global response in an attempt to ensure that the 
interests of affected communities were represented in the process (Kenis 2000, 130-2).  
Methodology 
The choices I made in structuring my fieldwork research and subsequent analysis were 
closely linked to my interest in the motivations as well as agency of community based 
organisations. I chose to conduct semi-structured interviews and to ask initially open-ended 
questions in order to gain insight into the terms in which participants in CBOs chose to 
present their activities to an outside observer, as well as the activities themselves. In guiding 
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the interview towards the general themes of my research, I was particularly interested in 
how spokespeople and activists for the organisations would characterise and justify their 
priorities for collective action and relationship-building. Semi-structured interviews allow 
for participants to voice their experiences in their own words, as well as identify issues of 
importance to them (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2010, 102). 
 In structuring the research process I was aware that the specific terminology and 
theoretical framing of my research interests would not necessarily correspond to the terms 
in which my participants would discuss the same issues. I wanted to make space in the 
interviews and in the process of analysis for a dialogue between my own concepts and 
those of participants. Also, and most crucially, I wanted to allow the conceptual 
frameworks that were implicit in the statements made by participants to emerge through 
the overall process of the research, without relying on such concepts being fully and 
explicitly stated by participants. For instance, the way that the concept of state legitimacy is 
developed and used in this thesis draws on numerous disparate statements made by 
participants in various contexts, from descriptions of anti-government protest action to 
discussions of everyday resentment of abuses by government agents, and at varying degrees 
of abstraction, from particular personal experiences to general judgements about what a 
government ought to do. I saw the process of drawing connections between the data 
provided by participants as being my key role as a researcher, requiring both close listening 
and analytical distance.  
 The research processes I adopted, and the strategies of analysis in particular, were drawn 
from the model of Grounded Theory developed by Strauss and Corbin (1998). As a 
method of qualitative theory-building, Grounded Theory offers a process of coding 
interview data and assessing emergent themes. While I borrowed the coding process 
developed by Strauss and Corbin, I took a more flexible approach to the identification of 
conceptual structures from the data than that proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1998, 181-
5), who provide a ‘conditional/consequential matrix’ as a heuristic device for ordering 
qualitative data. Strauss and Corbin’s symbolic interactionist approach, based heavily in 
‘objectivist’ assumptions about the interpretation of data, has been challenged by 
‘constructivist’ practitioners of Grounded Theory such as Charmaz (2006, 129-135). 
Without fully embracing the particular variant on constructivist theory followed by 
Charmaz, I agree with the argument she makes that Grounded Theory is best understood 
as a process of interpreting meaning in context rather than revealing objective truth about 
the data (Charmaz 2003, 277). I therefore took a pragmatic approach to adopting certain 
aspects of methodological procedure from Strauss and Corbin while remaining sensitive to 
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the interpretivist concerns raised by Charmaz. 
 A strength of the Grounded Theory research design adopted in this study is that it 
allows for direct and detailed comparisons to be made between the two case studies on the 
basis of qualitative data. The coding process allows for similarities and differences in the 
cases to be identified across a wide range of thematic categories emerging from the 
interviews. The ease with which Grounded Theory allows comparisons based on qualitative 
data is especially important for research involving Burma, where reliable aggregates of 
quantitative data are rarely available and official data is lacking, restricted or unreliable5. The 
piecemeal availability of published data for at least one of the cases made the qualitative 
design of the study preferable to quantitative or mixed-methods approaches. However, 
where statistics and information from independent agencies and researchers are available, 
these are used where appropriate to supplement and contextualise the data provided by 
interview participants.  
 Grounded theory also has the advantage for the present study of facilitating an 
engagement with the everyday politics and forms of expression of the participants.  
Everyday politics consists of the informal activities of non-elite actors which affect norms 
of authority, allocation, and association. This definition includes the hidden forms of 
everyday resistance focused on by Scott (1985, 1990) and Kerkvliet (2005, 2009), as well as 
extending some way into the considerably broader arena of subordinate political action 
covered by Hobson and Seabrooke (2007). There are two key aspects of this definition 
which distinguish everyday politics from other forms of politics. Firstly, everyday politics is 
non-elite. It is the politics of those who, without access to the political shortcuts of power 
and privilege, must rely on their own individual and collective efforts to make their way. It 
is distinguished from elite politics which involves the practices that Foucault (1991; 2009) 
termed discipline and governmentality, and the perspective that Scott (1998) has called 
‘seeing like a state’. While elite politics is concerned with the definition and control of 
populations, everyday politics consists of practices that occur within a population but elude 
the formal definition and control of elites. This brings us to the second aspect of the 
definition: everyday politics is informal. It consists of political action which is not codified in 
terms of either state sanction or organisational rules (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 727). It is 
the politics of the everyday in the sense described by Blanchot (1993, 239) as ‘the suspect 
                                                
5 On the unreliability of official economic statistics issued by the Government of Myanmar see Matthews 
(2006, 221). Foreign governments including Australia and the United States have also commented on the 
unreliability of official statistics from Burma (USA Department of State 2010; Australian Government 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2011). Since the data routinely published by international 
agencies such as the IMF, World Bank, and other UN agencies is reliant on information supplied by state 
19 
 
(and the oblique) that always escapes the clear decision of the law’. 
 Everyday politics is everywhere, but it is not everything. A focus on everyday politics is 
not sufficient to explain all political processes and outcomes, or to account for major 
changes in international political orders. Neither can a focus on everyday politics ignore the 
material capacity of state elites and the agenda-setting power of formal institutions at 
national and international levels. The claim made in focusing the analytical framework of 
this thesis on everyday politics is a more modest one: that a comprehensive understanding 
of the dynamics of political legitimacy and resistance requires consideration of the political 
activities of non-elites in informal settings. In the following chapters, the organisations 
which are the focus of this thesis will be shown to be acting as bridges between the 
everyday politics of their base communities and the elite, formal politics of the institutions 
within which the organisations represent the interests of their members.  
  The research process described by Grounded Theory offers a useful approach to the 
study of everyday politics which are by definition obscured from straightforward analysis. 
Symbolic forms of everyday resistance are, for Scott (1990), codified by ‘hidden transcripts’ 
which are intelligible to the peers of subordinate actors while contributing to the opacity of 
everyday politics for outsiders and elites.6 Scott’s concept of hidden transcripts implies 
more than just a practical difficulty in interpreting subversive action by non-elite actors. 
Such acts of resistance are not hidden because they are conducted out of sight of 
authorities. Rather, the meaning of subversive acts may be hidden from authorities because 
they do not share the ‘practical epistemology’ (Sidnell 2005) that everyday actors rely on for 
the intelligibility of their acts of resistance. Thus, even when there is no particular need to 
hide an act of resistance from an outside observer, it may not be an entirely straightforward 
process to render hidden transcripts legible. Grounded theory helps with this act of 
interpretation and translation, where participants are willing to share information about 
their practices of resistance, without relying on participants doing all the work required to 
make their practice legible to outsiders.  
 Defining everyday politics in terms of informal actions also excludes some of what 
                                                                                                                                          
parties, these sources suffer from the same problem of unreliability with regard to Burma. 
6 Similarly, Kerkvliet limits everyday politics to ‘quiet, mundane, and subtle expressions and acts that are rarely 
organised or direct’ (Kerkvliet 2009, 232).In making this limitation, Kerkvliet excludes what he calls official 
politics and advocacy politics, meaning any activity undertaken within or in interaction with an organisation 
of  any kind, whether it is a state, peasant association, or trade union. In this sense, the definition of  everyday 
politics used for this thesis is broader than that used by Kerkvliet. However, the definition adopted here is 
perhaps narrower in its specific focus on non-elite agency than his suggestion that the concept of  everyday 
politics applies equally well to the actions of  poor peasants as to the private actions of  those in ‘authoritative 
positions in universities and other organisations’ (Kerkvliet 2009, 241). 
 
20 
 
Hobson and Seabrooke mean by everyday political action, which they define as:  
acts by those who are subordinate within a broader power relationship but, whether through 
negotiation, resistance or non-resistance, either incrementally or suddenly, shape, constitute and 
transform the political and economic environment around and beyond them (Hobson and 
Seabrooke 2007, 15-16, emphasis in original). 
In accordance with this definition, the contributions to the volume edited by Hobson and 
Seabrooke (2007) take everyday politics to refer to autonomous or innovative action by 
subordinate actors within regimes structured by formal rules and elite interests. Through 
such action, subordinate or peripheral actors are able to subvert the conventional 
distribution of decision-making power and achieve outcomes that are more favourable to 
their collective interest. For instance, economic decisions made by small savers and 
investors are considered in terms of their effects on the (de-)legitimation of financial orders 
(Seabrooke 2007) and shifts in investment patterns (Langley 2007). These contributions 
consider formal – rule-bound and institutionalised – actions such as saving and investing 
by non-elites in the context of broader informal shifts in financial norms. The connection 
between formal and informal political actions is made by reference to ‘axiorational 
behaviour’ (Seabrooke 2007, 84; Langley 2007, 104), meaning action that is both rational 
and value-driven.  
 The focus of the work collected by Hobson and Seabrooke is on non-elite agency, 
covering both formal and informal political action, and is therefore overlapping but not 
entirely congruent with the definition of everyday politics adopted here. The definition of 
subordinate actors is also broader in the Hobson and Seabrooke volume than the definition 
of non-elites adopted in this thesis. For instance, Sharman (2007, 45) considers small states 
targeted as tax havens by the OECD as ‘small, peripheral actors which have traditionally 
been marginalised by the dominant regulatory framework’. While political actors 
representing tax havens are subordinate within an international regulatory order, they are 
simultaneously state elites within their local political environment and benefit from 
association with international financial elites.  
 Political status is clearly context-dependent, but state actors are excluded from the 
definition of everyday actors used here for two related reasons. First, because state 
representatives are not acting within a subordinated population, but rather operate as elites, 
even if some are more elite than others. Second, because statehood grants a formal status 
of sovereign independence which these actors are able to draw on to define and defend 
anomalous positions (in this case, capital mobility and low taxation). However, Sharman 
makes a compelling argument that the behaviour of those representing small states in 
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negotiating elite norms to suit their own ends shares important characteristics with the 
behaviour of subordinate groups in local and national politics. Points of definition aside, 
the approaches to everyday politics developed by the contributors to the collection edited 
by Seabrooke and Hobson are significant and valuable for the present study, as they 
highlight the role of subordinate actors in shaping the emergence of international norms. 
Research ethics 
Drawing attention to the power relations within which the CBOs in this study are 
constituted as subordinate also requires that attention be paid to the power relations 
involved in the research itself. Within my research project, the ethics and relations of 
power between myself and the participants in the research were enmeshed in the same 
networks of collective relationships that inform the results of the study. The relationships 
that I established as a researcher were primarily with organisations, through contact with 
members of the leadership or whoever was responsible for liaising with international 
visitors. In so doing, I was very often aware of participating in the very processes of 
international relationship-building that I was studying. I was also, of course, replicating 
many of the inequalities of power involved in international relationships. From my 
appearance as a (particularly tall) white male I was immediately recognisable as a privileged 
outsider, in the same category as the aid workers and NGO representatives whose 
relationships to the CBOs I was interested in studying. As a citizen of a Western country I 
enjoy many privileges not available to many of the participants in my research. For 
instance, I was able to travel freely on a passport issued by the government of my country 
of birth and to rely on some degree of assistance from the embassies of that country, 
neither of which was possible for any of the Burmese activists I met. 
 At the same time as my research process reflected the processes of non-state 
international relations, and the associated unequal power dynamics, my approach to 
research ethics emphasised my accountability as a researcher to the organisations and 
communities I was researching with. In the process of organising the research interviews, I 
was able to rely on the local expertise of CBOs to make arrangements for the security of 
myself and my research participants. This required me to place a great deal of trust in my 
contacts, for my personal safety and for the progress of my research, just as they were 
trusting me with access to the information provided by the participants from their 
organisations. The research I conducted would not have been possible without the 
agreement and support of the organisations I was studying, as well as the individual 
consent of the participants. I acknowledge a personal debt to those organisations and 
individuals which it may not be possible for me to fully repay. However, as I discuss in 
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Chapter Six of this thesis, one of the primary objectives of CBOs from both Burma and 
the Philippines in engaging with outsiders such as myself is to raise awareness of the 
political situations in their countries. Participants across the groups I spoke to emphasised 
their hope that people such as me who heard their stories would share the information with 
others and would find ways to support their organisations. I see the publication of my 
research in this thesis and in other forms as the first part of my obligation to repay the trust 
shown to me by the participants in this research who shared their stories.   
Fieldwork and analysis 
The field research was developed through a six-stage process. First, initial questions were 
drawn from an extensive secondary literature review. Second, participants for interviews 
from Burma were selected using a ‘snowball’ method of building a list of contacts. 
Interviews were sought with a range of high-profile CBOs with a presence on the Thai-
Burma border, and others recommended by contacts and interviewees. Where possible, 
interviews in Burma were conducted with activists and grassroots members of the groups 
as well as with leaders and spokespeople, while interviews conducted in the Philippines – as 
a secondary case study – were restricted to key spokespeople of major organisations. In the 
third stage, a small number of interviews were conducted as a pilot study of the interview 
questions, which enabled the questions to be revised and expanded in scope based on 
initial responses from interviewees. One example from this stage of refining interview 
questions is the importance that emerged from early interviews on the use of violence (or 
non-violence) in the strategies of opposition organisations in Burma, which helped to 
reorient the direction of research in counterintuitive ways compared with the questions 
suggested by the existing literature. In the fourth stage of the field research process, these 
revised questions were used in a broad range of interviews with Burmese organisations 
(and subsequently in the Philippines). Interviews were conducted at various locations, 
including Bangkok and Chiang Mai in Thailand, Thai border towns such as Mae Sot, Mae 
Sariang and Sangkla Buri; Mae La Oo refugee camp; and one site on the border of Karen 
state controlled by the Karen National Union (KNU). The interviews were conducted in 
October and November 2006 during fieldwork on the Thai-Burma border, as well as 
interviews conducted in the Philippines in April 2008 in the City of Manila and in the 
Cordillera region. A total of forty-five participants from leaders and members of 
community-based organisations were interviewed in Burma, along with six interviews with 
key spokespeople of major community-based organisations in the Philippines. These 
included in both cases a range of women’s, student/youth, ethnic, and trade union 
organisations.  
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 Interviews were semi-structured and based on a set of questions covering: (1) the goals 
of the groups; (2) their political actions in pursuit of these goals; and (3) the effectiveness 
of these strategies (see list of interview questions in Appendix B). The questions were 
aimed in particular at investigating different groups’ relations to their community, other 
organisations, and the state regime. Participants were asked to describe the most important 
goals of their organisation, their personal reasons for involvement and the issues for their 
community. They were also asked about the activities of the group, what support they had 
received and what further actions they thought were needed to achieve the change they 
wanted to see. In addition, participants were asked whether they felt their goals and 
activities were understood and supported by other groups including international NGOs. 
Where translation was used, this was usually done by peers from the groups concerned. 
This kind of amateur translation involved some loss of precision, but allowed participants 
to talk more freely than would have been the case if using local translators who were 
unknown to the participants. Issues of confidentiality, consent, and use of information 
were covered in a written and spoken briefing. Each interview was recorded and later 
transcribed after the field research was completed. The fifth and final stage of the field 
research process involved the coding of transcriptions (discussed further below), in order 
to identify key relevant points from the interviews, which were then categorised into 
themes, and subsequently re-grouped into meta-categories to identify patterns, similarities, 
and differences both between different types of community-based organisations in each 
case and similarities and differences between the two cases.  
 Coding followed the process of grounded theory as outlined by Strauss and Corbin 
(1998). In the initial phase of open coding, transcripts were coded at the level of meaning 
expressed by the participant. The ideas or points expressed in the interview were 
paraphrased as closely as possible into ‘meaning units’. The second phase of open coding 
involved abstracting each statement and grouping together like statements into ‘second-
order categories’. As with the first phase of coding, an attempt was made to base the 
coding on the original meaning expressed, even as it was abstracted out of its original 
specific context and related to other statements. In this way, as concepts and categories 
emerged through the interpretation of the researcher they also remained grounded in the 
expressed experiences of the participants. Depending on length, an interview transcript 
typically generated around 60 coded statements at the initial phase of open coding. During 
the second phase these statements were grouped together and added to existing ‘second-
order categories,’ or a new category was added. As each interview was analysed, fewer new 
categories were required, until a saturated coding model was developed, consisting of 95 
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distinct categories. The next phase of ‘axial coding’ involved sorting these second order 
categories into broad groups, based on patterns emerging from the categorisation and 
interpretation of statements. Once a grounded theory model has reached the saturation 
point of coding it presents a highly systematic and reliable means of organising the 
collected data. As a process of theory generation the final stage of axial coding allows the 
researcher’s interpretation and analysis to be based solidly in themes emerging from the 
data. From the identification of important themes, to the selection of illustrative quotes, 
following a grounded theory approach ensures that the material presented is a valid and 
representative portrayal of the collected data.  
Emergence of themes    
In this section I highlight and contextualise three points in the research process where key 
themes emerged from the analysis. The first point to highlight is the most general of the 
three; the observation, rather late in the process of axial coding, that the key processes I 
was studying could all be classified in terms of their contributions to particular inter-group 
relationships. The second point is that of the importance of political legitimacy, an idea that 
was present in the original kernel of my research question in the form of a concern with 
state legitimacy, but which has expanded in significance and generality as a way of 
conceptualising the interaction of CBOs with grassroots communities and international 
organisations as much as with states. The third point is the centrality of learning processes 
within both case studies, an idea that started as a straightforward observation of the 
prevalence of activity and concern around education and then expanded in theoretical 
significance once I started to consider the role of education and training in the formation 
and diffusion of political norms. 
Relationships 
 When I initially began sorting the coded statements, the categories I focussed on 
reflected my interest in collective agency and the factors motivating it. I sorted the codes 
into categories of ‘actions’, ‘problems’, ‘needs’, ‘lacks’ and ‘motivations’. Later, as I came 
across several coded statements which explicitly dealt with the relationships between 
groups, I added ‘relationships’ as a separate category. As I continued sorting codes, and 
especially in the process of deciding what was the main idea being expressed in particular 
statements, I began to notice that the relationships between groups had a more pervasive 
relevance to the processes being described than I had first thought. I decided to try a 
reorganisation of the Axial coding pattern to incorporate a more relational focus. The 
model I arrived at retains the original five categories (actions, problems, needs, lacks and 
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motivations) as sub-categories of relationship-building, where the high-level categories 
become instances of inter-group relationships. The relationships that emerged from the (re-
)coding process as the most significant for the participants were those within the CBO, 
between the CBO and the local community, with other CBOs, with the state regime, and 
with international groups. None of these categories implies homogeneity or a lack of 
differentiation within as well as across categories, however the combination into one 
category of relations with various kinds of international organisation is reflective of a 
pattern that emerged from the interviews. As is discussed further in Chapter 6, participants 
tended to differentiate between international actors in terms drawn from local priorities, 
according for instance to what a particular person or group could contribute to raising 
awareness or resources. This picture of locally-centred international relations is interesting 
in its own right for what it can contribute to the study of what Sylvester has termed 
‘relations international’ – the conceptualisation of politics on a global scale without 
necessarily prioritising state actors or formal institutions as the focus of analysis. 
 It has become common in IR theory to advocate a greater focus on relational processes 
and a move away from the 'substantialism' that treats entities like states as having a stable 
objective character (Jackson and Nexon 1999; Albert, Jacobsen and Lapid 2001, 3-5). This 
move towards a more process-oriented IR theory has been a central concern of the 
constructivist turn in the discipline. The concern is by no means restricted to 
constructivism however. Critical theorists have contributed to a relational view of power 
and non-state agency by opening the state-centric mainstream of IR theory to critique from 
broader political theory (Walker 1993). One form that this critical approach has taken is the 
application of post-structuralist theory to the study of the role which both state and non-
state actors play in shaping the discursive practices of international relations. While some 
have argued that critical theories of IR share a commitment to a post-positivist 
epistemology (Lapid 1989), others have pointed out that there is more that divides than 
unites the theorists grouped under this label (Biersteker 1989). Constructivist approaches to 
international relations have found common ground with critical theorists who emphasise 
the constitutive relations between knowledge and power in international relations (Price 
and Reus-Smit 1998). There has also been a greater focus on process across International 
Relations theory as challenges to the traditional substantialism of the discipline have been 
absorbed and accommodated. Mainstream theorists have begun to consider the social 
relations and processes by which agents and structures are formed and reproduced through 
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the practice of world politics.7 Widening the scope of our analysis to include non-state 
actors as participants in the construction and contestation of international relations is 
necessary for a consistently relational approach to the subject.  
Legitimacy 
When I began the research I was operating with a concept of political legitimacy as a 
property of state-society relations. As the research process progressed I began to see that 
CBOs were not just engaged in the contestation and production of state legitimacy, but 
were actively building their own political legitimacy in ways that were directly comparable 
to those of state regimes.  
 The idea that non-state actors are important players in the construction and contestation 
of political legitimacy is gaining acceptance in mainstream International Relations theory. 
Recent work addresses the role of non-state political and civil society organisations in 
contesting and claiming international legitimacy and builds on earlier work in International 
Political Economy (see Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999). In a recent volume, Hall and 
Biersteker (2002, 4) argue that, for many aspects of global governance, non-state political 
actors are bearers of legitimate authority in their own right. The concept of legitimate 
authority employed by Hall and Biersteker (2002, 204) emphasises both that it is a form of 
power based on consent and recognition rather than coercion  and that legitimate authority 
may be held by both state and non-state actors. Another recent collection (Grande and 
Pauly 2005) reaches similar conclusions about transformations in global governance from 
the perspective of states. Grande and Pauly argue that new and complex forms of state 
                                                
7 One area of mainstream international relations theory that has done much to advance a relational approach 
to world politics is that of the English School. For English School theorists however, the most important 
relations are those between states. According to Bull (2002), a minimal core of international norms is 
necessary for any stable international system to be maintained, including mutual recognition of sovereign 
territory and jurisdiction. More substantive norms, such as standards of democracy or human rights, have 
also developed over time to the point where we can speak of an ‘international society of states’. These 
more substantive norms operate in defining the proper relationship between states and also between 
states and populations (Bull 2002, 8-10). This definition of international society is expanded by Martin 
Wight, who distinguishes between pluralist and solidarist conceptions of international society. A pluralist 
international society is one based on a minimal set of norms designed to encourage cooperation between 
states even where they differ on fundamental values and political systems. In contrast, a solidarist 
international society is one where a broader set of norms defines expectations of state behaviour based on 
universal values such as human rights, procedural justice, or democracy (Butterfield and Wight 1966, 52). 
Bull’s concept of an international society and order based on sovereign states is situated within a broader 
concept of world order, defined as ‘those patterns or dispositions of human activity that sustain the 
elementary or primary goals of social life among mankind as a whole’ (Bull 2002, 19). World order is seen 
as wider, more fundamental, and morally prior to international order. Bull’s normative claim that the rules 
and institutions of international society should be promoted rests ultimately on the judgement that the 
goals of international society represent the best contemporary answer to the problem of world order (Bull 
2002, 21). The concepts of world order and world politics as the context for international society in the 
English School approach can be used to introduce the possibility of non-state agency in contesting the 
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sovereignty are emerging through the interaction of state and non-state actors in world 
politics. States have responded to challenges to their legitimacy by forging new 
relationships with non-state political actors, including public-private partnerships with 
commercial firms and consultation with civil society groups (Grande and Pauly 2005, 15). 
The contributors to the Grande and Pauly volume show that studying the relationship 
between states and non-state actors, including global civil society groups, is now of crucial 
importance for understanding political legitimacy.   
 An analysis of consent is of central importance to understanding the political character 
of power and legitimacy in international relations and in political theory more generally 
(Hindess 1996). As Hindess argues, concepts of political consent are at the core of Western 
political philosophy, but are rarely acknowledged as such. Thinkers like Hannah Arendt, 
who made consent an explicit foundation of her theory of power, are commonly seen as 
idiosyncratic exceptions to the tradition of treating power as a functional capacity. 
However, as Hindess (1996, 10-18) argues, this functionalist tradition is largely based on a 
selective reading of key theorists in which arguments about consent are treated as 
unimportant. Analysis of popular consent is central, for instance, to Weber’s theory of 
political legitimacy8, even though the neo-Weberian call to ‘bring the state back in’ to 
                                                                                                                                          
norms of the international system (Buzan 2004). 
8 Legitimacy for Weber (1978) is a property of  a social order, as judged by the actors within that order. 
Weber’s definition of  social action, as that behaviour which in its subjective meaning is oriented to take 
account of  the behaviour of  others, leads him to define a social order as one in which conduct is oriented 
toward more or less binding ‘maxims’ governing interaction. A social order is based on the orientation of  
actors toward maxims, (what we would now call norms), which may be accepted as expedient, customary, or 
legitimate, in order of  relative stability. An expedient norm is one accepted on the basis of  self  interest; the 
instrumentally rational orientation of  social action towards an actor’s own perceived interests. A customary 
norm is accepted out of  habit and usage, based on long standing. In contrast, a norm is legitimate if  it is 
considered by an actor to be both valid and binding (Weber 1978, 31). Weber’s definition of  political 
legitimacy is therefore based on two fundamental elements necessary to avoid the reification and 
naturalisation of  power: it is relational, and it is based on consent in the sense of  an actor’s conscious 
agreement with a norm8.  
Weber’s theory of  social maxims can be easily adapted to a typology of  norms and corresponding 
explanations for behaviour in terms of  social relations. Expedient norms are primarily enforced by social 
relations of  consequences (Horne 2009a, 4-6; March and Olsen 1998, 949-51). Customary norms are 
associated with social relations of  typicality and conformity (Horne 2009a, 9-11). Legitimate norms are 
distinguished by their reliance on social relations of  appropriateness and validity (Horne 2009a, 6-9; March 
and Olsen 1998, 951-2). As March and Olsen (1998, 952) suggest, the logics of  appropriateness and 
consequences are not mutually exclusive explanations for human behaviour and may overlap within the same 
social process. Similarly, the typology of  social norms identified here should be understood – following 
Weber – as a series of  ideal types, representing points on a continuum of  social relations ranging from 
instrumental action to meaningful, value-based consent. Horne (2009a, 11-15) argues that the main 
theoretical explanations for the social enforcement of  norms (consequentialism, meaning, and typicality) can 
each be understood as motivating factors within social relations of  norm enforcement. When considering 
political legitimacy, it is important to pay attention to the everyday social interactions within which acts of  
loyalty and resistance are given meaning, and rewarded or sanctioned (Horne 2009b). The effective legitimacy 
of  a political actor, Horne suggests, is affected by both the motivating factors and the density of  social 
relations through which everyday norms of  support for, or opposition to, the authority of  the actor are 
demonstrated (Horne 2009b, 407-410).  
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International Relations theory (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985) is notably lacking 
a theory of either popular consent or political legitimacy more generally (Seabrooke 2002, 
5). 
 Although Weber’s theory of legitimacy has been influential in sociology, contemporary 
theorists differ on how state legitimacy is to be measured. Beetham (1991) disagrees with 
Weber’s suggestion that state legitimacy is a simple empirical question of popular belief, 
arguing that legitimacy is a judgement that requires normative analysis. Therefore, for 
Beetham (1991, 11) ‘a given power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in 
its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of their beliefs’. Beetham argues that 
the primary criterion of political legitimacy is conformity to established rules for the 
acquisition, transfer, and use of power. The justification of the established rules in terms of 
shared beliefs is a secondary condition, followed by actual evidence of consent by the 
governed (1991, 15-6). While this establishes a hierarchy of criteria, the three aspects of 
legitimacy are expected to be taken together, and each may emerge as most important at 
different times. Regimes based on coercion rather than consent may be justified quite 
elaborately in the legal and moral terms of the powerful, but not translated successfully into 
the terms of the governed. What is important for Beetham’s (1991, 31 emphasis in original) 
definition is that there is a ‘legitimate relationship, justified in terms of shared beliefs, 
regulated according to understood conventions and confirmed through the expression of 
consent’. Therefore, although Beetham emphasises normative analysis over studies of 
popular opinion in the measurement of legitimacy, he maintains Weber’s emphasis on the 
relational and consensual qualities of state legitimacy. 
 The primary point of difference between Beetham’s framework and my usage of the 
concept of legitimacy is one of emphasis. Where Beetham gives central importance to the 
role of a distanced observer in judging legitimacy, the focus in this thesis is on the agency 
of everyday actors. Effectively, the emphasis in this thesis on what Beetham calls ‘actual 
evidence of consent’ inverts his hierarchy of criteria for establishing legitimacy. This does 
not mean that there is no role for judgement in establishing legitimacy, but rather that the 
assumed locus of judgement is shifted from the academic researcher to the participants in 
the research. The approach to consensual legitimacy in this research is concerned with both 
the facts of practice and the interpretation and meaning of practice according to the 
participants. Motivations and self-understandings are considered just as important as 
externally observed acts of compliance or resistance in judging the presence or lack of 
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political legitimacy. 
Learning 
Early in the research process I noticed the extent to which participants emphasised the 
importance of education and training. Education was treated as a priority for national and 
community development by organisations from both Burma and the Philippines. The 
majority of organisations included various forms of education and training as core elements 
of their political organising and community service programmes. This emphasis on 
education in itself seemed to be an interesting finding worthy of further investigation. As I 
progressed with the coding process, and especially once I began to code for relationships 
between organisations, I noticed the central importance of learning processes in the 
relationships between CBOs and communities, and between CBOs and international 
groups. As is discussed further in chapters five and six, the education and training 
programmes being run by CBOs were key to relationship-building between the 
organisations and their base communities, and between CBOs and international groups.  
 Much of the published work on learning in social movements tends to assume the 
emancipatory potential of individual agency based on universal democratic values (see for 
instance Welton 1993b; Walter 2007). Kilgore (1999) challenges the individualist 
assumptions of research on learning in social movements and develops a model of 
collective learning based on an innovative reading of educational psychology in which both 
individuals and collectives are treated as examples of ‘learning systems’. Kilgore argues 
convincingly that learning systems operating at the group level are of central importance 
for the study of social movements (Kilgore 1999, 197). 
 Based on a study of transnational cooperation and the growth in the numbers and 
networks of GCSOs, Smith (1997) argues that political learning processes among 
transnational social movements merit further attention. Smith suggests a working 
hypothesis that ‘political learning on the global stage should produce new 
conceptualisations of politics and appropriate strategies of influence, just as national 
activism has transformed movement strategies and tactics historically’ (Smith 1997, 57). 
 Writing in a western context, Holford (1995) argues that adult educators can play 
important roles as ‘movement intellectuals’, but that the historical link between adult 
education and progressive social movements has largely been broken (Holford 1995, 109). 
The empirical research presented in this chapter provides evidence that, in the context of 
non-western developing countries, adult education and social movements are very much 
connected. Holford’s broader argument about the potential links between the practices of 
adult education and social movements is therefore particularly relevant. 
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 Postcolonial theorists have also interrogated the power relationships involved in 
education and learning processes more generally. In particular, postcolonial theorists have 
drawn links between education and colonisation and have located their critique of 
educational practice within the power relationships of colonial and postcolonial societies. 
For Chatterjee (2001), civil society in colonial and postcolonial societies can itself be seen 
as a pedagogical project. Through an analysis of political practice during India’s struggle for 
independence, Chatterjee shows how practices of civil society, such as public meetings, 
literary societies and their publications, and even funerals, were deliberately encouraged by 
the nationalist elite to give credibility to their campaign for independence. In doing so, civil 
society was constructed as an elite practice of public education which overlaid and 
represented already existing forms of political society in India. When the Bengali poet and 
independence leader Rabindranath Tagore wrote: ‘Our public is still young; its behaviour 
bears the mark of adolescence … such a public needs to be educated, and discussions in 
public meetings are a principal means of education’, Chatterjee argues that he was stating 
‘the fundamental problematic of nationalist modernity under colonial conditions. The 
driving force of colonial modernity is a pedagogical mission’ (Chatterjee 2001, 168). 
 Critical theories of education have also encouraged reflection on the relationship 
between theories and practices of education, with broad implications for understanding the 
connections between ideas and learning processes in political change. The process of 
developing mutual connections between theory and practice is what Freire called ‘praxis’, 
following the usage of the term by earlier Marxist thinkers such as Labriola and Gramsci 
(Adamson 1983, 114; Gramsci 1971, 369). Freire defined praxis as ‘reflection and action 
upon the world in order to transform it’ (Freire 2000, 51), and he saw this as the central 
purpose of education and political learning processes. For Freire, the ideal form of 
education for the purposes of both revolutionary praxis and egalitarian learning is 
described as a dialogical process. A dialogical learning process is one in which a dialogue 
between teacher and student is used to explicitly draw attention to power relations in the 
learning environment and in the wider social context, and to work against inequalities of 
power and privilege (Freire and Shor 1987). The concept of dialogical learning has been 
widely adopted as a guide for creating transformative and emancipatory learning 
relationships (Borda 2001). Bearing in mind the dialogical model when analysing learning 
processes also encourages a focus on the dynamic interactions of social power and 
inequalities in the processes being studied.  
Conclusion 
In the chapters which follow, the results of the empirical research process outlined in this 
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chapter are presented. The research process, including the adaptation of Grounded Theory 
techniques of research design and analysis, allows both a close engagement with the data 
and a rigorous development of emergent themes. Following the relational model that 
emerged in the process of analysis, the presentation of results emphasises the political 
relationships formed by CBOs in local and international contexts. In each of the following 
chapters, the numerous examples and references to the interviews conducted with 
participants follow a thematic structure that emerged from the analysis of the research data 
as a whole. In particular, the concepts of political legitimacy and of learning processes are 
presented in this thesis in accordance with the way they emerged through the research 
process, through a constant conversation with the data provided by the research 
participants.  
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2 
Consensual Power: The Everyday Politics 
of Non-State Legitimacy 
The focus in the following empirical sections is on community-based organisations (CBOs) 
as a particular category of non-state political actors, and specifically four categories of non-
state actors: ethnic groups; women’s groups; student groups; and trade union organisations. 
CBOs may mediate between states and people in the construction and contestation of state 
legitimacy, but they are not necessarily confined to this intermediate role. Rather, CBOs are 
shown to be actively building their own political legitimacy through reciprocal relationships 
with communities. Because consensual legitimacy involves belief as well as action, the 
analysis of the cases engages with both the political actions engaged in by participants and 
their self-identified motivations for these actions. Consensual legitimacy is a quality of 
relationships which are built over time between a political organisation and base 
communities. Consideration of the case studies therefore begins with a brief overview of 
the historical development of opposition movements in Burma and the Philippines, with 
political relationships placed in their historical context in order to understand the 
emergence of consent and dissent. It is argued that non-state opposition groups in both 
countries are engaged in building consensual power through the development of reciprocal 
relationships between the organisations and their base communities. The key aspects of this 
consensual legitimacy are identified as resistance, assistance, and communication. 
Opposition organisations gain popular legitimacy by mobilising resistance to unpopular 
governments and government policies. They build their legitimacy by providing direct 
assistance that meets the immediate needs of their communities. And they sustain 
relationships of consensual legitimacy through practices of reciprocal communication with 
the community. 
Historical Development of Opposition in Burma 
The role of minority ethnic groups as opposition forces in Burma is as old as the 
centralised states of the pre-colonial period. The pre-colonial states system in the region 
can be broadly characterised by the overlapping and competing influence of the Burman, 
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Arakan, Mon, and Shan kingdoms. It was only in the period immediately prior to the 
nineteenth-century British invasions that the Burmese court at Ava attained hegemony in 
the region (Smith 2002, 6-7). However, as Scott (2009) emphasises, the power of the 
lowland kingdoms in the region was in constant tension with the ability of self-governing 
highland peoples to evade and resist the imposition of state rule. Thus, the power of 
groups such as the Kachin, Karen, Palaung, Lahu, Akha, and Chin/Zomi peoples was 
historically based not on state-formation but on state-evasion (Scott 2009, 178-219). As 
well as being the frequent progenitors of anti-state rebellions, the self-governing peoples of 
the hill regions provided zones of refuge for subjects of the lowland states fleeing from 
taxation, conscription, and forced labour (Scott 2009, 142-150).  
 This pattern of highland challenges to lowland state authority has continued through the 
colonial period to the present day. In the immediate post-independence period, the 
attempts of the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) government to establish 
effective sovereignty over the entire territory of Burma as well as a centralised military 
structure were fiercely resisted by the non-Burman ethnic groups. The origins of Burma’s 
contemporary ethnic insurgencies lie in the post-independence imposition of a unitary and 
centralised state structure, exacerbated by subsequent attempts by the central state to seek a 
military solution to the problem of national unity. The ceasefire agreements that many 
ethnic armies signed with the military regime in the 1990s have not addressed the 
underlying political tension between the claims to unitary sovereignty of the central state 
and the demands for autonomy by the non-Burman ethnic organisations. Ethnic 
organisations belonging to the National Democratic Front (NDF) continue to push for a 
political settlement, including constitutional change to a federal structure recognising 
autonomy for ethnic states on Burma's borders. This position is also supported by some 
ceasefire groups such as the New Mon State Party (NMSP), which despite the ceasefire has 
maintained a degree of political and military independence from the regime (interview 33, 
2006). 
 The contemporary women’s movements from Burma have their origins in the struggle 
for full participation and equality for women within the ethnic and student resistance 
organisations. The Burmese Women’s Union was formed in 1995 by women members of 
the ABSDF who were frustrated by the expectations of male leaders that women would 
play an auxiliary role in the struggle, supporting the male leadership (interview 13, 2006). 
For example, women activists in the ABSDF found that the needs of women in the 
organisation and in their base communities were not being adequately represented or 
addressed (interview 12, 2006). While some women activists devoted themselves full-time 
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to the new organisation, many members of the BWU adopted a dual membership and 
retained their roles as activists and soldiers in the ABSDF (interview 13, 2006). In the same 
period during the mid 1990s, women members of the ethnic opposition groups were also 
forming independent women's organisations. As with the student resistance movement, 
women in the insurgent ethnic groups had long been expected to play a supporting role, 
performing duties such as cooking and preparing food for male fighters (interview 22, 
2006). 
 By forming independent organisations such as the Karen Women’s Organisation 
(KWO), Mon Women’s Organisation (MWO), Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN), 
Kachin Women’s Association Thailand (KWAT), and others, women activists have been 
able to focus on issues of importance to women within their communities while also 
promoting the role of women within the political struggle. The women’s movements from 
Burma have therefore been described as a ‘struggle within a struggle’ (Irrawaddy 2010). 
Since establishing independent organisations and the umbrella Women’s League of Burma, 
the women’s movement has taken a leading role in international lobbying to challenge the 
legitimacy of the military regime in Burma (interview 12, 14, 25, 2006). 
 The opposition activism of students in Burma has its origins in the independence 
movement and early opposition to the establishment of military rule. Following 
independence, the All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU) was formed under 
the AFPFL government of the 1950s and in its early years led student strikes and protests 
against government imposition of regulations on student hostels and threats against the 
legal status of the student union (Mannello 1957; Aung Saw Oo 1993). Similar protests 
continued during the military government period from 1958 to 1962. But after General Ne 
Win’s coup d’état in 1962, the military regime no longer tolerated student protest. When 
students at Rangoon University demonstrated against education reforms in 1962, 
government troops fired on the students and dynamited the student union building. After 
political organisations were declared illegal in 1964, underground student organising and 
occasional protest activity continued without a centralised organisation (Aung Saw Oo 
1993). While the mass protests of 1988 marked a resurgence in student participation in the 
opposition movement, the reformulation of student organisations had begun some time 
before. One member of the BWU who had been a student in Kachin state in 1988 
described joining an organisation known as the National Young Student Union, which 
began holding meetings in the area. She became an organiser with the union and took part 
in organising anti-government protests in 1988 (interview 13, 2006). Similar processes of 
secretly reorganising the student movement and mobilising support for anti-government 
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protests were going on in all parts of the country (interview 2, 3, 8, 2006). Student activists, 
organisers and leaders emerged from the process of organising the underground student 
movement and went on to play leading roles in challenging the legitimacy of the military 
regime. In 1988, for example, students were at the forefront of organising and leading 
protests in urban areas, as well as spreading word of the uprising to rural areas (Aung Saw 
Oo 1993; interviews, 2006). 
 The role of the trade unions and the workers’ movement in Burmese politics followed a 
similar trajectory to that of the student movement, emerging as a political force in the 
struggle for independence. The British colonial government’s repression of the nationalist 
Thakin movement led to a series of protest strikes, out of which the first trade union 
federation, the All Burma Trade Union Congress (ABTUC), was formed in 1939. The 
involvement of the ABTUC in opposition activity continued after independence, with the 
organisation of a successful general strike in 1949 to oppose state servant layoffs and pay 
cuts (NLD 1997). Although the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) played a significant role 
in the initial formation of the ABTUC, this role decreased after independence as the CPB 
focused on rural armed struggle. By the time of its collapse in 1989, the CPB’s influence 
was confined to areas on the borders with Thailand and China, and the organisation had 
little contact with workers’ organisations (Lintner 1990). Overt trade union activity went 
into abeyance during the 1962-1988 period of military rule. The underground workers 
movement continued to organise itself as an opposition force, however, with widespread 
anti-government strikes occurring in 1974 without centralised leadership (Lintner 1990, 28). 
This pattern continued during the wave of anti-government protests in 1988, with 
workplace and township strike committees formed to coordinate general strikes and to take 
part in protests (interview 15, 5, 2006). Activists from the workers’ movement then met to 
re-form the national trade union movement, first in Rangoon in September 1988 and later 
on the Thai-Burma border in 1991. At this stage, the Federation of Trade Unions of Burma 
was formed to bring together affiliated unions, organise an underground labour movement, 
and oppose the military regime in Burma (interview 14, 2006; FTUB 2010). 
Historical Development of Opposition in the Philippines 
In the Philippines, the contemporary organisations of the extra-parliamentary legal 
opposition have their immediate origins in the struggle against the Marcos regime. During 
the period of martial law, a significant role in maintaining opposition to the regime was 
played by the underground organisation of the Communist Party of the Philippines, which 
attracted many activists from previously legal organisations, such as student and trade 
unions, which had been suppressed by the regime (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 219). 
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Opposition to the government under martial law was also maintained by armed groups. In 
addition to the communist guerrilla forces under the New People’s Army, ethnic- and 
religious-based movements maintained anti-government insurgencies in the Mindanao and 
Cordillera regions. Anti-government mobilisations among the Cordillera peoples centred 
on opposition to large-scale development projects such as the Chico dam promoted by the 
Marcos regime (interview 3, 2008).  Anti-government organising gathered pace after the 
government backed the assassination of popular opposition leader Benigno ‘Ninoy’ Aquino 
in August 1983 and the manipulation of elections in 1984. A broad, urban-based 
opposition movement formed, largely independent of the CPP, but with widespread 
support among left-wing students and workers and from sections of the church and 
military (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 221-3).  
 In this period of organising against the Marcos regime, the women’s movements 
emerged as an important mobilisation structure. In October 1983, a rally of 10,000 women, 
the first mass mobilisation under martial law, challenged the legitimacy of the Marcos 
regime. The following March, GABRIELA was formed as a national network of women’s 
organisations to fight for democracy (interview 4, 2008). In 1985, BAYAN was formed as 
an umbrella organisation to lead anti-government protesters, bringing together more than a 
thousand people’s organisations, including established alliances such as GABRIELA, 
militant unions under the KMU, and student and peasant organisations (interview 2, 2008; 
BAYAN, 2010a). This democratic movement provided the organisational base for the 
‘people power’ revolution in 1986 (Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 224-5). The mass 
community-based organisations affiliated to BAYAN subsequently played a leading role in 
the ousting of President Estrada in 2001 (interview 1,2, 2008). 
Constructing Consensual Power: Legitimate Non-State Actors 
For the community-based organisations in this study, an important aspect of legitimacy is 
the reciprocity of the relationships with their base communities. Reciprocity means that the 
people and the organisation need each other and, in the extreme case, depend on each 
other for their continued existence. Reciprocity is distinct from, though compatible with, 
representation as a basis for consensual legitimacy. While representational forms of 
legitimacy require that people consent to an organisation representing their interests, 
reciprocal legitimacy requires a consensual relationship of mutual need. This point was 
made explicitly by the spokesperson of one of the smaller organisations in the study, the 
Palaung State Liberation Front, who emphasised the importance of reciprocity in the 
original founding of the Palaung movements. On the one hand, the Palaung community 
came to see the organisation as protecting them and acting in their interests. On the other 
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hand, the organisation recognised that their purpose for existing depended on the 
community and their support for the organisation (interview 34, 2006).  
 The extent to which organisations in the study have cultivated reciprocal relationships 
of consensual legitimacy can be seen by how effectively the organisation meets the needs of 
the community in ways which make the involvement of the community indispensable for 
the organisation. The focus in the remainder of this chapter is on three dimensions of the 
construction of consensual power, including strategies of resistance, assistance, and 
communication. While common terms such as these have broader meanings, both in academic 
discourse and across different societies and cultures, this chapter illustrates that an 
important component of the everyday politics of democratic opposition is how the 
meaning of particular strategies is a product of concrete political practices – whereby the 
substance of social norms and forms of political contestation is enacted via ‘meaning-in-
use’ (Wiener 2009). 
Resistance 
For people suffering under military and political repression, mobilising resistance is an 
important need. The consensual legitimacy of opposition groups in terms of resistance 
depends on the extent to which they successfully mobilise popular support against a 
regime. During the Burmese democracy protests of 1988, the common experience of 
oppression by the government created a wide base of support for the protests. Many of the 
members of the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) who were interviewed 
for this study had been active in organising the 1988 protests in different geographic areas, 
before they came together in the border region to form the student army. Burma’s border 
zones have been highly significant as a refuge for opposition groups, both inside the 
country in the ‘liberated areas’ controlled by armed resistance groups like the Karen 
National Union (KNU) / Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and in the border 
regions of Thailand, Bangladesh, and India (see Callahan 2005, Smith 1999)9.  
 The 1988 democracy movement in Burma was not limited to actors involved in 
community-based organisations, opposition political parties, or full-time social activists, but 
drew political backing and assistance from a broad cross-section of the population. As one 
member of the ABSDF described it: ‘the majority of people supported the protests, not 
                                                
9 In the time since the fall of the KNU headquarters at Manerplaw in 1995 (see Fong 2008, 168-70) the 
geographical space controlled by opposition groups on the Thai-Burma border has steadily diminished, 
with armed resistance groups either resorting to guerrilla tactics or signing ceasefire agreements with the 
regime. In 2009, some of the last remaining fixed territory positions held by the KNU/KNLA, including 
one of the areas visited in the course of this research, were overrun in a joint operation by SPDC and 
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just students but also workers, servants, housewives’ (interview 3, 2006). Another ABSDF 
member described widespread support for the democracy movement in Karen state: ‘A lot 
of officials resigned from their positions. They joined demonstrations. Doctors, engineers, 
ruling class, even police officers, customs officers, from different sectors supported 
peaceful demonstrations’ (interview 8, 2006). Others described the process of mobilising 
people from their home communities to join the protests. One ABSDF member had been 
a student at the time of the uprising. When the universities were closed by the regime, he 
was sent home to his village where, like many other student radicals, he continued 
organising: ‘In the 1988 uprising I was in our village. We set a demonstration camp in our 
village. We tried to organise the villagers who lived in our village. We tried to explain to 
them about the government’. Another activist who later joined the ABSDF was a peasant 
living in a rural village at the time. He described hearing about the protests by word of 
mouth and then taking part in meetings of the village social committees (Khalada Puy) to 
discuss the news and a collective response: ‘During the uprising in 1988 there are a lot of 
people who suffer lack of food. The price of the food is very high. Most of the people have 
not enough food to eat for their survival. In their section they try to meet as Khalada Puy, 
women’s and men’s organisation to discuss about the situation, how to have the protest 
uprising’ (interview 5, 2006). When the ABSDF was formed as a resistance organisation on 
the border, its legitimacy with the border communities was initially based on the reputation 
that the students had gained as leaders of the 1988 resistance movement. As one ABSDF 
member, who had been a student himself, put it: ‘students had a good reputation: selfless, 
committed, to fight for the people of Burma, not for themselves’ (interview 8, 2006). 
 Once a CBO has become established in the leadership of popular resistance in Burma, 
the legitimacy of that organisation can be assessed via the level of popular support for 
resistance, in terms of both cooperation and material support (interview 22 and 34, 2006). 
With respect to forms of cooperation, the legitimacy and popular support of resistance 
organisations enables their ability to move freely through contested areas by relying on 
information from villagers. Resistance groups in the border areas, such as the KNLA, are 
then able to offer safe passage to other groups such as trade unions to enable them to 
organise in their area (interviews 15, 16, 2006). This cooperation is reciprocal in that 
members of organisations such as the KNLA who are moving through the border areas 
exchange information with villagers and internally displaced people about movements of 
government troops (interview 19, 2006). This ability of opposition organisations to warn 
people in border communities of approaching government troops constitutes an important 
                                                                                                                                          
DKBA troops (Saw Yan Naing 2009). 
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factor in the popular legitimacy of groups such as the ABSDF and KNLA. With such 
warnings, relayed in person or by radio, communities are able to keep one step ahead of the 
soldiers and move to protect their lives, food stocks, and animals (interviews 5 and 16, 
2006). This mode of reciprocal relationship based on information and safe movement 
between communities and armed resistance organisations is most pronounced in the free-
fire zones of active conflict in Karen state. But a similar relationship exists between 
resistance groups and local communities in areas of armed tension such as Arakan state and 
Shan state. In these areas, resistance groups with small armed forces such as the Arakan 
Liberation Party or the Palaung State Liberation Front also rely on the support of the 
community in order to be able to move through the area (interviews 10, 34).  
 For the Cordillera People’s Alliance (CPA) in the Philippines, the legitimacy of the 
organisation is seen primarily in terms of a reputation for struggling alongside the people. 
In a practical sense, this reputation is constructed and mobilised within the practices of 
organising and educating at the community level, as well as networking in local and 
international contexts. In describing the international recognition of the organisation by 
other grassroots organisations, the CPA’s general secretary emphasised the importance of 
the organisation’s commitment to local struggles in building its reputation and legitimacy:  
...they know that our cause is just and legitimate and even to the last drop of  our 
blood, we are committed to such cause, even if  it means death, we do not 
surrender, so we speak on high moral ground. It is not for our self-interest or 
opportunism, but it’s really for the people’s cause (interview 3, 2008). 
With regard to the CPA’s base communities, the legitimacy of the organisation, including 
its reputation of leadership in social struggles, is based on ongoing practices of community 
organising and education. The CPA has organised programs of political education designed 
to provide the ‘necessary analytical tools’ to the ‘root causes of the issues and basic 
problems of the people, as a distinct people'. The idea of the Cordillera peoples as a 
distinct group within the Filipino nation is a prominent part of the way that the CPA 
frames its involvement in broader popular movements in the Philippines, for instance, in 
connecting the demand for self-determination in the form of autonomy for the Cordillera 
region with the broader struggles of national liberation. This analysis guides the 
organisation's practice of building a regional alliance of Cordillera peoples, including a 
diverse range of indigenous groups in the area. It also legitimates the integration of the 
CPA into national networks of Philippine nationalist organisations and its affiliation to 
BAYAN. The nationalist orientation of the CPA, together with its guiding principles of 
self-determination and defence of ancestral lands, are conceived of in practical terms. The 
40 
 
organisation is understood by its leadership not as guided by abstract political principles 
but rather as ‘the concrete expression of the people's movement’ (interview 3, 2008). The 
materialism of this statement implies more than a certain influence of Marxist rhetoric 
which is common in the Philippines. It reveals an understanding of the organisation as 
based on its concrete relations with people and the land. The political goal of defending 
ancestral land is based on an analysis of these concrete relations more than any abstract 
principle: ‘[we] cannot exist any more as distinct indigenous peoples without a material base 
for our existence, and that is precisely our ancestral land’ (interview 3, 2008). From its 
inception, the CPA has been involved in coordinating local campaigns in defence of 
ancestral lands, from the campaigns against the Chico dam and Cellophil projects of the 
Marcos era, to the contemporary threats posed by multi-national logging companies. The 
repertoire of contention in these campaigns has ranged from information sharing and local 
organising, to coordinated direct action and protest, to political and legal challenges 
through national institutions.  The dynamics of both armed and non-armed resistance are 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter.  
Assistance 
Providing direct assistance to communities in their areas is a priority for most of the groups 
in this study. In this respect, the network of social relationships that activist organisations 
establish with their base communities forms an essential component of their legitimation 
strategies (as well as representing an important terrain in which state legitimacy is 
contested, such as when community-based organisations substitute for – or compete with – 
inadequate state provision of public goods and community needs). For example, numerous 
participants in the study expressed the view that communities who had received support 
from an organisation for their basic needs would be more likely to regard that organisation 
as legitimate. This is not simply an instrumental process of buying support, but is more a 
case of a community judging an organisation on its actions. An organisation which looks 
after the needs of the community is more likely to be seen as genuine in their desire to 
work with the people, and consequently is more likely to gain the support of the 
community. One ABSDF member described this effect in relation to the families of 
children who attended the school that the organisation had founded in its border camp: 
ABSDF provides some of  the education assistance to the people who live in the 
frontline area. For example they bring some of  the children from the frontline area. 
They provide shelter to them and teach them at the ABSDF school. So the 
children’s parents know what is the ABSDF, how they have helped them, so they 
support them. This is one kind of  support from the community. (interview 3, 2006) 
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Activists’ responses indicate a strongly principled belief that their organisations have a 
responsibility to meet the needs of their base communities. As a spokesperson described 
the activities of the New Mon State Party, ‘it is acting as a political party in Mon state. But 
while they are doing that, they also have a responsibility for the people in Mon state, for 
their education, for their health, for their development’ (interview 33, 2006). The legitimacy 
of community-based organisations is therefore contingent upon a sense of responsibility to 
the community, expressed in this case through various forms of direct assistance to meet 
the needs of the community.  
 In the process of organising women in grassroots communities in the Philippines, the 
GABRIELA women’s network follows a process of identifying community needs and 
finding collective solutions. An organiser will visit a community, often by request, and 
discuss the needs of the women as part of a social investigation of the situation of the 
women in the community. On the basis of this investigation, organisers recommend 
programs to organise in the area and request support from the regional chapter of 
GABRIELA. The support available to local member groups depends in part on the 
priorities identified in GABRIELA's national action plan, which in turn is decided at an 
annual conference with participation of delegates from local groups and regional chapters. 
The national secretary of GABRIELA stressed that this general program of action ‘is very 
wide, so when you go down to the community they define it based on their own needs and 
based on their own issues’ (interview 4, 2008). As programs are implemented, organisers 
train local organisers from the community to take over the tasks of running the programs 
and organising their community as part of the GABRIELA network. If the projects are 
successful, the organisation develops a reputation for effectiveness. On hearing about the 
results, neighbouring communities contact the organisation to request that they too be 
organised, a process which the chairperson of GABRIELA referred to as the ‘multiplier 
effect’ of community organising (interview 4, 2008). 
Communication 
Communication is an essential ingredient in the reciprocal relationships that constitute the 
popular legitimacy of opposition groups. In the process of communication, popular 
legitimacy rests on understandings and experiences of oppression, combined with a 
political framework for translating this experience into action. This mutual understanding is 
formed in the process of community organising and propagandising, while also drawing 
heavily on narratives of national identity. Identity-construction processes represent a 
powerful source of legitimation (both among elite and non-elite actors) at the same time as 
offering a potent resource for the contestation of state legitimacy. Indeed, as Cummings 
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(Cummings 2006, 180) suggests, ‘The way in which identification is developed and 
transforms... matters for various groups’ economic, political, and social resources’. This is 
relevant whether the group in question is comprised of elite actors or community-based 
organisations operating at the local everyday level.  
 An important source of legitimacy for each of the organisations in the study is therefore 
their role in promoting and enabling the self-definition of a community. Such identity-
building practices can of course operate in more than one dimension of group affiliation. 
For example, for the majority of organisations in Burma this means being based – first and 
foremost – on an ethnic definition of community. For long-standing ethnic organisations 
such as the Karen National Union (KNU), New Mon State Party (NMSP), and Arakan 
Liberation Party (ALP), the history of the organisation has been closely tied to the recent 
history of their ethnic community. Through a long-term process of building support in the 
community, these organisations have become closely associated with the survival and 
political destiny of the people. Within the ethnic community, organisations also create 
particular constituencies for themselves, representing women, youth, or workers. These 
organisations are then able to derive legitimacy both from their contribution to the 
development of their ethnic community, and from their cross-ethnic links to other groups 
of women, youth, or workers. Some organisations have attempted to cultivate these cross-
ethnic constituencies as their primary community – women in the case of the BWU, 
students for the ABSDF, and workers for the FTUB – with varying degrees of success. In 
these examples, actors have engaged in at least three forms of constructing group affiliation 
and common identity, based on ethnicity, intra-ethnic sectoral identities, and inter-ethnic sectoral 
identities. 
 One important historical example of the role of community-based organisations in the 
construction of group identity in Burma is the emergence of the dominant Palaung faction 
that formed the PSLO in 1976. The emergence of the PSLO amid shifting ethnic alliances 
was attributed to the successful community organising of activists loyal to Mai Kwan Tong 
(interview 34, 2006 and Mai Aik Phone 2006, 52-3). The present-day PSLF makes claims to 
legitimacy in part by its claim to be the true inheritor of the political line of Mai Kwan 
Tong. For the purpose of this claim to legitimacy, it suits the PSLF to present the legacy of 
Mai Kwan Tong in terms of timeless aims and objectives and a heroic narrative of Palaung 
nationalism, and the claim that this legacy is embodied by the new organisation. 
During the PNF, Palaung National Front is still combined with the Shan 
organisation, so they don’t have clear aim and objective. After that Mai Kwan Tong 
set up the Palaung political wing and armed wing for Palaung political movement. 
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So now most people will accept that he is our hero, our Palaung hero. (interview 34, 
2006) 
This quote, from the contemporary leader of the PSLF, makes reference to the heroic 
narrative of Palaung independence from the Shan organisations, a discursive link which is 
continued in publications of the PSLF (Palaung State Liberation Front 2010; Mai Aik 
Phone 2006). However, when discussing the historical context for the formation of the 
Palaung organisations, the PSLF spokesperson emphasised the lessons to be drawn from 
the strategic community organising carried out by Mai Kwan Tong's dominant Palaung 
faction. At the same time as negotiating military alliances, this faction which formed the 
PSLO was sending community organisers to all the Palaung communities, crossing 
previous boundaries of kinship and loyalty and spreading a message of Palaung 
nationalism.  
 This narrative emphasises the constructed nature of Palaung nationalism. It also defines 
the legacy of the 1970s leaders as much in terms of community organising as of national 
heroism. Both narratives, of national heroism and of community organising, are relevant to 
the legitimacy claims of the contemporary PSLF. On the one hand, the narrative of 
national heroism provides ideational resources which help the leadership to appeal to the 
loyalty of Palaung communities. Identifying as a nation is also an advantage for seeking 
recognition from outsiders, as it fits easily with existing understandings of the rights of self-
determination accruing to nations. On the other hand, the narrative of community 
organising provides the leadership and activists of the contemporary organisation with a 
model of a successful strategy for mobilising popular support. In practice, the two 
narratives are compatible, suggesting a strategy for mobilising popular support through 
both community organising and appeals to national loyalty, even though this involves 
combining two narratives which rest on quite different conceptions of the sources of 
national identity.  
 This integration of claims to legitimacy based on community organising and national 
identity was common to most of the groups in the study. The majority of active CBOs 
were connected to an ethno-nationalist organisation recognised by their base community. 
Women's and youth organisations were often formed in association with ethnic 
organisations, both to further the goals of the ethnic organisations and to promote reform 
within them. Although in formal terms the women's and youth organisations were often 
either loosely connected or entirely autonomous from the ethnic organisations, there was a 
clear sense that they were connected by relations of recognition and legitimacy. For 
instance, the Kachin Women's Association in Thailand (KWAT) had had no formal 
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relationship or contact with the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) since the latter 
had signed a ceasefire agreement with the SPDC regime, yet a spokesperson for KWAT 
described the KIO as follows: 
KIO is the heart of  our Kachin people. That’s why it is very important, they should 
understand for Kachin people, what Kachin local people facing problems and they 
should consult them and listen to the Kachin people’s voice and they should 
involve to protect and to get democracy for Burma (interview 23, 2006). 
This was a particularly clear statement of a common theme in which the legitimacy of a 
CBO was based both on an emotional identification of the organisation with national 
loyalty and on an expectation of reciprocal communication and advocacy. CBOs organised 
around groups within the community, such as women and youth, would associate 
themselves with the ethno-nationalist organisation for their community to the extent that 
the latter had established authority based on identification with ethno-nationalist values and 
on procedures of reciprocal communication.   
 Communication also has a more generalised relevance to the legitimacy of CBOs in the 
region, as they function as conduits to access international flows of information. Numerous 
activists describe their involvement with a community-based organisation as their first 
opportunity for contact with the world outside Burma, with consequent opportunities for 
education and personal development. Organisations are aware of the importance of these 
experiences, and often run dedicated internship programmes for the purpose of bringing 
emerging activists across the border for exposure and training programmes. These 
opportunities entail a responsibility to use the awareness and education gained to serve the 
community. Interns from KWAT also expressed a sense of responsibility to use their 
relatively greater access to the international community to communicate the suffering and 
experience of their communities inside Burma (interview 23). 
 CBOs in the study were able to establish channels of reciprocal communication with 
relative ease in their base communities due to the shared linguistic and cultural background 
of activists and community members. When asked about differences between local and 
international forms of communication, a spokesperson for the Karen Women's 
Organisation emphasised a combination of cultural factors and shared experience:  
If  you talk to the people in our grassroots communities it’s like they’re your 
communities and feel more close to them … I think for the community inside 
Karen state there is not much you have to talk about Burma and the brutality of  
the SPDC, because they experience it, they know already (interview 25, 2006). 
Another participant, a medic with the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), described 
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participating in processes of consultation between Karen National Union (KNU) 
representatives and villagers from her area. The KNU representative would visit the area 
and meet with the village headman, who would then call a meeting of the whole village. 
When asked about the differences between talking to villagers and talking to the author in 
the interview process, the KNLA medic responded: ‘We are very similar to the villagers, so 
you can speak freely, not be afraid it’s the right answer or wrong answer, or have no idea’ 
(interview 19, 2006). This response illustrates the importance of social and cultural affinity 
as a precondition for reciprocal communication and thus legitimacy. 
 Among the Philippines opposition movements, community organising is again clearly of 
primary importance as the basis of the legitimacy of non-state organisations. The 
organisation of resistance to unpopular policies or branches of the state, as well as the 
organisation of assistance to meet the needs of the community, were important aspects of 
community organising. Whereas in Burma, the desperate situations of communities in 
terms of repression and deprivation could make community organising seem like a means 
to the more immediate ends of resistance or assistance, for the Philippines groups, the 
organisation of resistance and assistance were clearly integrated into a long-term strategy of 
community organising. 
 Opposition organisations in the Philippines use communication to mobilise support 
from base communities and to encourage potential activists to join the organisation. 
Anakbayan, the youth wing of the BAYAN movement, describe their primary purpose as 
being to ‘arouse, organise and mobilise the Filipino youth for the national democratic 
aspirations of the Filipino people’ (interview 1, 2008). The chairperson of Anakbayan 
emphasised the role of ideas and experience in motivating youth to get involved and take 
action for political change. Anakbayan's programs of alternative education and ‘basic 
masses integration’, designed to expose youth activists to the realities of life for the urban 
and rural poor, are therefore crucial aspects of their organising programme. These 
programmes seek to develop the political consciousness of youth activists and their 
attachment to the organisation. ‘It starts with some observations, curiosity, a sense of 
awareness, then it could lead to some political consciousness, which will be more 
systematic if you are a part of the organisation’ (interview 1, 2008). The program of 
alternative education is also a form of direct action, gaining legitimacy for the organisation 
by efforts to directly realise their goals for nationalist, ‘pro-people’, and scientific education, 
without waiting for the state to deliver it. The organisation’s view is that the need for 
popular education ‘will not just begin when the state performs its role, so we have our own 
initiatives and activities that we do now’ (interview 1, 2008). The ultimate aim of organising 
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youth for Anakbayan is to develop activists to take part in campaigns and mass struggles 
which ‘involve taking up the issues of the basic masses and advancing their interests and 
welfare’ (interview 1, 2008). Therefore, the legitimacy of the organisation with regards to its 
membership depends largely on its degree of success in creating opportunities to become 
involved in politics and to learn the skills and political analysis necessary for being a 
political activist. The organisation also has a broader legitimacy with regards to the general 
population, which depends on the degree to which its members are visibly involved in 
political campaigns and outreach work with relevance to ordinary people. 
 The importance of popular education for building the legitimacy of community-based 
organisations is also emphasised by the KMU union federation. The general secretary of 
the KMU described the popular education carried out by the federation as operating on 
three levels of analysis. The first level is designed to introduce the concept of rights, which 
gives legitimacy to union activities and de-legitimises government repression. The second 
level is concerned with the politics of government and includes discussion of international 
politics and sovereignty, in order to place the economic problems of the Philippines in an 
international context. The third level involves developing an analysis of social and political 
change, together with a vision of an alternative social and political order as an orientation 
for collective action (interview 5, KMU). 
 Organisations are also able to build legitimacy through communication by working to 
resolve communal and intercommunal conflicts. In seeking regional unity among the 
different peoples of the Cordillera, the CPA had to find strategies to overcome the many 
intercommunal conflicts which would occasionally erupt into warfare between 
neighbouring groups. One strategy that was used to achieve this was to convene a council 
of elders from member communities who are recognised as influential ‘in the natural 
course of their leadership and respect and credibility and service to the community’ 
(interview 3, 2008). By facilitating solutions to intercommunal conflicts, the CPA gained 
legitimacy. This was especially true in the case of an institution such as the elders’ council, 
where the CPA could tap into an existing source of legitimacy by gaining the support of 
legitimate leaders of the community. As these examples from the Philippines show, the 
political values of the organisation – self-determination and defence of ancestral lands – 
only make sense when situated in the particular context of concrete relationships with the 
land and people. Likewise, the legitimacy of the organisation in the community is not 
measured in abstract terms in relation to goals and outcomes, but is situated within 
concrete social relations and practices which make up the organisational repertoire of the 
group. Over time, as CPA activists have demonstrated commitment and practical solidarity 
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for local causes, the legitimacy of the organisation in local communities has grown 
(interview 3, 2008). 
Conclusion 
Community-based opposition organisations develop political legitimacy based on popular 
consent, illustrated in this chapter through the cases of Burma and the Philippines. More 
specifically, the consensual legitimacy of CBOs is based on sustained reciprocal 
relationships between the organisation and the community. These relationships take time 
to build and are based on the development of a shared history of political struggle. In 
particular, organisations gain consensual legitimacy when they enable the community to 
resist oppression, gain assistance to meet their needs, and establish positive channels of 
communication between the organisation and the community. Consensual legitimacy is the 
basis for the power of opposition organisations, as it enables them to count on the practical 
and political support of a community. In situations where the state is seen as an oppressive 
force, opposition CBOs are able to mobilise on the basis of consensual legitimacy to 
challenge the legitimacy of the state. The following chapter turns to this dynamic to 
understand how and why non-state actors in Burma and the Philippines are mobilising 
challenges to the legitimacy of the governments of those countries.  
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3 
Resisting Oppression: The Everyday 
Politics of Challenges to State Legitimacy 
 
State regimes, by definition, are based on hierarchical power relationships between 
governing decision-makers and governed subjects. As a consequence of this political 
hierarchy, power must be constituted through the consent of the governed in order for a 
state to enjoy a broad level of regime legitimacy. Following the typology set out by Nincic 
(2005, 13), if states are defined by ‘whom they govern’, and a government ‘by who is 
governing’, we can define a state regime as ‘how and why a government governs’. Likewise, 
the study of regime legitimacy is not simply about ‘who’ is governing and ‘whom’ is being 
governed, but instead centres on the rightfulness and – crucially – the social validity of how 
and why a government governs. 
 This leads to the question of how to measure popular consent and hence establish the 
legitimacy of state power. In contrast to rationalist approaches (see Levi, et al., 2009), which 
define legitimacy narrowly in terms of ‘value-based legitimacy’ (‘a sense of obligation or 
willingness to obey authorities’) that quasi-automatically translates into ‘behavioural 
legitimacy’ (‘compliance with governmental regulations and laws’), processes of legitimation 
are understood in this thesis as broader political dynamics that encompass not just a 
willingness to comply with formal procedures but also a practical process whereby non-
state actors must confer legitimacy upon a state through consent (cf. Seabrooke 2006, 9-12).  
The approach to consensual legitimacy developed in previous chapters follows Weber 
(1978) in arguing that studying legitimacy in terms of consent requires an inquiry into the 
meaning of social action and hence the motivations of actors – not just the assumed social 
validity (or lack thereof) of governmental actions and issues of procedural justice. The 
motivations of non-state actors in contesting or consenting to state power and in 
constructing alternative projects of political legitimacy are therefore of central importance. 
In particular, an analysis of the legitimacy of a state in terms of popular consent requires an 
investigation of the practices of everyday politics within which state-society relations are 
situated and reproduced (Migdal 1988, 24-33). In this chapter, the approach to political 
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legitimacy developed in the foregoing discussion, based on relations of political consent, is 
applied to an analysis of challenges to state legitimacy in Burma and the Philippines. 
 State legitimacy is conceptualised as a special case of political legitimacy, defined as a 
property of power relations based on consent. Studying the legitimacy of states in terms of 
power relations between governors and governed both requires and contributes to an 
analysis of the state as embedded in social relations. Legitimacy has both a descriptive and a 
normative content as it deals with the issue of consent, which operates at the intersection 
of belief and practice. These theoretical considerations open several empirical lines of 
enquiry for studying political legitimacy in practice. Social practices involved in the 
construction and contestation of state legitimacy include: state policies and practices which 
mobilise people to consent to state power, or provoke dissent (Alagappa 1995); the 
organised politics of non-state groups which mobilise consent or dissent towards state 
power (Boudreau 2004); and the everyday politics of people’s lives which either engage 
with or circumvent state power (Kerkvliet 2005; Thawnghmung 2004). 
 Popular consent – which forms the basis of political legitimacy – is embodied in the 
norms of everyday politics. Even in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, the 
capacity and stability of the state can be limited by popular opposition activity that 
challenges the legitimacy of the regime (Horne 2009, 37-50). As Lyall (2006) argues, even 
authoritarian states rely on public forms of rhetorical legitimation which can be exploited 
by opposition groups highlighting inconsistencies between the policies and practices of the 
regime. Faced with popular challenges to their legitimacy, state agencies choose between 
strategies of coercion and legitimation to seek compliance, with most agencies choosing 
hybrid strategies most of the time (Lyall 2006, 378-380). 
 Opposition activists in both Burma and the Philippines blame the state for failing to 
meet the needs of the people, particularly for education and economic development. In 
doing so, opposition activists are invoking popular expectations which they are also 
involved in mobilising and constructing. From this common base of concerns, groups 
from the two countries diverge in the ways they frame the issues of education and 
development and hence the character of the solutions they propose. By setting education 
and development as standards by which to judge the present state, opposition groups are 
also making claims about the ability of a rival political order to perform better in these 
areas. Again, groups from Burma and the Philippines diverge in the form of political order 
they advocate, based on their own political circumstances and traditions. In both countries, 
regardless of the particular form of the state, meeting the people’s needs for education and 
economic development is a key requirement for the state to establish popular legitimacy.  
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 Opposition community-based organisations in Burma and the Philippines describe the 
state as a hostile force, responsible for military and political repression of activists and their 
base communities. These charges are highly significant for consideration of state legitimacy 
as they provide both a motivation for popular opposition to the state and an explanation 
for how the state maintains its power in the absence of consensual legitimacy. Where state 
elites are unable to rely on popular consent in the daily exercise of government, they fall 
back on coercion and repression to maintain effective power. This pattern of repression is 
repeated in various forms and to varying degrees through the two case studies. Repression 
in both Burma and the Philippines has occasioned international condemnation and 
damaged the international legitimacy of these states.  
 Regional recognition and support has been important for the SLORC/SPDC regime in 
Burma, as it has faced strong condemnation from Western countries led by the USA and 
EU as well as multilateral organisations (BBC 2007; Salai Pi Pi 2009). Membership in 
ASEAN, as well as bilateral relations with its neighbours, has been important for the 
regime to maintain some degree of moral and practical support in shoring up its contested 
international legitimacy. Of Burma in 2002, Clark (2003, 130) was able to write: ‘The 
beginnings of political legitimacy for Burma can largely be attributed to its membership in 
ASEAN’. ASEAN countries have, however, been increasingly unwilling to offer 
unqualified support to the regime. The level of criticism of Burma within ASEAN reached 
the point that, when it was Burma’s turn to take the chair of ASEAN in 2005, the Junta 
decided to forgo this right (James 2006, 165). According to a joint statement released after 
the 2006 ASEAN ministerial, delegates ‘expressed concern on the pace of the national 
reconciliation process and hope to see tangible progress that would lead to peaceful 
transition to democracy in the near future’, and reiterated ‘calls for the early release of 
those placed under detention and for effective dialogue with all parties concerned.’ 
(ASEAN 2006) While the statement was very mildly worded, it represented a significant 
departure from ASEAN’s usual policy of not making public comment on the internal 
affairs of member states.  
 The focus in this chapter, however, is on the effect that state repression has in shaping 
the relationship between the state and the communities within its borders. To the extent 
that the state-society relationship becomes characterised by repression, consensual 
legitimacy is precluded and replaced by coercion. The situation in Burma is an extreme 
case, in which the state functions almost entirely as a coercive and repressive apparatus. 
However, this political closure can never be entirely complete and even in the case of 
Burma the survival of the regime depends on the tacit consent of sections of the 
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populations, together with the reluctant compliance of others (Thawnghmung 2004).
 Unlike the SPDC regime in Burma, the Philippines government under recent 
administrations has not faced any significant international challenges to its legitimate 
existence or to its participation in international bodies. On the basic standard of 
recognition then, the Philippines regime is accorded international legitimacy. With regard 
to more substantive international norms, the international reputation of the regime has 
been somewhat tarnished by domestic challenges to the legitimacy of the regime, in 
particular, challenges based on military repression and abuses of human rights. While not as 
extreme or as generalised as in the case of Burma, politically targeted repression is also 
much in evidence in the Philippines, effectively undermining the government’s claims to 
popular legitimacy. Reports by states and international human rights organisations have 
linked sections of the armed forces of the Philippines to extra-judicial killings, 
disappearances, and other abuses of human rights (Amnesty International 2006; USA 
Department of State 2008). Campaigners in the Philippines report that international 
pressure on the Philippines was significant enough to compel action by the President, 
resulting in a reduction in reported human rights violations (interview 1, 2008). 
 This chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, I examine the sources of state 
legitimacy through an exploration of the role of religion, nationalism, and patronage 
networks. The second section analyses the motivations for non-state actors to contest state 
legitimacy, focusing on the failure of the state to effectively provide basic public goods as 
well as threats to community safety through military oppression. The third and final section 
of this chapter discusses the processes and practices employed by non-state actors to 
challenge state authority through everyday politics.  
The Politics of Regime Legitimacy in Burma and the Philippines 
The sources of regime legitimacy are manifold and may vary both across different societies 
and within the same society at different points in time. Potential sources of legitimation for 
an incumbent regime are not without risk, and can often serve as a double-edged sword. 
For example, some of the most salient sources of actual or potential regime legitimacy in 
Burma and the Philippines include the role of religion, democratic elections, national 
identity, and patronage networks, each of which is discussed in further detail below. Yet 
each of these possible sources of legitimacy may also open a regime to political entrapment 
by opposition activities, whereby elite strategies to pursue legitimation are effectively 
turned back against the regime itself (see Lyall 2006). 
 For many societies, regime legitimacy now rests – first and foremost – on the holding of 
free elections at regular intervals, which result in peaceful changes in government. 
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Democratic elections can be thought of in this respect as a ‘fundamental institution’ (cf. 
Reus-Smit 1997) of political legitimacy within international society, to the extent that even 
authoritarian regimes have attempted to exploit the appearance of democratic legitimacy. 
The danger for an authoritarian regime attempting to represent itself as an elected 
government is twofold, and results from the overarching possibility that, by flirting with 
democracy, a regime risks endorsing the validity of democratic principles among the wider 
population. First, direct manipulation of elections through vote-buying, intimidation, and 
fraud may backfire on a regime by provoking popular protest that effectively invalidates the 
election result (as occurred in the 1986 Philippines election called by President Marcos). 
Second, there is a risk for a regime that it may easily overestimate its own control over the 
population in assuming that an election can be won by the incumbent rulers through 
coercion and oppression of the opposition (such as the 1990 election held in Burma, where 
campaigning by opposition parties was severely restricted, and yet the parties allied with the 
opposition National League for Democracy still won a majority of seats). 
 Of the two case studies examined in this thesis, the Philippines has been notably more 
successful than Burma in claiming the mantle of legitimacy as a ‘democratic’ state. Burma 
has been under continuous military government since 1962, when General Ne Win’s coup 
overthrew the elected government and installed a Revolutionary Council run by the 
Burmese Socialist Programme Party. Despite its name, the party had no mass base and 
represented ‘essentially a small military oligarchy’ (Silverstein 1977, 88). The 1972 
constitution was written by the BSPP to confirm their power, creating a unitary state under 
one party rule; a ‘constitutional dictatorship’ (Silverstein 1977, 124). In the 1990 elections, 
the National League for Democracy (NLD) won 392 out of 484 seats, of which 100 
members of parliament have been stripped of their status by military decree, 40 have been 
imprisoned and 20 exiled (Matthews 1999, 83). According to Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe 
(1995, 172) the elections were a ‘clear contest for the mandate to rule’. He explicitly links 
the election to the concept of popular sovereignty: ‘The election was certainly viewed by 
the opposition, as well as by the military, as a test of legitimacy. Both accepted the 
electorate as the final arbiter: the sovereign people would decide who had the right to rule’.  
 Nevertheless, the Junta refused to accept the results of the elections as legitimating a 
new civilian government led by the NLD. Instead, SLORC (which was renamed the SPDC 
in 1997) declared – after the fact – that the elections had been for a constituent assembly to 
draft a new constitution, and that the military would stay in power to oversee this process. 
In 1992 the NLD walked out of the National Convention discussions of a new constitution 
which would have allowed them only 15 percent representation in the new parliament 
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(Matthews 1999, 84). Although the regime has persisted with a lengthy National 
Convention process – at the same time as the military’s position in the country’s politics 
and in economic activity has become further entrenched (Min 2008) – the NLD continues 
to boycott the talks until all its members are able to participate and restrictions on the 
agenda are lifted. In 2005, they were joined in the boycott by Shan organisations. Other 
representatives of ethnic nationalities, including the Karen National Union, were barred 
from participation by their continuing conflict with the regime (James 2006, 163). 
 As well as democratic elections, organised religion, with strong community roots and 
beliefs that are widely held among a population, can also play a crucial role in the 
construction of political legitimacy. Yet religious authority can work against a state regime 
just as easily as it can be made to work for it, especially in cases where a religion and 
religious leaders enjoy a broader and more durable form of legitimacy political elites. In 
short, ‘Religion may be used to legitimate governments as well as those who oppose them’ 
(Fox 2001, 65-6). In addition to often enjoying broader social legitimacy than a state 
regime, organised religious groups often control significant resources that can be employed 
strategically for political mobilisation, including ‘membership networks, leadership 
structures, building space, [and] institutionalized patterns of financial contributions’ 
(Williams 1996, 885). Because of the intimate relationship between religion and culture, 
religious beliefs may shape the environment in which the political legitimacy of a regime is 
contested, as well as ‘shaping a repertoire or “toolkit” of habits, skills and styles from 
which people construct “strategies of action”’ (Swidler 1986, 273).  
 In the two cases examined here, both the Buddhist Sangha in Burma and the Catholic 
Church in the Philippines constitute important sources of non-state legitimate authority. In 
an attempt to take advantage of their broad social legitimacy, state regimes and particular 
governments in both countries have made numerous attempts to ally themselves with 
religious authority, with varying degrees of success.  
 In Burma, Buddhism as the majority religion has historically provided the primary 
structure of political legitimacy for the lowland kingdoms of the Burmese, Mon, Shan, and 
Arakanese (Jordt 2003; Scott 2010; South 2003, 57-61). The place of religion in the official 
ideology of the Burmese state has gone through several stages since independence, from a 
central place as the official religion in the 1950s to a more marginal yet still officially 
recognised status under Ne Win’s military and Socialist Programme Party rule (Jordt 2003). 
However, as Jordt (2003) argues, religion has played a consistently important role in 
informal elite politics and in the attempts of regime actors to gain public legitimacy through 
engagement with the everyday politics of religion. State elites have cast themselves in the 
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role of legitimate rulers by adopting the practices of Buddhist kingship and have attempted 
to gain public as well as religious merit through conspicuous offerings and religious works, 
such as the elaborate renovations of the Shwedagon pagoda. Such elite practices have not 
prevented Buddhist monks becoming a strong source of either overt or covert resistance to 
the legitimacy of the regime, both in the case of the most recent mass protests for 
democracy in 2007 (stimulated by smaller initial protests against fuel price rises) and in 
earlier episodes. For example, independent and underground monks’ associations in Burma 
became powerful supporters of the pro-democracy movement in 1988 (International Crisis 
Group 2001, 17). Likewise, in 1986 the ‘people power’ popular uprising against the Marcos 
regime in the Philippines was sparked in part by a call by Cardinal Sin, the head of the 
Catholic Church in the country, –– for public protests in support of military units rebelling 
against the President (Alagappa 1995, 47; Philpott 2004; Ofreneo 1987). 
 Rather than attempting to ‘anchor’ regime legitimacy in the legal processes and formal 
institutions of the state, as is more usual in established democracies, it is common for more 
authoritarian governments to legitimise their rule through rhetorical claims and the 
generation of new political discourses (see Lyall 2006, 383). In terms of elite rhetorical 
practices to claim a mantle of regime legitimacy, nationalist ‘Burman’ discourses remain an 
especially important strategy for Burma’s military leaders to foster a common ethnocentric 
‘national’ identity based on the Burman dominant majority ethnic group. As an important 
illustration of these strategies, the ‘Three Main National Tasks’ of the SPDC are explicitly 
articulated in an official document entitled ‘Endeavours of the Myanmar Armed Forces 
Government for National Reconciliation’ (cited in Grundy-Warr and Wong Siew Yin 2002, 
99). These three explicit strategic tasks include: (1) to ensure ‘Non-disintegration of the 
Union’; (2) to ensure ‘Non-disintegration of National Unity’; and (3) to ensure the 
‘Preservation of National Sovereignty’. Each of these elements of nationalist discourse 
reflects the strong preoccupation of Burma’s leaders with ‘national sovereignty and [an] 
emotional attachment to the nation (or rather to the state, which is seen as the embodiment 
of the nation)’ (International Crisis Group 2001b, 4). 
 As Lyall (2006, 384) points out, symbolically important rhetorical claims such as these 
can sometimes lead to the entrapment of a regime within its own discursive framework, 
which highlights the importance for regime legitimacy of publicly defending the reputation 
of the ruling elite. An example of this can be seen in the SPDC’s presentation to a 2001 
UN conference on the Least Developed Countries, when the SPDC gave itself a glowing 
report on achievement of the National Tasks, stating: ‘These endeavours have resulted in 
considerable and tangible achievements that include, among others, peace and stability of 
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the state, accelerated growth of the economy and alleviation of poverty through socio-
economic development of the country, especially in the remote and border areas’ (Soe Tha 
2001). Furthermore, official statements in the state-run newspaper New Light of Myanmar 
emphasise the role of the military in ‘holding the country together’ and, through ceasefire 
agreements with insurgent groups and border development policies, bringing all the 
‘national races’ back into the ‘legal fold’ (cited in Grundy-Warr and Wong Siew Yin 2002, 
99-100). While it is difficult to objectively judge the degree of and depth of resonance that 
such rhetorical claims about national identity have in an authoritarian regime such as 
Burma, with a population of approximately 50 million people, these claims did not resonate 
for any of the broad range of activist participants – representing a cross-section of Burmese 
society from different age cohorts, ethnicities, occupational backgrounds, and gender 
differences – who were interviewed in this study.  
 In the contemporary era, political legitimacy has attained an intimate relationship with 
the effectiveness of state action. ‘Effectiveness’ in this sense can be defined solely in terms of 
the adequate provision of basic public goods (such as access to education, employment 
opportunities, a minimum standard of living, and personal security), regardless of regime 
type (such as democratic or authoritarian), or it may also be related to the process of 
governance itself. The fact that many states in the Asia region have combined economic 
growth with authoritarian forms of government has led some scholars to suggest state 
performance as a key source of legitimacy (Means 1996; Park 1991). Other scholars have 
treated political legitimacy and economic performance as distinct but related factors in 
predicting regime stability. In his seminal article on the ‘social requisites of democracy’, for 
example, Lipset (1959, 100) distinguishes between two dimensions of what he refers to as 
‘the struggle for citizenship’: (1) political rights, including access to power; and (2) 
economic rights, especially with respect to economic opportunities, freedom of association, 
and development. In mounting an argument for the inclusion of effectiveness (defined as 
governmental performance in relation to economic development and living standards, as 
well as educational standards) with political legitimacy as two central requirements for a 
successful and sustainable democracy, many of Lipset’s (1959, 86) earlier findings also 
resonate in contemporary cases such as Burma and the Philippines, where regime 
legitimacy is commonly challenged by non-elite actors on the basis of government failure 
to effectively respond to the fundamental social and economic challenges facing these 
societies. 
 A further important potential source of political legitimacy is the ability of a regime to 
effectively ‘buy’ support from a particular section or sections of the population through 
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patronage. In this respect, patrimonial regimes are commonly associated with the allocation 
of material rewards – through both formal and informal mechanisms – in exchange for 
loyalty and obedience to a ruler or ruling elite. A patrimonial regime is therefore ‘based not 
only on patriarchal values and norms, but on rationally driven exchange of services, when a 
patron buys the loyalty of a client in exchange for protection of the client’s interests’ 
(Ilkhamov 2007, 66). In particular, rather than the universal (or near-universal) provision of 
public goods by the state (defined as non-exclusive services and benefits), in a patronage-
based regime, characterised by deep political and economic inequalities, political support 
may be traded by particular social groups in exchange for access to exclusive public goods 
that are denied to others (see Collins 2004, 233). In Burma, for example, state-owned 
enterprises dominated by the country’s military leaders act as economically inefficient 
‘patronage vehicles for the SPDC’, with collective losses in 2006-07 that have been 
estimated by the International Monetary Fund as equalling more than 23 percent of the 
country’s total tax revenue (Turnell, et al. 2009, 641). The pattern of patronage extends to 
the local level, structuring relations between local elites and communities.  
 As Scott (1972) argues in a study including the Philippines, many features of electoral 
and bureaucratic politics in Southeast Asia cannot be understood without an analysis of the 
role of patron-client relations in both resource distribution and face-to-face interactions. 
Kerkvliet (1995) supports this basic thesis, while sounding the cautionary note that 
patronage should be understood as one factor within a more comprehensive theory of 
politics in the Philippines, and not as a single variable explaining all forms of political 
action. In addition to the economic rewards implied in patron-client relations, however, the 
effect of patronage can be as much in the ritualistic importance of engagement between 
patron and client as in any material benefit being exchanged. When patronage takes on this 
kind of symbolic function, it can be extended to a national scale, for example in the 
expression of personal concern by the President for the grievances of the population or of 
a particular group (Suhrke 1971, 134). In a review of democratic reforms in the Philippines, 
Eaton (2003) shows how efforts to reform the electoral process to reduce the dominance 
of traditional oligarchies have had mixed results. On the one hand, space for representation 
of marginalised groups has been opened by the allocation of reserved party list seats in 
congress as well as by measures to reduce some of the more overt forms of dominance by 
landowning dynasties. On the other hand, the ‘traditional politicians’ drawn from the elite 
class of landowners and merchants have maintained dominance in the government, in part 
by accommodating reform processes while working to minimise or subvert their effect.  
 Patronage also emerged as a key issue in the 2010 election campaign in Burma, where 
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candidates for the regime-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) openly 
used state funds to exchange concessionary loans and local development projects for 
advance votes for the party (Ellgee 2010). However, an effect of patron-client structures in 
electoral politics is that voting is treated as a matter of communal rather than individual 
interest. In one village in Shan state visited by Ellgee the community had decided 
collectively to vote for the opposition Shan Nationalities Democratic Party, but to also 
allocate a block of votes to the USDP to avoid repercussions after the election10.  
Contesting State Legitimacy: Motivations 
The absence of consensual legitimacy in present relationships between the state and 
communities in both Burma and the Philippines is characterised by opposition groups in 
terms of a series of problems, which either relate to the failure of the state to provide 
universal access to basic public goods, or are a direct consequence of state coercion and 
oppression. Activists discuss the needs of the community that the state is failing to provide 
for, as well as challenges for their communities that are directly caused by state policy and 
actions. The two categories of unequal provision of public goods that emerged from the 
analysis of interviews as the most important judgements of state illegitimacy were a lack of 
education and a lack of economic opportunity. The most significant categories of problems 
caused by the state that emerged from the analysis were described in terms of political 
oppression and military oppression. These four aspects of the popular judgement of state 
illegitimacy – the lack of education and economic opportunity and the problems of political 
and military oppression – are discussed in the following sections. 
Lack of Education  
The results of the Burma case study paint a picture of an education system in a state of 
collapse. Participants in this study identified a lack of adequate education in their various 
communities and linked this to their views of the SPDC regime, which was described as 
generally hostile towards public education. Aspects of the state’s approach to education 
which were identified included: systematic discrimination against women and ethnic 
minorities; general neglect and lack of resource provision; and widespread destruction, 
                                                
10 The persistence of communal decision-making within formally individualised processes of representative 
democracy is discussed by Chatterjee (2001) in connection with his distinction between ‘political society’ 
and ‘civil society’ in postcolonial regimes. For a discussion of communal representation which is 
particularly instructive of the trends which may influence a post-democratic Burma see Ghai (2002). 
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closure, and political repression of educational institutions by police and military forces.11 
 Systematic discrimination against women in education and structural inequalities present 
major barriers to women’s participation in higher education in Burma. For example, a 
member of the Mon Women’s Organisation reported that men were given priority over 
women for university entrance, even where their test scores were equal. In effect, women 
had to pass a higher standard to gain entrance to higher education (interview 30, 2006). 
Another participant linked the lack of education for women to the economic and social 
hardships faced by women, saying that women were ‘not learning a lot, because of their 
struggle for their life’ (interview 13, 2006). To these participants, the state was failing to 
adequately or equally promote the education of women and, in fact, state educational 
institutions were adding barriers of discrimination to women’s participation in education.  
 Burmese youth suffer from a general lack of access to higher education. Non-Burman 
ethnic minorites in particular suffer from discrimination in the education system. One 
participant from the All Arakan Student and Youth Congress described the lack of 
resources provided by the government for schools in his area. This included a lack of 
qualified teachers, while all learning materials have to be provided by parents or relatives. 
School buildings are derelict and not weatherproof, so classes have to be cancelled in poor 
weather. There is also a lack of high schools in rural areas, with this participant describing 
how he moved three times to bigger towns, staying with relatives, in order to continue his 
education (interview 1, 2006). In the bigger cities, students from minority ethnic groups 
face discrimination in both education and employment. In criticising the state for failing to 
provide adequate resources for education, participants were setting this as a standard of 
legitimacy which the state was failing to meet.  
 The state education system is commonly described as corrupt and as generally 
discriminatory against anyone who is not an active supporter of the military regime. 
Participants describe how authorities have created a two-tier education system, with most 
                                                
11 The issues outlined here accord with many of  those raised as concerns by the United Nations Committee 
on the Rights of  the Child (2004). In the report on Myanmar approved at its 36th session in 2004 the 
committee noted that it was ‘seriously concerned at the following problematic aspects of  the existing 
education system: 
(a) The low quality of  education reflected in the high repetition and dropout rates, which affect more girls 
than boys; 
(b)The significant variation in school enrolment between urban and rural areas, and the particularly low level 
of  enrolment of  children belonging to minority groups; 
(c) The limited length of  compulsory education, which ends at the fourth grade; 
(d) Free primary education is not guaranteed in practice, as parents are required to cover the costs of  
uniforms, textbooks, stationery and other supplies; and 
(e) The majority of  schools in Myanmar do not provide a conducive learning environment for children owing 
to, inter alia, the poor conditions of  buildings, the poor quality of  teaching/learning methodologies and the 
shortage of  qualified teachers’ (United Nations Committee on the Rights of  the Child 2004, para. 62). 
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of the meagre resources available for education reserved for military-run schools. ‘If you 
compare somebody who has a relationship with the military regime and us, we cannot 
compete with them, because of the corruption. People who can pay a lot of money can get 
better education from them’ (interview 32, 2006). Corruption in the education system at 
the local level is also evident, with this participant describing how there is little motivation 
to study for exams because the answers were often available for sale from teachers.  
 Participants emphasised the detrimental effect on education of the presence of central 
government troops in their areas. Two members of different ethnic youth organisations 
described how SPDC soldiers had destroyed schools and forbidden education in the native 
language of the areas (interviews 32 and 28, 2006). When people were forced to flee their 
villages, education for the children of the village was disrupted. The effect on education 
was one of the problems that participants emphasised in discussing forced displacement 
(e.g., interviews 12, 32, 2006). This emphasis on education was especially striking given the 
context of forced displacement, where the entire life of the community was under threat. 
In this case, the state was seen as illegitimate because the actions of the state military 
constituted an active barrier to the education of the people. 
 The actions of the SPDC regime towards education and students led several participants 
to suggest that the regime was threatened by education. One participant from a women’s 
organisation said that ‘the regime is worried that the people will be educated and against 
them, so they relocate their campuses, the universities, they close down universities’ 
(interview 25, 2006). This statement epitomises the feeling expressed by many participants 
that the current regime in Burma was generally opposed to education and that the regime 
saw an educated population as a political threat. Several participants who had experienced 
the events of 1988 described how the military government of the time had reacted to 
student protests by shutting down the universities and sending students home (interviews 2 
and 3, 2006). Others reported that this pattern had continued up to the present, whenever 
the regime felt threatened by student organising (interviews 1 and 23, 2006). Participants 
presented these official actions as evidence that the regime was actively hostile towards 
education, which they saw as an important public good.  
 Participants discussed their personal experiences of education in Burma in ways that are 
revealing of their judgements of state legitimacy. One participant from a youth group 
described the poor standard of education in Burma as a motivation for leaving the country 
to seek better opportunities in Thailand. He described an education system in which 
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students were not allowed or encouraged to have their own opinions (interview 4, 2006). 
Several participants went further and described a lack of opportunity for education as a 
personal motivation to join groups opposing the government. One member of an armed 
group described his decision to become a soldier in these terms:  ‘At the time I learn I live 
in the [refugee] camp, so have no freedom, no job, no chance to continue at the high 
school. When I finished tenth standard it is end for me. So I have no chance. So I know 
that for me, I am Karen people, we are Karen people. We must have freedom, we must 
have nation’ (interview 20, 2006). Statements like these are political as well as personal and 
are especially relevant to judgements of state legitimacy, since an explicit link is made 
between criticism of the education system and political action to oppose the state.  
 In the Philippines, participants described a public education system which was suffering 
from government underfunding and what the opposition groups saw as skewed priorities 
which favoured foreign commercial interests over the educational needs of Filipino people. 
According to the President of the National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP), 
education remained inaccessible for the majority of families in the country. Even families 
that were able to educate their children were struggling to pay tuition fee increases at 
government schools (interview 6, 2008). The incremental withdrawal of state subsidies for 
public education was seen as part of a process of commercialisation of education, whereby 
private education providers were expanding to fill the gap left by the state. The consequent 
lack of free public schools was having a serious impact on access to education for the 
majority of the population. Many schools would refuse to allow students who forfeited on 
fee payments to sit their exams – the so-called ‘no permit, no exam’ policy – meaning that 
even some students who managed to finish school would not officially graduate or receive 
any qualification (interview 6, 2008).  
 A lack of government schools in rural areas adds the barrier of distance to the 
difficulties of participation in education (interview 1, 2008). The government was seen as 
failing to address the problem of ‘out of school youth’ (interview 1 and 6, 2008). As the 
chairperson of the national youth organisation Anakbayan commented, the lack of access 
to education for youth had flow-on social effects for an already vulnerable population: 
‘They're not in school, they’re not employed, they’re just around. So a lot of them really 
don’t have a sense of direction’ (interview 1, 2008). Both NUSP and Anakbayan blamed 
government education policy for failing to respond to the lack of education for the 
majority of the population. Both organisations cited this policy failure in calling for the 
removal of the Arroyo administration and for structual change in the political system.  
 The NUSP and Anakbayan shared an analysis of government education policy in the 
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Philippines as being guided by a colonial mentality based on subservience to foreign 
economic interests. School and university curricula were seen as oriented towards 
producing workers for low-level service jobs with foreign companies operating in the 
Philippines (interview 1 and 6, 2008).  Government policies were criticised by the student 
and youth organisations as being guided not even by economic rationality but rather by a 
feudal approach to education left over from Spanish and American colonial rule. According 
to this critique, there is no attempt by government to identify the national needs for skilled 
graduates – whether in health, education, or industry – and to orient the education system 
accordingly. This problem is seen as connected to the government’s policy of exporting 
labour, which facilitates the migration of both skilled and unskilled workers in order for the 
state to benefit from remittances sent back to the Philippines.  
 International labour migration was first instituted as a major policy priority of the 
Philippines government in the 1974 Philippines Labour Code, as a response to economic 
problems such as a scarcity of foreign exchange earnings and high rates of unemployment. 
The policy subsequently led to the introduction of both punitive measures and positive 
incentives to encourage overseas Filipino workers to remit part of their income to their 
families in the Philippines through the banking system (Go 2003, 264-5). As a result of this 
policy, the Philippines now has the highest rate of outward migration relative to the size of 
its population in East and Southeast Asia, with over 8 million overseas Filipino workers in 
2008 (representing one-quarter of the size of the domestic labour force) (Philippine 
Overseas Employment Administration 2008). Moreover, skilled workers such as doctors 
and nurses now account for more than a third of outward migrants, with the Philippines 
ranking as the world’s third-highest recipient of remittances (in cash terms) in 2005, behind 
India and Mexico (Burgess and Haksar 2005). In recent years, the level of remittances to 
the Philippines has grown to reach the equivalent of more than 10 percent of the country’s 
gross domestic product (GDP), and the Philippines is now firmly established as the world’s 
largest net recipient of remittances relative to GDP (International Monetary Fund 2009, 
14-15).  
 In stark contrast to the Philippines, survey evidence of remittances sent back to Burma 
by migrants in countries such as Thailand (often transferred informally through hundi 
schemes, which are similar to other examples of informal money transfer systems, such as 
‘hawala’ networks in Arabic-speaking countries), while large, are used primarily for the 
purposes of family and household survival, rather than having a broader developmental 
impact (Turnell, et al. 2008). 
  This deliberate policy focus by the Philippines government on exporting labour and 
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alleviating balance of payments pressures via the ‘quick-fix’ route of remittances, rather 
than tackling structural problems and a lack of employment opportunities in the domestic 
economy, represents an important source of political discontent in the country. In 
particular, rather than creating job opportunities for graduates and focusing the priorities of 
education on areas where graduates would find productive work in the Philippines, 
government policy is frequently criticised as perpetuating the status quo of under-
development in both educational and economic terms. In contrast to state education 
policy, the alternative model of education proposed by both the NUSP and Anakbayan is 
described as ‘pro-people, nationalist and scientific’ (interview 1 and 6, 2008). The model of 
popular education advocated by these groups, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 
Five, is oriented towards meeting the social and economic development needs of the 
majority population of the Philippines. It is also based on a critique of existing state 
education policies as being oriented towards a model of economic and social development 
which is subordinated to foreign economic interests and benefits only a small minority of 
elite Filipinos. 
Lack of Economic Opportunities   
Like access to education, access to economic opportunities features prominently as a 
source of political legitimacy and contestation in Burma and the Philippines. Participants 
from Burma described a lack of economic opportunities for themselves and their 
communities, which in many cases amounted to a deprivation of the basic means of 
survival. Continuing economic underdevelopment and poor living standards in the country 
are attributed by activists and non-elite actors within the country, as well as by external 
academic observers, to the policies of the regime, in particular to poor economic 
management and the privileging of military spending over social welfare and economic 
development (for a recent assessment of the Burmese economy and economic 
management, see Turnell, et al., 2009). Economic problems and regulatory inefficiencies in 
Burma abound in almost every sector of the economy, with major policy issues including 
an inefficient and corrupt multiple exchange rate regime, a weak tax base and inadequate 
revenue collection capacity, high inflation rates of between 30 percent and 50 percent 
annually (as a result of the central bank printing money to fill the government’s budgetary 
shortfalls), erratic decisions on major public investment and capital spending programmes, 
as well as severe restrictions on trade, finance, and especially agricultural production (Tin 
Maung Maung Than 2007, 363-77; Turnell, et al. 2009; Wilson et al. 2008). 
 Several participants complained of a lack of appropriate jobs for university graduates. 
Participants linked this lack of economic opportunity to a series of negative social 
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consequences among students and graduates. Some students are being driven to 
prostitution to pay their tuition and living costs (interview 23, 2006), while many 
unemployed graduates are left suffering from depression and turn to drugs and alcohol to 
cope. Emotional responses to a lack of economic opportunities are also directed towards 
the regime, and are cited as a motivation for students and graduates to take part in anti-
government protests.  
 In many societies, subsistence farming can serve as a crucial survival mechanism for 
rural populations, especially in countries undergoing rapid political and economic change 
or which suffer from adverse circumstances such as economic repression (cf. Kostov and 
Lingard 2002). Yet in the case of Burma, subsistence livelihoods in many rural areas have 
been made impossible as a result of SPDC military operations (see Malseed 2009). The 
widespread and systematic use of forced labour by SPDC military units, together with the 
confiscation of land, animals, and crops, has had a devastating economic impact on 
communities throughout Burma. Participants from communities in Mon, Arakan, Karen, 
and Kachin states all report similar patterns of economic exploitation of ordinary people by 
military divisions stationed in their areas. Forced labour is especially common in the 
construction or maintenance of military projects such as army camps and roads (interviews 
1, 19, 21, 22, 25 and 27, 2006). Land and property, including plantations and factories, are 
frequently confiscated for economic projects for the sole benefit of the army (interview 5, 
30 and 32, 2006). These forms of economic exploitation by the army were described as 
characterising the common practice of the regime, rather than representing a few isolated 
incidents. Forced labour and looting of private property are not seen as an isolated or 
corrupt local practice, but are rather blamed on policies and norms set by the central 
military command.  
 The practice of direct expropriation of private labour and property by the military set 
the general pattern of government economic policies experienced by participants. 
Government intervention in the economy was seen in one-way terms, as taking from the 
civilian population and giving nothing back. Farmers were forced to sell a set quantity of 
rice paddy to government-controlled purchase centres at prices below the cost of 
production. Farmers who were unable to meet the quota were liable to be arrested and 
beaten. Some farmers were therefore compelled to buy paddy at market rates in order to 
sell it to the government at the reduced price (interviews 13 and 15, 2006). Others who 
made a living from fishing or trading found that the cost of obtaining licenses was 
arbitrarily high and the process corrupt (interview 1, 2006). While this type of economic 
repression was partly blamed on local officials, the central government was held 
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responsible in general terms for the bureaucratic restrictions on everyday economic activity 
that made the local corruption possible.  
 In addition to the stifling restrictions of micro-economic activity, participants also held 
the central government responsible for the mismanagement of macro-economic policy. 
This was particularly evident in statements about economic development, which was seen 
as either entirely lacking or as being of no benefit to ordinary people. The regime was 
especially blamed for wasting the rich natural resources of Burma and for wasting the 
opportunity to use these resources for economic development of benefit to the broader 
population. Numerous studies have sought to examine the relationship between a rich 
endowment of exploitable natural resources in a country, political oppression, and regime 
stability, with Ross (2001, 336) observing that disputes between different groups over 
ownership rights with respect to a country’s natural resources may be more prone to ‘lead 
to larger military forces and less democracy in resource-rich, ethnically fractured states’ 
(such as Burma). As one participant expressed it: ‘The problem happened because of the 
government structure. There’s a lot of natural resources in Burma. The authorities sold 
most of the natural resources overseas, not used for the public. Most of the money used 
for the weapons’ (interview 5, 2006). This accusation, that the central regime diverts 
revenue from the exploitation of natural resources to the military and not for the public 
good, was repeated by many participants and is backed up by figures collated by the  
opposition movement (National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma, 2004).  
 A similar grievance is that resources extracted from a particular region are not used to 
benefit that region. For instance, participants from Arakan state complained that major gas 
projects in their state did not benefit their people. Much of the gas is exported, with profits 
shared between foreign companies and the central government. In addition, Arakan 
opposition groups complained that a greater share of the electricity that is produced is 
diverted to Rangoon, while the capital of Arakan, Sittwe, receives only two hours of 
electricity per day, and rural areas none at all (interview 1, 2006).  
 Participants discussed economic problems in the context of a history of misdirected 
economic development, for which they blamed successive military regimes. From 1974 to 
1988, the military-controlled Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP) ran a one-party 
government, which maintained strict control over a centrally-planned economy. However, 
as participants in this research pointed out, the military had little interest in aspects of 
socialist ideology emphasising social equality and development, but rather focused 
exclusively on maintaining authoritarian control of the state. In particular, participants 
blamed the BSPP regime for an economic crisis marked by rising prices and widespread 
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poverty in the 1980s.  
 In order for governments to achieve economic stability and to foster development, 
everyday actors must be able to have at least a minimal degree of confidence in core 
economic institutions, such as the value of a national currency as an everyday medium of 
exchange. As a consequence, fundamental changes in economic policies and conventions 
enacted by decree within any society can substantially erode regime legitimacy, in particular 
because ‘[e]conomic exchange relies on social relations of interpersonal trust’ (Broome 
2009, 9). For many households in Burma, the final straw came in 1987 when the regime 
responded to inflation by cancelling banknotes. Many families, already distrustful of the 
financial system, had kept their life savings in cash, which was rendered worthless 
overnight. The widespread anger and desperation caused by the 1980s economic crisis in 
Burma was therefore an important factor in the growing popular feeling during this period 
that the BSPP regime was illegitimate (interviews 2 and 15, 2006). 
 There is nothing pre-ordained about Burma’s economic malaise during recent decades. 
At the time of independence in 1948, Burma had been one of the wealthier countries in 
South-East Asia, possessing abundant natural resources and producing a large surplus of 
rice and other products for export. But opposition groups blame the succession of military-
dominated governments for economic policies that have seen Burma today become one of 
the poorest Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the world, while neighbouring countries 
such as Thailand and India have developed fast-growing and comparatively prosperous 
economies. Indeed, the policy lessons that can be drawn from comparisons with the 
growing wealth of their neighbours are not lost on opponents of the Burmese regime. For 
example, participants readily refer to the major discrepancies in living standards and 
economic development between Burma and Thailand as evidence of poor handling of the 
economy by the SPDC and previous regimes. This discrepancy is linked to economic 
migration, with the difference in wages between the two countries cited as a reason for 
leaving Burma in search of work in Thailand (interviews 4 and 5, 2006).   
 The economic motivations for popular opposition to regimes in Burma and the 
Philippines share some common sources, and are largely centred on the lack of local 
economic opportunities, economic underdevelopment, and the different strategic goals 
driving economic policymaking in each country. An important difference between each 
case, however, is that while the Burmese state is driven by the objectives of maintaining 
military control and resisting external interference, the economic strategy of the Philippines 
state is largely determined by a high level of dependence on loans and investment from the 
international financial institutions (and is thus shaped by the policy conditions that such 
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loans entail).  
 In the Philippines, the organisations in this study shared an analysis of the parlous 
economic conditions and were united in blaming successive governments for failing to 
implement beneficial economic development. The Secretary-General of BAYAN described 
the situation as a continuation of ‘more than a hundred years of colonial and neo-colonial 
rule’, which is characterised by ‘backward agricultural feudal and semi-feudal conditions 
and power concentrated in the hands of the few, the economic and political elite’. 
According to this analysis, the ‘major ills of contemporary society’ in the Philippines were 
imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism. These conditions of economic 
exploitation were ‘represented by the Arroyo administration’, which was seen as so 
hopelessly dependent on American interests that it was often referred to in derogatory 
terms by opposition activists as the ‘US-Arroyo regime’ (interview 2, 2008). While the 
general terms and language of this analysis are shared by the organisations in the study, the 
specific emphasis with respect to the perceived causes of the country’s economic 
challenges depends on the experiences and concerns of each organisation’s base 
community. 
 Besides education, the biggest issue faced by youth organisations in the Philippines is 
employment. This can be illustrated by the description by the Anakbayan chairperson of 
the consequences for  youth of the government’s economic policies: ‘the few educated 
youth tends to go abroad to secure employment, while the majority of our youth will find 
themselves at a loss of how to get employment, whether locally or abroad’ (interview 1, 
2008). The problem of domestic unemployment and outward labour migration is blamed 
squarely on the government, which is seen as unconcerned with creating local employment 
and solely focused on how to ‘facilitate the movement of the young people from here to 
other countries’ in order to increase the volume of foreign exchange the country receives 
from remittances (interview 1, 2008). The government’s labour export policy is also 
criticised by the Secretary-General of the KMU union federation, who describes the policy 
as part of the government’s neoliberal economic policies of trade liberalisation, 
privatisation, and deregulation. According to the KMU, the majority of migrant workers 
under the government’s labour export scheme are actually educated professionals, yet were 
often assigned to domestic or menial work (Baldonaza 2008).  
 In stark contrast to the Burmese regime, which has long sought to fiercely defend the 
country’s sovereignty from external interference (International Crisis Group 2001b), the 
Philippines is closely integrated into the existing structures of global economic governance 
through its membership of – and dependence upon support from – the international 
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financial institutions. This serves as an important driver of political discontent directed 
against the state’s ‘neoliberal’ economic orientation. For example, the government’s 
neoliberal economic policies are seen by the KMU as connected to the Philippines’ 
membership of international trade and finance regimes governed by the GATT/WTO and 
the international financial institutions (especially the International Monetary Fund). Unlike 
Burma, which often refuses to disclose even basic economic data to the IMF, the 
Philippines has spent much of the three decades prior to 2000 operating under back-to-
back IMF loan programs (Seabrooke 2010). Moreover, the Philippines government 
continues to borrow heavily from the World Bank (with loans estimated at between 
US$700 million and US$1 billion for the 2009-2012 period), as well as maintaining close 
cooperation with the investment arm of the World Bank Group that promotes private 
sector financing, the International Finance Corporation (with additional investment for 
2009-2012 expected to be approximately US$250-300 million per year) (International 
Monetary Fund 2010, 5).  
 The high level of dependence of the Philippines government on continued access to 
multilateral loans, and the consequent constraints these conditional lending arrangements 
impose on the country’s economic policy autonomy, are widely seen by opposition groups 
as detrimental to the country’s economic well-being and domestic development. For 
example, government policies are commonly described as having opened the country up to 
exploitation by international capital through the extraction of cheap resources and labour, 
with little investment in the infrastructure or industrial base of the economy. Despite the 
Philippines possessing the necessary labour force and natural materials to achieve 
development and support the population, the majority of the population live in absolute 
poverty with high rates of unemployment (Baldonaza 2008). These policies are associated 
with the dominance of the Philippines government by foreign, especially American, 
interests (either directly through the US-Philippines bilateral relationship, or indirectly 
through US influence over the IMF and the World Bank’s activities). The economic 
policies of the government have been directly linked to judgements of popular legitimacy 
by the KMU Secretary-General, who claimed that ‘it is clear that this is not a government 
of the people but of business and capital’ (Baldonaza 2008). 
 In addition to the perceived negative effects of the country’s economic policy 
orientation on the population in general, it is clear that the Philippines’ continued 
underdevelopment and poverty has had a particularly severe impact on women. For 
example, the chairperson of the Gabriela network emphasised the effects on women in the 
Philippines of price rises in basic commodities such as rice. Sudden increases in food prices 
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were blamed on government deregulation of trade in agriculture, which had seen large-scale 
conversion of land from food crops to industrial cash crops. The Philippines had gone 
from being a rice exporter to being dependent on rice imports which were insufficient to 
meet demand, leading to rising prices. This is of particular concern to Gabriela members as 
‘[i]n the Philippines, women have the role of being the one budgeting for the family. So it is 
a very big problem for them if there is not enough money to buy food for the children’ 
(interview 4, 2008). Gabriela member organisations in rural areas also reported that women 
were being driven by economic necessity to exchange sex for rice. Although few women 
would openly admit to it, the prevalence of the practice was shown by the emergence of 
local terms to describe it, such as Palimigas, meaning ‘rice barter’ in Tagalog (interview 4, 
2008). Another example of the gendered effects of commodity price rises in the Philippines 
is the disruption to women’s everyday lives caused by the extra time required to spend 
queuing to buy subsidised rice. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter Two, Gabriela members 
further complain that the scheduling of rice distribution by local government officials has 
an uncanny tendency to fall on days when anti-government demonstrations have been 
called, disrupting the ability of women to attend the protests (interview 4, 2008). 
Military Oppression 
The dynamics of military oppression differ greatly between Burma and the Philippines, 
with the former characterised by widespread coercion and direct forms of local oppression, 
and the latter characterised more by ‘covert’ and less-direct forms of coercion and targeted 
oppression. These differences translate into distinct patterns of oppression of opposition 
movements, despite some similarities, and inform the different views that everyday non-
elite actors have formed of the military in each case. For example, participants interviewed 
in this study from Burma view the state army, the Tatmadaw, as an oppressive enemy force, 
and blame the SPDC military regime for the abuse they regularly suffer at the hands of 
local military units. Opposition groups from different areas of Burma paint a consistent 
picture of a regime at war with its own people, which is consequently seen as an illegitimate 
government. Common abuses committed by the military against the population range from 
killings of civilians, rape, forced labour and conscription, looting and confiscation of 
property, and destruction of homes and crops.  
 Participants reported that a similar range of abuses against ordinary people occur 
wherever there are army bases, including in areas formally under ceasefire agreements, 
which indicates a systemic policy of military oppression whereby the military can act 
against local communities with impunity. Mon opposition groups interviewed in 2006 
emphasised that human rights violations by the army had continued despite a 1995 
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ceasefire agreement between the SPDC and the New Mon State Party (NMSP). 
Participants reported systemic abuses such as rape by soldiers, land confiscation, and 
forced relocation of villages in the area. This situation has resulted in people being forced 
to flee their homes as Internally Displaced People (IDPs). Without any income or 
livelihood, and unable to gain entry into neighbouring countries as refugees, these IDPs are 
entirely dependent on organisations such as the NMSP for their survival (interviews 30 and 
32, 2006). In Kachin state, despite a ceasefire agreement with the Kachin Independence 
Organisation, similar abuses were reported. The regime is also blamed for involvement in 
drug trafficking in the area, and for creating the conditions for widespread drug abuse, 
especially by Kachin youth (interview 9, 2006).  
 In addition to the interviews conducted for this study, other sources of evidence 
indicate that such abuses of the population by the military are neither isolated nor 
infrequent. Indeed, forced displacement of the population in Burma has reached 
disastrously high levels in recent years, with an estimated 500,000 Internally Displaced 
People on the country’s eastern border just in the last decade. This led the International 
Committee of the Red Cross to publicly criticise the Burmese regime in 2007 for creating ‘a 
climate of constant fear among the population’ (cited in Brees 2008, 4). The pattern of 
abuse identified through the empirical research in this study is repeated and intensified in 
areas of active conflict. For instance, in Karen state, in the course of a long-running 
conflict with the Karen National Liberation Army, the Tatmadaw has systematically targeted 
the civilian population in an attempt to weaken its resistance. Contemporary abuses 
reported by participants included the systematic destruction of villages and crops, with 
villagers confined to their homes or forcibly relocated and cut off from their fields and 
food supplies (interviews 16, 21, and 25, 2006). These abuses have been official military 
tactics since General Ne Win introduced the ‘four cuts’ policy in 1962 to deprive the rebel 
Karen National Union of food, funds, intelligence, and recruits (Grundy-Warr and Wong 
Siew Yin 2002, 101). The impact of this army campaign against the civilian base of the 
Karen organisations is that ordinary people live in constant fear of government soldiers. 
One participant, a Karen youth organisation (KYO) member in his early twenties, 
described a lifetime spent as part of a community on the run from the government: 
I was born in the forest. I was born in 1983. At that time the SPDC came and 
attacked our village. Attacked the KNU. I grew up in the forest. When I grew up I 
recognised that whenever the SPDC troops entered the village they normally burnt 
down the village. At that time we also have to run away, leave our village and flee to 
the forest’ (interview 27, 2006). 
 In discussing the impact of these attacks by government troops, participants described 
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many abuses against individuals, such as soldiers killing and wounding civilians. But 
participants also talked in as much detail and with as much emotion about the soldiers 
destroying villages and crops and killing farm animals (interviews 1, 16 and 25, 2006). One 
explanation for this focus on the non-human aspects of the military violence is that these 
were the often the acts which appeared to be most deliberately calculated to inflict 
collective punishment. Soldiers who systematically burnt rice barns and shot buffalo were 
seen as deliberately attacking the whole community. Such indiscriminate violence and 
destruction feeds local perceptions of a regime at war with the population. When asked 
about the main problems caused by the military presence in his area, one KYO member 
said: ‘First they destroy the farms and the paddy fields, second they will burn down the 
whole of your village, thirdly they kill the villagers who they meet in the forest’ (interview 
28, 2006). The killing of individuals is seen as a part of a campaign of terror by an 
occupying military force against the local population. But the killing of individuals is not 
seen as the only, or even the primary, means used by the military to attack the collective 
existence of minority groups. The systematic attacks by the military on the material basis of 
collective life – crops, animals, cooking utensils, food stores, dwellings etc. –  are just as 
much a part of an attempt at collective annihilation and are seen as such by the affected 
populations. The KYO member summed up his view of the motivations of the SPDC by 
saying: ‘I see that they want to destroy our life, they want to kill all of the Karen people’ 
(interview 28, 2006). If this statement were taken in isolation as a description of the killing 
of individuals it might seem to be hyperbole, but, taken in the context of broader 
descriptions of the Tatmadaw military campaigns against minority ethnic groups and the 
systematic destruction of the material basis of collective survival, the statement gains a 
more chilling sense of reality. 
  Participants in Burma describing the actions of individual soldiers and military units 
often referred to them by the initials of the regime, SPDC. Participants would refer to the 
SPDC as being responsible for particular abuses committed by soldiers and, conversely, 
would refer to abuses committed by soldiers when asked about their general impressions of 
the government. The central government was therefore strongly associated in the minds of 
local communities with the abuses committed against them by the state military forces. The 
abuses committed by local military units are thus seen as an extension of policies and 
norms set by the central regime, which is consequently seen as illegitimate by those 
suffering the abuse.  
 In contrast to Burma, military oppression in the Philippines is (comparatively) more 
covert, targeted, and less indiscriminate. For example, in April 2005 it emerged that the 
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Armed Forces of the Philippines had produced an internal training presentation called 
‘knowing the enemy’, which listed various civil society and media organisations as fronts of 
the Communist Party of the Philippines – New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) (Cabacungan 
and Pazzibugan 2005). The groups listed included the Filipino organisations covered in this 
study, along with church groups and other organisations such as the National Union of 
Journalists of the Philippines. According to an Army Intelligence source quoted in the 
Philippines Enquirer, the military believed that the CPP-NPA had infiltrated the organisations 
named in the briefing as part of a plan to ‘exploit the weaknesses of the democratic system’ 
(Cabacungan and Pazzibugan 2005). The leaking of this presentation confirmed what the 
participants in this study already knew, that they were being targeted as part of the 
military’s counter-insurgency campaign against the New People’s Army. As the chairperson 
of Gabriela stated: 
Groups like us are being attacked as a front, a communist front. And so our leaders 
are also endangered because they have a reason to pick you up or to disappear you. 
So one issue that we have right now is human rights and political repression 
(interview 4, 2008). 
The targeting of civil society groups as enemies of the state is not just an isolated case, or 
an example of poor public relations work by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, but is 
instead a consistent feature of the government’s counter-insurgency program, known as 
Oplan Bantay Laya (OBL) (Karapatan 2009). The counter-insurgency campaign was 
presented by the government as part of the global war on terrorism (Arroyo 2001), and has 
been supported by the United States as part of Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines 
(Maxwell 2004). But organisations such as Gabriela, whose members have been targeted by 
military units under the OPL, assert that the people whom the government now defines as 
terrorists are in fact ordinary political activists and even workers for service NGOs: ‘These 
are ordinary civilians who have been working in non-government organisations, doing a lot 
of organising and providing services to the people who need them most’ (interview 4, 
2008). 
Political Oppression 
The history of political oppression in Burma and the Philippines forms an important third 
strand that – along with economic and military oppression – helps to explain everyday 
actors’ contemporary motivations for engaging in resistance to the ruling regime in each 
case. Burmese participants describing political oppression by the SPDC, for example, often 
put this in the context of a long history of repressive government in Burma. In particular, 
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those involved in the events of 1988 referred to the military crackdown on peaceful 
protests as evidence of the regime’s intolerance of dissent. Prior to 1988, the Burmese 
Socialist Program Party (BSPP) ran a one-party government which allowed no opposition. 
This led to a long-running political crisis in the 1980s as the BSPP regime maintained a 
socialist ideology that was in conflict with government practice, while enforcing order with 
‘draconian censorship laws’ and arrest of people who criticised the government (interview 
8, 2006). Student activists who organised anti-government protests at this time were 
motivated primarily by their experiences of political repression. Although the protests 
initially focused on demands for a government inquiry into police brutality, they quickly 
spread to a more widespread denunciation of the regime and demands for democracy. As 
one student organiser remembered it: 
To begin with, the protests were concerned with the student movement and the 
demands for the truth commission. But the military government didn’t answer, so 
the protest continued. Every time there was a protest the demands grew but the 
government never answered. So finally we demanded democracy, a change to a 
democratic government and human rights (interview 3, 2006). 
As this quote indicates, the inflexibility of the BSPP regime’s response to political 
opposition caused a polarisation of the political situation and an escalation of the demands 
of the popular protest.  
 As participation in the 1988 protests grew, they became a focal point for a wide range of 
grievances against the government held by different sectors of the population across the 
country. In the cities, workers formed strike committees and demanded the right to 
organise unions free from political interference (interview 15, 2006). Participants who had 
joined the protests in rural areas reported that resentment of local authorities, poverty, 
economic restrictions, and widespread corruption were primary motivating factors. Local 
authorities in particular were seen as incompetent and self-serving, owing their 
appointment to the party hierarchy rather than to the people they governed (interviews 2 
and 5, 2006).  
 The escalation of public protest gradually led to an expansion of the political goals that 
demonstrators pursued. In particular, as participation in the protests spread to more and 
more sectors of the population, the protest ceased to demand concessions from the regime 
and began instead to aim for its removal. This revealed the popular illegitimacy of the 
regime and created a systemic political crisis as the regime was forced to choose between 
making the transition to government with the consent of the people or relying on coercion 
to crush the protests. The choice of coercion over consent was made when a group of 
generals from the Tatmadaw launched a coup, taking control of the government and giving 
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the orders to brutally crush the protests (Lintner 1990). That approach has effectively 
continued to the present day, as the military regime has held on to power through 
repression and coercion, in the absence of popular consent.  
 In the Philippines, participants in this study also reported widespread political 
repression and corruption. Yet the character of this repression and the language used to 
describe it is affected in this case by the fact that the Philippines is formally a democracy. 
Compared to the situation in Burma, opposition groups have more freedom to organise 
within the country, and are even able to achieve representation in Parliament. While 
activists in the Philippines are opposed to the structure of the state as well as to particular 
governments, there is also a degree of qualified legitimacy given to certain aspects of state 
authority. For instance, in supporting particular election campaigns, or by taking part in 
congress hearings, activists confer legitimacy on these aspects of state authority. In 
discussing political and military repression, which both remain present in the Philippines 
and are especially targeted at political activists, participants tend to emphasise the political 
nature of the repression. Whereas military repression in Burma can be seen as 
indiscriminate and, in the case of abuses such as forced labour, part of the normal practice 
of the army, military repression in the Philippines tends to be seen by activists more as a 
deliberate tool of political repression.   
 It is important to note that engaging in political resistance in an environment that is 
characterised by a relatively greater degree of legal freedoms does not necessarily remove 
the threat of direct methods of state coercion and targeted political oppression. The 
relatively greater space for a legal movement in the Philippines, therefore, does not 
diminish the risks involved in political activism. Rather, activists are frequently subject to 
extra-judicial disappearances and killings, as well as politically-targeted arrests. The end of 
the Marcos period of martial law significantly opened the democratic space for groups to 
legally and openly organise, but as groups moved into this political space, the state 
responded with extra-judicial repression. Indeed, the Arroyo administration adopted tactics 
from the martial law era of extra-judicial killings and disappearances, with 1,188 cases of 
extra-judicial killing documented between 2001 and 2009 (Karapatan 2009). The main 
effect of the ‘democratic transition’ in the Philippines compared to the martial law period 
has been an increase in democratic space combined with a more or less constant level of 
state repression. While state repression has not declined in absolute terms, activists in effect 
have more freedom to act without triggering repression. However, the arbitrary nature of 
extra-judicial repression means that the government continues to be widely distrusted and 
is treated as a hostile force by opposition activists. 
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Challenging and Engaging the State 
Groups organising inside Burma often evade political repression by finding creative ways 
to voice opposition to the regime in campaigns of political defiance. Acts of political 
defiance range from symbolic forms of everyday resistance to sabotage and overt 
challenges to state authority. Students in Arakan state, for instance, have taken part in a 
combination of overt and covert anti-government protest actions. Activists paint anti-
government slogans, paste up printed posters, and distribute leaflets. Leaflets and posters 
denouncing the military regime are produced clandestinely using computer printers and 
quickly distributed. Student groups have also organised fora at the Sittwe University 
campus to discuss democracy and human rights. Such activities inevitably attract the 
attention of military intelligence, so activists have to carefully calculate the risks and be 
ready to leave town if they realise they are being watched (interview 1, 2006). In more rural 
areas, activists from the youth wing of the ALP encourage villagers to incorporate small 
acts of political defiance into their everyday lives:  
they can sing a song, they can pray every day. Day after day, if  they practise in that 
way, people will be interested and they can share with other people, other villagers. 
So any kind of  sign you can show that you don’t like the government, in any way. 
This is political defiance for us.’ (interview 11, 2006). 
 Acts of symbolic resistance are also used to raise support for more concrete acts of 
resistance. Trade union activists regularly cross the border from Thailand and have 
organised annual Mayday celebrations inside Burma. Celebrations have been combined 
with training on workers’ rights and discussions about resisting abuses such as forced 
labour. After such discussions, some villages decided to resist government demands to 
grow castor seeds, which the regime sought to use for biofuel: ‘we convinced some villages 
not to pay money for the seeds and also against growing the plants’ (interview 15, 2006). 
When the village headmen were called by the army to explain their actions, the union 
activists encouraged them to go in groups for safety. In one case, an entire village 
accompanied their headman to the army base and in this way were able to return to their 
village unharmed. A month later, soldiers arrived in the village and forced the farmers to 
accept the seeds, putting an end to the resistance. However, such acts of overt resistance 
significantly slowed down the implementation of state directives in these areas and clearly 
showed the lack of legitimate authority on the part of the regime, which was forced to 
resort to military force in order to implement the most basic of agricultural policies 
(interview 15, 2006).  
 Union activists also operate secretly in urban areas, maintaining a network of members 
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and keeping in contact with union organisations on the border (interview 14, 2006). 
Occasionally, urban workers are able to organise more overt acts of resistance, despite the 
constant threat of state surveillance and repression: 
there are workers’ activities in Rangoon and Pegu, but also the workers’ activities 
are carefully watched, so also very difficult to do. But even so, workers’ 
demonstrations and strikes are occasionally happening. At least one factory a 
month (interview 15, 2006). 
These activities of everyday resistance constitute both an active challenge to state legitimacy 
and a demonstration of the political legitimacy of the opposition groups engaged in 
resistance.  
 In the Philippines, the organisations covered in this study overtly challenge the 
legitimacy of the state, not only calling for the removal of particular governments, but also 
for structural change in a political system which they see as illegitimate. Building on their 
experiences in the ‘people power’ revolutions that ousted former Presidents Marcos and 
Estrada, opposition organisations have called for a third people power movement to 
change the structure of the state (interview 2, 2008). One example of these efforts is a 
leaflet issued by BAYAN in 2008, and distributed widely in the Philippines, which explicitly 
targeted President Gloria Arroyo under the slogan ‘Onward with a new People Power! 
Oust Gloria now!’. The leaflet recounts a series of corruption scandals involving the 
Arroyo administration, adding that the regime has ‘subverted, blocked and rendered 
impossible all legal avenues to be made accountable’. Therefore, BAYAN claims, extra-
constitutional measures are justified to end the ‘illegitimate rule’ of the President through 
popular mobilisation (BAYAN 2008). Although this campaign was personalised and 
directed against President Arroyo, drawing on the memory of earlier mobilisations against 
Marcos and Estrada, BAYAN makes it clear that ‘the removal of a corrupt president is not 
enough for the needed socio-economic and political reforms to be implemented’ (BAYAN 
2008, 5). Rather, BAYAN calls for a transitional council which would introduce immediate 
economic reforms, initiate prosecutions for human rights abuses, begin peace talks with 
insurgent groups, and introduce electoral reforms before calling new elections (BAYAN 
2008, 7). While the National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP) has not taken a 
definite position on the form of structural change that was required, it has voted as a body 
to call for the removal of President Arroyo from office. As the NUSP President put it: 
we’re mature enough to know that it shouldn’t just be a change of  personalities, it 
shouldn’t just be a change of  the people within the government, it has to be an 
overhaul of  the entire system. … But let me say that we think that there is a need 
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for immediate relief  for the Filipino people by having this immediate change in 
leadership (interview 2008). 
This statement, and the statements by BAYAN, show a rhetorical distinction being made 
between the legitimacy of the government administration and the legitimacy of the regime. 
This demonstrates one opportunity for a flexible political strategy afforded by the political 
system in the Philippines. The relative complexity and differentiation in the political 
system, compared to that of Burma, can potentially be exploited by non-state actors to 
target campaigns at challenging the legitimacy of one branch of the state, while potentially 
utilising political opportunities offered by other branches.  
 One such strategy, which could be termed ‘state-splitting’, is employed by militant non-
state actors to exploit divisions among political elites in an attempt to gain support for 
political change from rival factions of state office-holders. For instance, in supporting 
candidates running for office in the congress or senate, non-state actors can challenge the 
legitimacy of the office of the president or perhaps draw attention to the wider oligarchic 
power structures of capitalists and landlords. In challenging the legitimacy of the military, 
such as through drawing public attention to cases of disappearances and human rights 
abuses, non-state actors can make use of the courts to file writs of habeas corpus (Azcuna, 
2009).  
 The success of the people power campaigns in achieving a change of executive 
government in 1986 and 2001 can in large part be attributed to the success of non-state 
actors in splitting various branches of the state. By gaining the support of sections of the 
military and police and by making use of elite allies, such as a leading opposition candidate 
in the case of Corazon Aquino during the 1986 campaign against President Marcos, or the 
Vice-President in the case of Gloria Arroyo in the 2001 campaign against President 
Estrada, non-state actors were able to effect change at the highest level of state power. The 
more difficult challenge now being faced by the coalition of non-state actors represented 
by BAYAN is how to articulate this state-splitting strategy to achieve more fundamental 
changes in the political and economic structures in order to benefit the base communities 
of the activist organisations (interview 2, 2008). The idea of the transitional council is a 
potential strategy to build a temporary coalition of elite and community-based actors to 
effect structural changes. However, this strategy relies on a combination of highly 
contingent factors involved in gaining support for another people power revolution from 
base communities, together with support from powerful interests in the church, 
government, and military. In 2008, for example, BAYAN was able to mobilise substantial 
popular support for political and economic reforms, but lacked support from military and 
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church elites (interview 2, 2008). 
 A less ambitious strategy of selective engagement with the state was followed by the 
NUSP, which sought to retain access to the state in order to influence policy, while 
selectively challenging the legitimacy of aspects of the state to push for more far-reaching 
political change. One of the main areas of activity of the NUSP is in researching position 
papers on matters of education policy, to coordinate between member student associations 
and state agencies responsible for education. In addition to these policy recommendations, 
the NUSP is a regular participant in congress and senate committee meetings, representing 
youth and students. The NUSP also engages with the National Youth Commission, under 
the office of the President, which ‘often seeks the NUSP's position on various issues, 
especially regarding legislation for the youth’ (interview 6, 2008). In parallel to this strategy 
of engagement, the NUSP has evolved a progressive orientation based on a radical analysis 
of political and economic power in the Philippines. This progressive orientation developed 
originally in the form of a critique of the ‘mistakes’ of the 1980s NUSP leadership and 
certain ‘erroneous tendencies to heavily rely on parliamentary processes, within the legal 
framework’ (interview 6, 2008). Through a process of ‘radicalisation’, the NUSP developed 
a dual strategy of selectively engaging with branches of the state to achieve policy reform, 
while also forming alliances with other non-state actors in campaigns to challenge the 
legitimacy of aspects of the state. Such campaigns focused, for instance, on ending 
government corruption, expelling US bases from the Philippines, and on calls for 
constitutional change. In such campaigns, the NUSP contrasted challenges to the present 
legitimacy of state institutions with the potential legitimacy of a reformed state: 
We have to some extent lost faith in our democratic processes and institutions. It 
will take a long time, but definitely we want the process to succeed, to serve their 
purposes, in terms of  providing social services, meeting the demands of  the 
Philippine people (interview 6, 2008). 
As this quote illustrates, the criticisms of the state advanced by opposition groups envisage 
the shape of a future legitimate political order. Rather than achieving a change of 
government (who is governing), political resistance and everyday political actions are instead 
directed at achieving a change in the regime (defined as how and why a government governs), 
which is a strategic goal common to everyday political struggles in both Burma and the 
Philippines. Efforts to contest the legitimacy of the existing government are therefore 
interdependent in both cases with political projects to transform the state. 
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Conclusion 
Opposition groups in Burma and the Philippines are engaged in projects aimed at the 
realisation of radical political change, which aim to transform states lacking consensual 
legitimacy into democratic states based on popular consent. The meaning that democracy 
holds in these two societies is determined in the context of relationships between the state 
and communities within its borders, on the basis of understandings of the consensual 
legitimacy that is lacking in the current regime and that would form the basis for a future 
political order. Arguments about the illegitimacy of a present regime thus combine with the 
forms of consensual power demonstrated in the practices of opposition groups to produce 
political standards of consensual legitimacy and of democracy.  
 In the cases of Burma and the Philippines, the state is widely criticised for its failure to 
protect the people or to provide for their needs in the areas of education and economic 
development. The lack of economic opportunities, access to education, and personal or 
community security form the primary motivations for political resistance in both cases, 
albeit in distinct ways given the differences in the social, economic, and political 
environments in each country. Opposition groups strive to contrast the present failures of 
the state with their own efforts to mobilise resistance to oppression, provide for the needs 
of the people, and engage in reciprocal processes of political communication. The 
consensual legitimacy gained by opposition groups is used in these cases as leverage to 
further the political project of transforming the state regime. The blueprints for the state 
that these groups intend to build if they are successful in taking power are being drawn in 
the process of struggle, in the interaction between popular motivations for resistance to 
present regimes, and in the forms of organisation developed by opposition groups as they 
seek to create an alternative base of consensual power. 
 Criticisms of the current regimes in Burma and the Philippines are based on judgements 
of state legitimacy in terms of the needs of the community and the quality of the 
relationship between the state and people. The appropriate provision of education and 
economic management is identified in both cases as key needs and determinants of political 
legitimacy. In Burma, the state is judged actively hostile to the goals of popular education 
and economic development. In the Philippines, the under-performance of the state in both 
education and economic development is attributed to structural failings and a dependent 
relationship with external actors, which undermines the legitimacy of the state.  
 In addition, the state is judged in terms of the relative openness to participation, versus 
the degree of political and military repression. In the Philippines, certain limited 
opportunities for engagement and participation in the political structure of the state coexist 
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with a high level of military repression of opposition groups. In Burma, a complete lack of 
opportunities to engage politically with the state is combined with a very high level of 
generalised military repression and targeting of opposition groups.  
 This chapter has highlighted how non-state actors are significant players in the 
construction and contestation of political legitimacy. With regard to the state, community-
based organisations play an important role in framing popular judgements and mobilising 
popular political actions, which may serve to either reinforce or undermine a state’s 
legitimacy. In addition, non-state actors actively build their own political legitimacy in 
relation to their communities. Where a polity is characterised by a high degree of conflict in 
which the state is seen as partisan or hostile to social actors, the legitimacy of community-
based organisations can be comparable to or greater than that of the state. In conflict 
situations, community-based organisations gain legitimacy through mobilising resistance to 
the state, assistance to the community, and through reciprocal relationships of mutual 
communication. 
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4 
Political Violence and Non-Violence 
 
This chapter argues that a variety of attitudes and approaches towards violence and non-
violence exist within civil society. Research in the areas of global civil society and political 
violence has tended to reinforce a dichotomy between the two in normative and descriptive 
terms. While civil society groups are assumed to be non-violent and opposed to war, armed 
groups are sometimes treated as if they have no connection to the networks and concerns 
of civil society. By contrast, the approach taken in this thesis situates both armed and non-
armed groups within networks of relationships extending from local to global contexts.  
 Applying this relational approach to the study of violence and non-violence within 
political movements reveals that armed and non-armed groups often have more in 
common than is sometimes assumed. A range of viewpoints on political violence exists 
across the groups, with many armed group members supporting peaceful solutions and 
many members of non-violent organisations defending aspects of the armed struggle. This 
chapter argues that the existence of differing political positions on violence does not 
represent a fundamental or unbridgeable division between groups and does not prevent 
widespread cooperation between groups ranging from those actively engaged in armed 
struggle to those with a principled commitment to pacifism. 
 The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section discusses existing theories of global 
civil society as essentially ‘non-violent’, as well as demonstrating the normative assumptions 
that such theories embody, which are not borne out in practice in many actual cases of 
social struggles. In addition, the links between contemporary coercive practices in Burma 
and the Philippines and each country’s colonial legacy are also examined, helping to 
illustrate how earlier patterns of state violence can result in a form of path dependence that 
is difficult to shift even after a sustained period of post-colonial rule. The four remaining 
sections in the chapter each draw on these concepts and themes to focus on Burma and the 
Philippines with respect to the nature of community relations, the dynamics of relations 
within community-based organisations, and the differences in the nature of relations 
between these organisations and local communities, the state, and international groups. 
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The chapter concludes by emphasising the commonalities that are often shared between 
both violent and non-violent groups in the cases of Burma and the Philippines. These 
commonalities suggest the need for a rethinking of the analytical category of (global) ‘civil 
society’ as an essentially non-violent realm in the study of International Relations. 
Theories of Non-Violent Global Civil Society 
Theorists of global civil society have tended to associate the concept with a commitment to 
non-violence. John Keane’s (2003, 145) view of global civil society is that ‘violence is 
anathema to its spirit and substance. This follows, by definition, because global civil society 
is marked by a tendency to non-violence’. While Keane’s assertion is broadly representative 
of the Liberal consensus on the subject, not all theorists share the definition of civil society 
as a sphere of non-violent voluntary association. Chandhoke (2003, 61) has problematised 
the assumptions that civil society is non-violent and that it is characterised by horizontal 
relationships of trust. Taken together, these two assumptions render invisible the political 
nature of resistance by oppressed groups and fail to recognise the inequalities of power that 
constitute the oppression in the first place. For marginalised or oppressed groups to take 
advantage of the rights of civil society, such as the right to organise a social movement or 
trade union, is in itself often a struggle occasioning violent repression. In such situations, 
civil society is not experienced as a neutral and peaceful realm of association, but rather as 
a set of unequal power relations linked to economic class and enforced by state violence 
(Chandhoke 2003, 207-220). In a similar historical argument which generalises the 
experiences of developing states from a comparative analysis of the development of civil 
societies in India and Europe, Mitra (2003) argues that emerging civil societies have always 
been characterised by political violence. From this perspective, outbreaks of violent 
resistance are less a result of state failure and more a result of social conflicts focused 
around a developing state. The existence of violence in a developing civil society should 
not then be seen as exceptional but rather as a sign of underlying conflicts over political 
values and status. 
 Considering the relationship between civil society and violence in a social context 
requires an understanding of violence as more than the deliberate infliction of physical 
harm by one person on another. In an influential article, Galtung (1969) has argued for an 
expanded definition of violence to include a variety of means by which harm may be 
inflicted. Violence, for Galtung, is a phenomenon that diminishes a person’s actual ability 
to realise their potential wellbeing, whether physical, psychological, or social (Galtung 1969, 
169). On the basis of this definition, Galtung distinguishes between personal violence 
where there is a specific actor who commits a violent act, and structural violence where 
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there is no one actor to which harm is attributable. The concept of structural violence is 
similar in some ways to Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic violence, which operates through 
the inequalities of power in relationships that constrict the range of interpretations and 
choices that an actor can make in a given situation. For Bourdieu (1995, 192), symbolic 
violence involves the legitimation of inequality and exploitation, in a way that masks or 
euphemises the violence of the relations, in contrast to physical violence which makes the 
act of oppression visible. Bourdieu applied his concept of symbolic violence to analyse 
oppressive social relations from economic exploitation to masculine domination (Bourdieu 
2001). While the focus in this chapter is on the political use or avoidance of direct violence, 
the concepts of structural and symbolic violence help to show how violence is imbricated 
in patterns of everyday social relationships.  
 In the cases of Burma and the Philippines, many of the social relations that give rise to 
violent conflict are based in forms of structural and symbolic violence inherited from the 
colonial state and specific to the post-colonial conditions of these societies. The practices 
of colonial rule created patterns of direct, structural, and symbolic violence which continue 
to influence state-society relations in the present day. The forms of direct state violence by 
which exploitative demands on the population are enforced, and resistance quashed, find 
their direct antecedents in the colonial period. In Burma, the most brutal forms of forced 
labour found today were pioneered by the British colonial administration. Likewise, the 
Tatmadaw practices of forced portering, including the practices of beating and starving 
porters to death and of using porters as human shields, are a continuation of military 
practices established by the British army in Burma (Scott 2010). In both Burma and the 
Philippines, the tactics of counter-insurgency which involve widespread collective 
punishment of civilians as a means to weaken the resolve of resistance groups are also 
borrowed directly from colonial regimes. For instance, the Tatmadaw practice of forced 
relocation, under which thousands of villages in Burma’s border areas have been destroyed 
and their inhabitants forcibly resettled in ‘model villages’ (interview 16, 2006), is an 
application of the British policy of ‘strategic hamletting’ applied on a large scale in Malaya 
during the 1948 insurgency and later by American forces in Vietnam (Nagl 2001, 129). 
 More insidiously, the post-colonial state continues to exercise the colonial means of 
symbolic violence that Fanon (1986, 12-13) identified as the social causes of internalised 
feelings of inferiority on the part of colonial subjects. The means of symbolic violence are 
embedded in the social relations of everyday politics and include those forms of systematic 
deprivation and exploitation that, in the aggregate, correspond to Galtung’s category of 
structural violence. For instance, the systematic under-development of state-provided 
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education discussed in the previous chapter can be seen as a form of structural violence in 
that it limits the actual potential wellbeing of the population (Galtung 1969, 169), and as 
symbolic violence in that inequality in access to education has been utilised since colonial 
times to create stratified societies in which the majority of the population is isolated from 
the means of political decision-making.  Through symbolic violence, exploited and 
oppressed people come to misrecognise their situation as a natural order (Bourdieu 1995) 
rather than as a contingent and changeable political arrangement. This symbolic violence 
must be overcome for a successful resistance to be launched against state repression. As 
Fanon (2005) argued, the direct violence of revolutionary resistance can play a positive and 
cathartic role in overcoming oppressive symbolic violence. 
 In contrast to this view, theorists and proponents of global civil society have tended to 
see violence in all its forms as a threat, or as part of the ‘dark side’ of civil society (Albrow 
and Anheir 2007, 1). Many scholars of global civil society have promoted it as a field of 
practice which can reinforce the governance roles of international organisations and 
powerful states in the pursuit of international law and peace. Global civil society in turn is 
seen as mobilising against war, with large scale anti-war protest showing ‘both the robust 
reality of global civil society, and its current weakness as a challenge to geopolitical 
prerogatives’ (Falk 2005, 76). Others have gone further, claiming that due to the expansion 
of global civil society and of international law, ‘war, meaning violence between socially 
organised groups, normally states, has become morally unjustifiable’ (Ezzat and Kaldor 
2007, 19). Kaldor has argued elsewhere that Liberals since Kant have ‘envisaged the 
construction of a liberal international order linked to the rise of domestic civil society, in 
which force was increasingly limited to policing actions’ (2003a, 36). Kaldor (2003b, 583) 
identifies with this Kantian tradition and emphasises that the conditions of liberal global 
governance in politico-legal terms are co-constitutive with those of global civil society: ‘civil 
society needs governance, a framework of rules and institutions for civil society to 
function’ (Kaldor 2003a, 109), in particular, the ‘extension and application of international 
humanitarian law (the ‘laws of war’) and human rights law’. Noting that laws need 
enforcement, Kaldor (2003a, 128) advocates ‘humanitarian intervention’ in the form of 
military force which aims ‘not to defeat an enemy but to protect civilians and stabilise war 
situations so that non-extremist tolerant politics has space to develop’. Global civil society 
is thus seen as a civilising influence on state violence, not only in preventing war, but also 
in certain circumstances in legitimising state warfare for humanitarian ends. 
 The pragmatic willingness of theorists of global civil society to consider state violence as 
potentially legitimate is not generally extended to non-state actors. In what Keane calls 
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‘uncivil war’ the traditional rules of state warfare do not apply as the anarchy of non-state 
violence is unleashed. While traditional civil wars involve rival claimants to state power, 
uncivil war involves the breakdown of state power, or in currently fashionable terms, state 
failure. The removal of the state as the stable centre of conflict disturbs the familiar moral 
order, leading Keane (2004, 155-7) to warn that uncivil war operates ‘according to no rules 
except that of destructiveness’ as ‘sober restrictions covering the ground rules of war are 
swept aside’. However, Keane does not provide any substantive evidence of state warfare 
being conducted according to sober rules or a care to avoid destruction. While uncivil wars 
are discussed in terms of periods of communal violence such as in Rwanda and Bosnia, the 
term is broad enough to cover almost any non-state violence. The only form of resistance 
that is explicitly exempted from this definition of ‘uncivil society’ is the non-violent civil 
disobedience of Thoreau and Gandhi (Keane 2004, 109, n1). Keane’s concept of uncivil 
war correlates to what Kaldor calls ‘network war’, a supposedly new form of conflict 
involving ‘armed networks of non-state and state actors’ (Kaldor 2003a, 119). The analysis 
of network war depicts non-state armed groups in pejorative terms as terrorists, fanatics, 
criminals, mercenaries, and followers of charismatic leaders and warlords. Like Keane, 
Kaldor makes use of the idea of ‘failed states’ to explain how these groups exploit 
conditions in which ‘the monopoly of legitimate organised violence is being eroded’ (2003, 
120). In contrast to the potential for state violence to reinforce international norms, non-
state violence is seen as destabilising and necessarily contrary to the aims of global civil 
society. This view has not been directly challenged by theorists of political violence, who 
have tended to be engaged in debates about conflict and insurgency rather than the 
character of global civil society. However, this chapter argues that there is more empirical 
overlap between the subfields of political violence and global civil society than has 
generally been assumed.  
Relations in the Community 
Burma 
The impact of ongoing armed conflicts and military repression in Burma looms large over 
the communities inside Burma with which opposition groups maintain relationships. The 
severe problems and collective suffering experienced by communities in Burma can be seen 
as both causes and consequences of armed conflicts. Participants across the different 
groups experience a lack of education and economic opportunities in their communities, as 
well as ethnic and gender discrimination. 
 The discrimination faced by non-Burman ethnic communities is a significant factor in 
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framing the identification of activists with their communities and in the forms of collective 
action they choose to engage in. The experience of one young engineering graduate from 
Kachin state applying for work in a Burman-dominated state industry shows how ethnic 
and religious discrimination are closely linked: 
They didn’t give me permanent work. They want me only as a helper worker. 
Because I am a Christian and a Kachin, so they don’t want to give the opportunity 
to Christian people (interview 9, 2006). 
For this participant, ethnic and religious discrimination, combined with a lack of economic 
opportunity, motivated her decisions to become a migrant worker in Thailand and to 
participate in non-armed opposition work with the AKSYU. For others in similar 
situations, the combination of religious and ethnic discrimination with economic hardship 
in their communities motivate them to join armed groups. A description by the KNU’s 
foreign secretary of his personal reasons for joining the Karen insurgency in the late 1970s 
shows the interrelationship of discrimination and insurgency: 
I studied in Rangoon, and when I finished my school, the first thing I face is the 
discrimination. As a Karen ethnic group. And then there is the Karen insurgency at 
the border area, and also at that time it’s in Pego Yama, in the centre of  Burma, so 
we are not getting the opportunity even in education or even in job. This is the 
discrimination that I faced, so I think that if  I join the resistance group here I can 
work more than what I have to do in Burma (interview 21, 2006). 
This statement, which echoes the experiences of many members of armed groups, shows 
that ethnic discrimination can be both a cause and a consequence of armed hostilities. The 
statement also illustrates, together with the previous quote, how important discrimination 
can be in framing ethnic identity-formation. In both statements, the description of 
discrimination is accompanied by a strong statement of identity, such as ‘I am a Christian 
and a Kachin’, and ‘As a Karen ethnic group’. The significance of these identity statements 
is emphasised by their context in the personal narratives, where participants are describing 
their motivations for joining opposition groups. As a framing process for identities, ethnic 
discrimination fulfils both the collaborative and conflictual functions suggested by Hunt, 
Benford and Snow (1994). While discrimination is in the first case an antagonistic relation 
with an oppressive other, the personal and collective responses to discrimination play a 
collaborative role in strengthening ties of ethnic identity.  The common experience of 
discrimination therefore provides a frame for both the articulation of shared ethnic identity 
and the mobilisation of resistance. The framing of collective identity and resistance in 
terms of discrimination functions in a similar way for both armed and non-armed 
resistance. 
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  Discrimination and abuse against women is also linked to conflict and shows a similar 
pattern of motivating resistance as well as solidarity. Women in conflict zones face abuses 
including rape by members of the military (interview 13, 22 and 32, 2006). The lack of 
economic and social power that some women experience is also demonstrated by the 
prevalence of human trafficking and forced prostitution in militarised areas such as Kachin 
state (interview 22, 2006). Women also lack control over marriage and are expected to 
support their men during armed conflict while also looking after children and family 
members (interviews 13 and 22, 2006). Discrimination against women, both within 
opposition movements and in the community, has led women to form independent 
organisations to promote equal participation and empowerment of women. While women 
are represented in both armed and non-armed groups and have a range of views on 
political violence, the formation of autonomous women’s organisations in the 1990s 
represented a move away from armed struggle towards non-violent forms of resistance for 
the women involved. Each of the women’s organisations in the study has a policy 
commitment to non-violence, and many have taken leading roles in promoting non-violent 
political resistance and conflict resolution in their communities (interviews 12 and 25, 
2006).  
 Communities experiencing a military onslaught by the state face seemingly impossible 
choices between resistance and surrender. Participants discussed problems with both 
armed resistance and the ceasefire agreements that many armed ethnic groups have signed 
with the central government. Armed resistance was seen as leading to further loss of life, 
abuse of human rights, and damage to property. Fighting was seen to harm innocent 
people and cause suffering (interviews 13, 23, 2006). Resistance was also seen as unlikely to 
succeed, given the superior firepower of the military regime (interview 23, 2006). The 
difficulties of armed struggle are furthered by a lack of weapons and international support. 
Global trends, such as the end of the cold war and the declaration of a ‘war on terrorism’, 
were cited as reasons for this (interviews 2, 3 and 6, 2006). The difficulties of continued 
resistance have led many armed groups to sign ceasefire agreements with the regime. As 
one participant from Kachin state put it: 
Most of  the armed groups, why they start to get a ceasefire with the SPDC is that 
any armed organisation faces a lot of  problems. Most of  your local people shot 
dead by SPDC. For example, here is maybe one brigade settled in the region, but in 
the region most are local people living. So the SPDC came to fight them several 
times, but the local people could not resist them anymore. They have lack of  food, 
lack of  health … So finally the ethnic armed groups know their local people face a 
problem and they start to get ceasefire with the SPDC (interview 17, 2006). 
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Several participants criticised existing ceasefire agreements as ‘not genuine’ or a ‘false 
peace’ (interviews 25 and 34, 2006). Reasons given were that ethnic groups had been forced 
to accept the ceasefire, that the ceasefire did not address the underlying causes of conflict 
or political reforms, and that expansion of military bases and abuses of the people had 
continued. These concerns were expressed by both armed and non-armed groups 
(interviews 2, 9, 25, 30 and 34, 2006). 
 Participants discussed the relationships their groups had formed with both their own 
communities and other organisations. Participants from both armed and non-armed groups 
expressed the opinion that armed groups were supported by their communities. A 
spokesperson for the non-armed KWO said of the armed KNLA that: 
for the people who are inside [Burma], they feel like they still have people to 
protect them and it would be worse if  they are not present there. For example if  
the military comes to attack them and if  there is a guerrilla group try to intervene, 
try to stop, even though they cannot protect them completely, they still feel like 
they try to defend them, so they have time to run away (interview 25, 2006). 
Kachin participants, all from non-armed groups, said that the KIO had enjoyed broad 
community support since its formation, with one saying ‘the KIO is the heart of our 
Kachin people’ (interview 22, 2006). Although the KIO had signed a ceasefire with the 
regime, it was still seen as providing a buffer against SPDC troops. The spokesperson for 
the PSLF said that from the time of its formation, until signing a ceasefire with the regime, 
the PSLO had received ‘100 percent support from the Palaung people to make activity for 
the Palaung revolution movement and even to join with Shan, join with Kachin, join with 
Communists sometimes, we fight our common enemy, what we now call SPDC.’ (interview 
34, 2006). This support is seen as arising from community organising, creating a 
recognition that the community and the organisation were mutually reliant on each other. 
For example, the KNU is seen as the legitimate representatives of the Karen people by 
both armed and non-armed groups. Their spokesperson said that the organisation relied 
almost entirely on community support: ‘through the whole struggle we didn’t get any 
support from outside, we only got support from our own Karen people from inside.’ 
(interview 21, 2006). Ethnic armed groups typically took on state functions in areas under 
their control, providing for the health, education, and welfare of their people. A 
spokesperson for the New Mon State Party said that the armed group ‘is acting as a 
political party in Mon state. But while they are doing that, they also have a responsibility for 
the people in Mon state, for their education, for their health, for their development.’ 
(interview 33, 2006) 
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The Philippines 
The organisations from the Philippines that were included in this study were all part of the 
legal and non-violent opposition movements and had no formal links to groups engaged in 
armed resistance. One organisation, the Cordillera People’s Alliance, includes groups that 
were previously engaged in armed resistance to the Marcos regime in the 1980s. One 
participant, from the KMU union federation, also discussed aspects of the relationship 
between the communist New People’s Army and their base communities. In both cases, 
the relationships between the armed groups and local communities were seen as important. 
Where an armed group could be seen to be supporting and protecting the local people, 
they would be likely to gain support. 
 Two major areas of armed resistance were described in the Cordillera region during the 
1980s. Both related to major development projects promoted by the Marcos regime, the 
Chico dam project and the Cellophil resources corporation. In both cases, the Cordillera 
peoples in the areas to be affected by the projects mobilised in opposition. The Chico dam 
project was initiated by the Marcos regime with support from the World Bank. If the 
project had gone ahead, the CPA claims that approximately 100,000 families would have 
been immediately displaced (interview 3, 2008). The dam project was resisted by members 
of the Bontok and Kalinga people, who disrupted surveying and construction work with 
sabotage and armed attacks. The other major area of struggle in the region during the 
period was the opposition to logging by the Cellophil corporation. Resistance was led by 
Tinguan people in Abra province, together with Kantanay people in Mountain Province 
and Kalinga in the North-Eastern area of Illocosur (interview 3, 2008). The armed 
resistance to both of the large scale development projects was described by the present 
secretary of the CPA as ‘waging armed struggle to defend our ancestral territories’ 
(interview 3, 2008). The legitimacy of these instances of armed resistance is defended by 
the CPA in terms of the values of its member communities: 
these communities are also tribal communities, they are warrior societies, and to 
them to defend life, to defend our territory, it is legitimate to us to wage an armed 
struggle. Because that’s the decision of  the people. Because their position is to 
defend, they are not the ones attacking, but to defend what is rightfully theirs, for 
the present generation and for the future (interview 3, 2008). 
Although the CPA now has a policy of non-violence as part of the legal opposition 
movement, the memory of militant armed struggle against state repression is still a 
celebrated part of the organisation’s history. CPA activists remember the struggles against 
state repression in the form of songs and popular theatre that are a central feature of CPA 
gatherings (interview 3, 2008). 
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 Members of other organisations in the legal opposition movements also expressed 
private support for the armed struggle of the New People’s Army (NPA), the armed wing 
of the outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). The general secretary of the 
KMU union federation expressed his personal opinion that the  NPA were ‘protecting the 
interests of the oppressed’ against the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) who were 
‘defending the interests of the bourgeois and the foreign forces’ (interview 5, 2008).  This 
claim, that the CPP-NPA is on the side of the people, was not only based on the manifesto 
goals of the party but also on their methods of organising. The NPA was seen as a 
volunteer force whose continued existence was dependent on the support they received 
from their base communities. As the KMU general secretary put it, whereas government 
forces use money collected from the people to suppress the people, the NPA are a ‘self-
reliant movement of people fighting on their own terms’ (interview 5, 2008). Support from 
local communities was seen as both necessary to the survival of the NPA and as a mark of 
the legitimacy of the armed group.  
Relations in the Organisation 
Burma 
Some participants expressed an explicit need for their groups to hold arms in the current 
situation. The reasons given were to continue to fight for the aims and objectives of the 
group, to be able to continue political work and maintain access to information from inside 
the country, and to protect or defend people in border areas. (interviews 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 16, 28 
and 34, 2006). Armed organisations are able to access areas which would be unsafe without 
armed protection. This has allowed them to continue other non-violent activities, including 
collecting information, political organising, and training. As the ABSDF spokesperson 
explained: ‘Sometimes in the jungle, we did the training, some of the human rights training, 
community organising training, but we need to hold the arms for their security.’ (interview 
2, 2006) 
 Perhaps more surprising, however, were the many expressions of support and 
preference for a range of non-violent forms of action from members of armed groups in 
the study. These included expression of the need for more international awareness and 
pressure on the regime, the need for a grassroots people’s movement inside Burma, and the 
need for a political solution to the conflict, leading to reforms. Spokespeople for armed 
groups wanted more international awareness of the situation and suffering of people in 
Burma to counter the ‘propaganda’ of the SPDC regime. A spokesperson for the New 
Mon State Party, which includes an armed wing, expressed appreciation for academic 
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researchers who had worked in the area and brought the existence and struggles of the 
Mon people to the world’s attention. Participants from armed groups also emphasised their 
need for international support. One spokesperson stated that raising international 
awareness and support for political change in Burma was the most important goal of his 
organisation and the primary purpose of their cross-border presence in Thailand. Another 
emphasised the need for humanitarian assistance to people in conflict areas, arguing that 
with more food, medical care and education, people would have more energy and ability to 
engage in non-violent forms of political action. One participant from an armed group, 
when asked what he would like to see change in Burma, said that he did not want there to 
be a lot of armed organisations and wanted the people to be able to live in peace. 
 Several participants from both armed and non-armed groups expressed a belief that 
armed struggle could not solve their problems. For some participants from non-armed 
groups this was expressed as a commitment to ‘peaceful ways to get change’ and a hope 
that negotiation to end the conflicts would be possible (interview 25, 2006). Others, from 
armed groups, saw the armed struggle as a legitimate last resort, but never as a full solution. 
This attitude was expressed in similar terms to those from non-armed groups as statements 
expressing a need for a combination of tactics and for a political solution to the conflicts 
(interviews 3, 20 and 21, 2006). For some, however, the unpopularity of the armed struggle 
was something they had to reluctantly accept. These participants felt that a commitment to 
the armed struggle was the best contribution they could make to political change in Burma 
and felt frustrated that they were unable to take effective action (interview 7, 2006). 
Participants from groups engaged in armed struggle expressed difficulty in finding other 
ways of pursuing their political objectives, given the lack of international support for the 
non-violent activities of their organisations, such as education and training (interview 3, 
2006). 
 The role of armed struggle in the opposition movement is a controversial issue and a 
matter of active debate for groups in the study. Disagreement over the relative importance 
of armed and political resistance caused a split within the ABSDF, with the ‘political’ group 
splitting to form the Network for Development and Democracy (NDD). However, the 
two groups continue to cooperate and cohabit, with many members of the two groups 
sharing one section of a refugee camp on the Thai-Burma border (interview 2, 2006).  
 Each armed group in Burma faces the dilemma over whether to accept a ceasefire 
agreement with the military regime. When the PSLO accepted a ceasefire, the PSLF split to 
continue armed resistance (interview 34). In small focus group interviews with members of 
the Burmese Women’s Union and the Kachin Women’s Association Thailand, the question 
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of violent versus non-violent action was the issue that generated the most contentious 
discussion and disagreement in both interviews (interviews 13 and 23, 2006). The BWU, 
which has a policy commitment to non-violence, was originally formed to push for gender 
equality inside the student guerrilla movement and includes members with a range of views 
and experiences of armed struggle, including current members of the ABSDF. As one of 
the group’s leaders explained, ‘we can’t say that everyone accepts non-violence or armed 
group support. For example, we all based on the ABSDF members, then we believed that 
gender equality we needed to do, there was a bad situation that we needed to change. That 
is why our policy is on gender equality and mostly by peaceful non-violent action, but 
politically we have different views.’ (interview 13, 2006). Such discussions show that the 
question of armed versus non-violent action is actively debated among the Burmese 
opposition groups. While many groups maintain a policy of non-violence for a range of 
principled and strategic reasons, no sharp lines can be drawn between these groups and 
others who have taken up arms.  
The Philippines 
Leaders of mass organisations in the Philippines are eager to emphasise their status as part 
of the legal opposition movement. In asserting their legal status, the organisations reject the 
attempts of state forces to equate them with the illegal opposition, principally the CPP-
NPA. In claiming legal status, movement leaders distance themselves from the armed 
opposition while recognising its existence and expressing an acceptance of different forms 
of struggle. The context of such claims makes it clear that the legitimacy of legal status is 
being claimed in opposition to state repression and not in opposition to armed struggle. 
For example, the secretary-general of BAYAN reports: 
the recent experience of  political repression and human rights violations have also 
had impacts on regional formations of  BAYAN. There are some regional 
formations that operate on a semi-legal mode, meaning that they don’t have fixed 
or open offices, they have to be mobile most of  the time, so a lot of  restrictions on 
their mode. But we are trying to overcome these and assert the legal democratic 
mass-movement (interview 2, 2008). 
Here the legitimacy of BAYAN as a leading force in the legal movement is contrasted to 
the illegitimacy of state repression. The experiences of BAYAN activists suffering from 
state repression are echoed by those of student activists affiliated to the NUSP. As the 
NUSP President explains: 
We are often subject to red-baiting, being called a front of  the Communist Party of  
the Philippines. We continue to condemn such apparent harassment by state 
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authorities. There is an antagonistic relationship to state authorities. At the same 
time, we continue to assert the legal basis of  our organisation and as I said before 
we are the premier authority on student issues (interview 6, 2008). 
Here, the NUSP president makes a claim to legality and legitimacy, while rejecting any 
association with the illegal CPP. He also makes it clear however, that the ‘antagonistic 
relationship’ is not with the CPP but with the state. 
 In the above quote from the BAYAN secretary-general, state repression is identified as 
a factor in forcing movement groups to operate in a secretive ‘semi-legal’ mode. Legality 
and illegality are therefore seen as modes of operation and as responses to state repression 
and not necessarily as markers of legitimacy. When legality is mobilised as a marker of 
legitimacy, it is in order to deny the legitimacy of state repression and not to deny the 
legitimacy of illegal action. A similar pattern can be seen in the way the secretary-general of 
the CPA introduces his summary of past political action in the Cordillera as ‘those 
successful struggles, which used various forms, from legal, meta-legal, even extra-legal and 
armed means’ (interview 3, 2008). Here legality becomes a marker identifying different 
modes of action, each of which may be considered as legitimate in their own context. 
Indeed, the CPA is seen as inheriting the legacy of the combined successes of both legal 
and illegal modes of collective agency, involving both armed and non-armed action. 
Relations with Local Groups 
Burma 
Cooperation between armed and non-armed groups is a widespread and normal feature of 
the Burmese opposition movement. Participants emphasised that different groups could 
work together towards the same ends by different means and that this could include both 
non-violent and armed actions. When discussing what forms of action were needed, 
participants from both armed and non-armed groups expressed support for a combination 
of tactics, including political mobilisation inside Burma, armed struggle, and international 
pressure on the regime. A spokesperson for the BWU said that armed and non-armed 
groups worked together on various campaigns and joint action committees, including 
seminars for youth dialogue and on issues of democracy, national reconciliation and federal 
union. ‘Our beliefs are the same, we have a common goal, although we are using different 
strategies. So we are working together all the time.’ (interview 12, 2006). Asked whether she 
thought that outside organisations would understand the need to work with armed groups, 
she said that this should not be confusing to observers who understood the complexity of 
the situation as well as the common goals of the groups. 
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 Even groups with a principled commitment to non-violence were not in favour of 
disarming the non-state armed groups. A spokesperson for the KWO thought that working 
towards a people’s movement inside Burma was the most effective strategy for change, but 
recognised that armed opposition groups were also necessary in the current situation to 
help protect the people: 
I think to disarm them is not, I mean it is very difficult. Because they are standing 
where they are to protect their people, not that they love fighting or for themselves. 
They think that this is the way to protect the people. So I think that would be 
difficult (interview 25, 2006). 
 Participants from armed groups reported that their organisations had formed alliances 
and worked cooperatively with each other, as well as with non-armed groups. The ethnic 
armed groups had initially formed the National Democratic Front in 1976 to coordinate 
their armed struggles for self-determination. In 1988, an expanded alliance was formed to 
incorporate the newly formed ABSDF, as well as other groups including the Federation of 
Trade Unions of Burma, under the name Democratic Alliance of Burma. In 1992 these 
organisations came together with the National League for Democracy (Liberated Area) to 
form the National Council of the Union of Burma (interviews 10, 15 and 21; NCUB 2007). 
Ethnic armed groups tended to have close working relationships with the non-armed 
women’s and youth groups from the same communities. Similarly, the Burmese Women’s 
Union was formed by female members of the ABSDF and, although the women’s group 
was committed to non-violence, the two organisations maintained some overlapping 
membership (interview 13, 2006). 
 Participants from the ABSDF considered the group to be part of civil society in Burma, 
understood as ‘based on civilians, the people, and the public’ (interview 7, 2006) and the 
self-organisation of the community. Examples given of civil society activity in Burma were 
village committees to organise social events, or volunteering time at Buddhist temples. 
ABSDF members considered their group to be part of civil society by virtue of their social 
service activities for health and education, as well as by the support they received from the 
community (interviews 2, 4 and 7, 2006). 
 Differences of opinion over the question of ceasefire agreements had caused division 
amongst the opposition groups. One participant from the AKSYU reported arguments 
between supporters and opponents of the ceasefires as a divisive issue at youth networking 
meetings (interview 9, 2006). The spokesperson for the ABSDF expressed the criticisms 
that some ceasefire groups were more interested in ‘getting rich’ and maintaining their own 
local authority than in working toward democracy or cooperating with other opposition 
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groups (interview 2, 2006). Disagreement with the decision of the Palaung State Liberation 
Organisation to sign a ceasefire was the founding moment for the PSLF to break away 
from their ‘mother organisation’ and to ‘continue to fight for our aim and objectives as we 
have laid down’ (interview 6, 2006). However, the ceasefire in Palaung state has made it 
difficult for the PSLF to continue the armed struggle, as they were cut off from 
communications, arms, and recruits. Similarly, the ABSDF has found their operations in 
Kachin and Karen states restricted following the Kachin Independence Organisation 
(KIO) ceasefire and the 2004 ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ between the regime and the KNU 
(interview 2, 2006). Mon organisations have had difficulties with a ceasefire agreement that 
forbids political activity or contact with outside organisations. Members of the 
organisations active inside Mon state said the ceasefire had made it harder for them to 
express their opinions freely or organise protests. It was difficult to deal with other 
organisations and they had to be very careful when arranging meetings or contact 
(interviews 31, 32 and 33). 
Philippines 
The KMU general secretary supported the armed struggle of the NPA because ‘it puts the 
people’s organisation on a par with government suppression, because they can rely on this 
group whenever there is government suppression, they can always call on support from 
these people to protect them.’ For these reasons, the general secretary felt that his opinions 
were shared by many activists within the legal non-violent opposition movements: ‘people’s 
organisations know very well that this armed group is for them and this military and police 
are tools of their enemy’ (interview 5, 2008) 
 It is not possible for most activists in the legal opposition movements to express such 
open support for the armed struggle of the NPA. Government repression of legal activists 
is often based on allegations that these activists are communists or that they support the 
rebels. Legal organisations are therefore careful to maintain public neutrality on the conflict 
between the NPA and the AFP. Statements of support for the outlawed CPP are 
somewhat more common however, including public campaigns in support of the exiled 
founder of the CPP, Prof. Jose Maria Sison (BAYAN 2010b). Sison remains a key figure 
whose role as a public intellectual and political leader extends beyond the CPP. In his role 
as chair of the International League of Peoples’ Struggle, Sison is able to promote links 
between the legal and the armed wings of the opposition movements in the Philippines. 
These connections are discussed in more detail below in the section on relations with 
international groups.  
 The CPP maintains that waging armed struggle against the state is consistent with 
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supporting efforts by other opposition movements to engage with parliamentary and legal 
processes. When military sources suggested in the media that the CPP leadership was split 
between those supporting the armed struggle and those advocating a legal and 
parliamentary approach, the CPP responded that there was no contradiction in supporting 
both. While the CPP maintains that ‘it is revolutionary armed struggle that will guarantee 
the eventual victory of the revolutionary movement’, it also recognises the potential for 
progress to be made through legal political channels: 
The entire revolutionary movement welcomes and persistently works for the 
attainment of  substantive or even tactical gains for the revolution and the Filipino 
people through peace talks, parliamentary struggle and all other forms of  legal 
struggle, without at any moment abandoning or relegating to secondary status the 
revolutionary armed struggle (CPP, 2010). 
While this statement should of course be read as propaganda, the choice of response is 
nonetheless interesting. Rather than denying outright the AFP’s claim that support exists 
within the CPP for legal parliamentary approaches, the party emphatically affirmed the 
compatibility of legal and armed struggle. Although it is more difficult for members of the 
legal organisations to express such opinions without facing persecution, it seems reasonable 
to agree with the general secretary of the KMU that such views are likely to be widespread 
within the legal movements.  
Relations with the State 
Burma 
Problems which were explicitly identified by participants as causes of armed conflict 
included government denial of ethnic rights and refusal to listen to minority voices, 
government attacks on community leaders, the government reneging on agreements, 
ineffectiveness of peaceful protest, and desperation caused by poverty and a lack of 
alternative forms of resistance. Many of these problems, like the conflicts they are linked 
to, go back fifty years or more to the political struggles of post-independence Burma. 
Specific grievances which sparked conflict included the 1948 disbanding of ethnic-based 
military units such as the Karen Rifles, the lack of promised Karen and Mon States in the 
independent Union of Burma, and the 1961 government suppression of the traditional 
Palaung royalty (interviews 21, 33 and 34, 2006). The 1988 student conflict with the regime 
which preceded the formation of the ABSDF had been sparked by a heavy police response 
to a fight in a Rangoon tea shop. When students protested, demanding an official 
investigation, the state responded with further violence, and protests escalated. When the 
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military intervened and crushed the protests, many students fled to the jungle and took up 
arms. Participants described an ongoing political crisis in the 1980s as the BSPP regime 
maintained a one-party system and a socialist ideology that was in conflict with government 
practice, while enforcing order with ‘draconian censorship laws’ and arrests of people who 
criticised the government (interviews 2 and 8, 2006). Members of each armed group cited a 
lack of consultation or unwillingness to listen on the part of successive regimes as causes of 
the ongoing and unresolved armed conflicts. 
 The impossibility of working with the regime was also identified as a problem by 
participants from non-armed groups. Members of women’s groups felt that they were 
hated by the regime for exposing the abuses of women by members of the military and for 
their criticisms of the regime (interview 12, 2006). Members of the groups had been 
blacklisted and forced to flee the country. It was felt that any contact with the regime was 
dangerous (interview 22, 2006). Participants from groups that had produced reports on 
social problems in Burma did not believe that these would be heeded by the regime or have 
an effect on policy (interview 9, 2006). 
 Participants reported widespread anger with the regime. In the cities, these ‘bad feelings’ 
toward the government were caused by decisions such as the cancellation of certain 
banknotes in 1987, instantly impoverishing many people, as well as by political repression 
and violence toward protesters (interview 2, 2006). In rural areas, resentment of local BSPP 
authorities was exacerbated by poverty, economic restrictions, and widespread corruption 
(interview 1, 2006). One participant from Karen state said that this situation made the 
people ‘desperate to fight for their freedom in terms of political freedom, economic 
freedom.’ (interview 8, 2008). Another participant, from Kachin state, said that most 
people learnt to both fear and oppose government and local authority officers from the 
first time they encountered them: ‘Because always the SPDC threaten with the gun to the 
civilian or local people, so they are afraid of that weapon, but in their mind they know what 
they should do.’ (interview 9, 2006). 
 A range of abuses by the military regime was catalogued by participants across all groups 
in the sample. Recent army offensives and expansion of military bases in the border area, 
especially in Karen state, had caused villagers to be confined to their homes or forcibly 
relocated and cut off from their fields and food supplies. Others had been forced to flee 
their homes, hiding in the jungle or crossing the border into Thailand (interviews 16 and 
25, 2006). Various participants from Karen and Kachin states reported an increase in 
forced labour, conscription, and extortion by military authorities to fund the expanded 
military presence in those areas (interviews 9, 16, 22 and 25, 2006). Groups from Mon state 
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reported that despite a ceasefire with the military regime, people continued to suffer forced 
labour and relocation and other human rights violations, including rape and killings 
(interviews 32, 33 and 34, 2006). Participants from all women’s groups reported widespread 
rape by soldiers, which they felt was sanctioned by military authorities and used as a 
weapon of war against their communities. The regime was also blamed for involvement in 
drug trafficking and creating the conditions for widespread drug addiction, especially 
among young people in Kachin state (interview 9, 2006). These abuses and the resentment 
and resistance they engender can seen as both cause and consequence of armed conflict. 
The Philippines 
Legal opposition movements in the Philippines face an ambiguous relationship with the 
state. On the one hand, the formally democratic parliamentary system provides real 
opportunities to engage with authorities. On the other hand, political repression is 
widespread as units of the AFP extend their counter-insurgency campaign against the CPP-
NPA to target civil society organisations seen as sympathetic. In addition, each of the 
opposition activists interviewed linked wider problems in Philippines society and economy 
to the structure of the state. The state is seen as dominated by elite economic interests, 
primarily landowning families, who are in turn subservient to foreign capital.  As the 
secretary-general of BAYAN put it:  
The Philippine reality has been shaped by more than a hundred years of  colonial 
and neo-colonial rule, backward agricultural feudal, semi-feudal conditions and 
power concentrated in the hands of  the few, the economic and political elite 
(interview 2, 2006). 
In this context, opposition activists describe the collective motivations of their 
organisations to seek a renewal of Philippines culture along ‘nationalist, pro-people and 
scientific’ lines (interview 1, 2008). Because the structural problems with the state are seen 
as rooted in the social and economic systems of the country, the form that resistance takes 
is just as important as any immediate strategic objective: 
our goal is not just the removal of  one administration or the changing of  one 
regime, it is the long term goal of  changing society and the social system. But for 
the current regime, the immediate objective is to make it accountable for all its 
crimes and seek its removal through peaceful means and mass protest actions 
(interview 2, 2008). 
Opposition activists emphasise the importance of non-violent activism and cultural work in 
creating the necessary conditions for political and social change. While mobilising in 
opposition to the state on particular issues such as corruption, opposition movements also 
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try to link these issues to broader problems with the structure of the state and the need for 
fundamental change.  
 Where political space has been unavailable for the peaceful expression of opposition to 
government policies, political movements have taken up armed resistance against the state. 
For example, the resistance of the Cordillera peoples to state development projects in the 
1970s and 1980s followed a typical pattern of escalation. When protest letters, petitions, 
and meetings with government officials had no effect, the affected communities turned to 
more direct and militant forms of protest. In one peaceful direct action against the Chico 
dam, an entire community dismantled a surveying camp and marched en masse to the 
provincial capital to return the engineering equipment to the governor. The military 
responded to such actions with repression, arresting protest leaders and even whole 
communities and holding them for long periods (Hyndman 1991, 172). As the Cordillera 
region became increasingly militarised under martial law, some of those resisting large-scale 
development projects joined the New People’s Army or took independent armed action 
against the state forces (interview 3, 2008). With the relative increase in political space 
following the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship, opposition groups such as the CPA 
have returned to legal and non-violent forms of struggle.  
Relations with International Groups 
Burma 
Participants from armed organisations expressed a desire for international understanding of 
their need to hold arms for self-defence and in pursuit of their goals. A common sentiment 
was expressed by a member of the ABSDF: ‘when they come after us with guns, we need 
the guns to defend ourselves. I think if people come and talk to us and see the situation, 
they will understand that’. Others expressed frustration at the lack of international support 
or funds for groups that hold arms. Members of armed groups in the study felt that they 
deserved the support of global civil society because they were fighting for democratic 
change and for the benefit of the people. As one ABSDF member put it, ‘the international 
groups like NGOs, civil society, if they really want to change Burma they need to support 
armed struggle effectively’. These needs for weapons and support for armed struggle were, 
unsurprisingly, expressed by members of the armed groups rather than those from non-
armed groups. 
 A lack of international awareness, understanding, or support was expressed by several 
participants from both armed and non-armed groups. However, members of armed groups 
reported a more widespread lack of support than members of non-armed groups. 
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Participants who felt their groups lacked international support attributed this to various 
factors, including isolation, lack of information sharing, lack of contacts, and international 
interest in national politics rather than minority interests. These concerns were expressed 
by members of the armed groups as well as members of the smaller, less well known non-
armed groups (KWAT, AKSYU).  
 In addition, members of armed groups felt that they lacked international support and 
understanding due to a widespread opposition to armed struggle and political violence. 
However, as Clifford Bob (2005, 4) has pointed out, international support for armed 
resistance movements is uneven and depends both on strategic factors and the agency of 
armed groups themselves in forging international alliances. Armed groups from Burma 
have struggled for many years to access any international assistance, including humanitarian 
assistance or support for their education and health departments. When the ABSDF was in 
the early stages of organising students fleeing state repression in the late 1980s, emergency 
food supplied by international NGOs was restricted to rice and fish paste, and was only 
supplied to non-combatants. The group survived by trading rice for other food supplies 
and sharing half-rations between armed and non-armed members. Later, the group 
managed to access some aid funding to assist in setting up education and health programs 
for refugees on the border. But in 2001, this funding too was cut, with USAID 
withdrawing support. Group members interviewed felt that this indicated a changing 
international attitude against armed groups, which was confirmed by the declaration of the 
‘war on terror’. A spokesperson for the KNU also linked a lack of recognition from 
international groups and governments to a perception that armed groups were linked to 
terrorism. This was due, in his opinion, to a lack of understanding of the causes of conflict: 
when you talk about arms, some of  the westerners think that you’re from the other 
side, like you’re from the terrorist group. But we have to explain to them why we 
hold arms. From the very beginning, people don’t want to hold arms. All the ethnic 
groups from the early days, they would like to solve the problem by democratic 
ways. But when you are forced to come to this solution, I think all the ethnic 
groups started with this struggle. To get the support, we have to explain to them 
the atrocity that our people facing in our homeland, the discrimination that our 
people facing (interview 2). 
This participant reported that similar attitudes had initially been encountered from students 
and other political refugees fleeing repression in the cities. He felt that some people were 
wary of working with armed groups because of government propaganda that ethnic armed 
groups were terrorists. Only when they had stayed for a while at the border and seen that 
the armed groups were there ‘only to defend their community, defend themselves’ did they 
understand and support the need to hold arms. This explanation links the lack of 
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international support for armed groups to a lack of awareness and understanding of the 
situation for their communities, the causes of the conflicts, and the motivations for armed 
resistance. 
 While international support for armed resistance has declined, there has been some 
increase in international efforts to promote norms of non-violent resistance. For instance, 
the Albert Einstein Institution (AEI) established by Gene Sharp, a leading proponent of 
strategic non-violence, has taken an increasingly active interest in Burma (Albert Einstein 
Institution 2000, 2004). Sharp’s book From Dictatorship to Democracy was written for use by 
Burmese opposition activists and was first published in serial form in Burmese and English 
by the Burmese opposition journal Kyit Paing (New Era) in 1993 (Sharp 2003, 87-90). In 
2009, the National Endowment for Democracy provided USD300,000 through the 
International Republican Institute for training programmes and other activities run by AEI 
to ‘strengthen the capacity of the democratic opposition and civil society groups to engage 
in non-violent political action inside Burma’ (National Endowment for Democracy 2010). 
The effects of these training activities in promoting international norms and reframing local 
practices are discussed in more detail in the following chapter.  
 Members of both armed and non-armed groups discussed international awareness-
raising and networking as potential sources of financial and human resources for their 
groups. For instance, a soldier from the Karen National Liberation Army said that he 
hoped that people who heard about the situation in Karen state through this study would 
be able to come to the area and help in some way. One women’s group member said: 
‘when other people know about what is happening inside…we get donations or people 
want to come and help’. Members of women’s, youth, and student organisations also 
discussed the strength of international networks that allowed them to participate in 
international campaigns and learn from other organisations. Participants from both armed 
and non-armed groups expressed a need for peace in their country. 
 All members of armed groups in the sample said that more international pressure on the 
regime in Burma was needed. Pressure was seen as needed to persuade the regime to enter 
into dialogue, to respect human rights, and to give up power. Support was consistently 
expressed for ‘tripartite dialogue’ between armed ethnic groups, the National League for 
Democracy (NLD), and the SPDC regime. Participants supported international pressure 
towards these goals in the form of action by the United Nations Security Council, 
diplomatic pressure by states, and sanctions on Burmese military and business interests. No 
support was expressed for outside military intervention, with one participant saying 
supporting this would be ‘quite crazy’. 
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The Philippines 
Opposition activists from the Philippines, including members of both unarmed legal 
movements and armed illegal movements, have been able to use international fora to 
interact in ways which would not be possible domestically. The Philippines mass 
movements affiliated with BAYAN, which include all of the groups participating in this 
study, with the exception of the NUSP, are also affiliated with the International League for 
Peoples’ Struggle (ILPS) (International League of Peoples' Struggle 2004a). The ILPS is an 
organisation which exists to ‘promote, support and develop the anti-imperialist and 
democratic struggles of the peoples of the world’ (International League of Peoples' Struggle 
2004b). Links between the ILPS and the Philippines are especially strong, as the ILPS is 
chaired by Prof. Jose Maria Sison, exiled leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines 
(CPP) and chief political advisor to the National Democratic Front of the Philippines 
(NDFP), who now lives in the Netherlands. Members of the Philippines organisations 
attend international meetings of the ILPS and receive delegations from ILPS affiliates in 
other countries (interviews 2, 3 and 5, 2008). ILPS meetings provide an opportunity for 
members of the legal movements in the Philippines to liaise with Prof. Sison and the 
NDFP in an open forum which could not occur in the Philippines, where the NDFP’s 
member organisations are banned.  
 Opposition groups from the Philippines have also used international fora and 
relationships with international groups to campaign against political violence targeted 
against them by the state. The BAYAN organisations coordinate campaigns against killings, 
abductions, and disappearances of activists by state forces (interview 2, 2008; IBON 2007). 
The secretary-general of BAYAN credited international support for the ‘Stop the Killings’ 
campaign with putting sufficient pressure on the Arroyo government to achieve a 
reduction in the politically targeted violence. For instance, by working through 
international trade union contacts, the KMU was able to persuade the International Trade 
Union Confederation (ITUC) to issue a statement condemning repression of trade union 
activists. The International Labour Organisation also passed resolutions calling on the 
Philippines government to investigate the claims and allow international missions to 
monitor and report on the human rights situation (interview 5, 2008).   
Conclusion 
Existing literature on the relationship between global civil society and political violence has 
tended to assume a clear division between the two. On the one hand, global civil society 
actors are assumed to be committed to non-violence and are seen as a legitimate force for 
global political change. On the other hand, non-state armed groups are identified with the 
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unrestrained violence of ‘uncivil’ or ‘network’ wars and are not seen as legitimate political 
actors. However, it is evident from the results of the empirical research discussed in this 
paper that participants were not making such stark divisions between groups that have a 
commitment to non violence and those that hold arms. The question of whether violence 
by non-state groups is acceptable was found to be not one but several questions, relating to 
both principled belief and to strategic choices in complex situations. Answers to these 
questions about the legitimacy of violence were not always dependent on whether the 
participant was a member of an armed or a non-armed group. 
 Participants discussed their situation and activities in terms of specific problems faced 
by their communities; what they needed and lacked. Motivations for group actions and 
relationships were similarly based on understandings grounded in the situation of the 
community. In discussing their needs, lacks, problems, motivations, actions, and 
relationships there was more that united than divided the participants from armed and 
non-armed groups. To the participants, the tactics or means that a group used to resist 
were not usually the most important signifiers of inclusion within the bonds of trust and 
association sometimes identified as civil society. Rather, a demonstrated commitment to 
responding to the needs and problems of the community, motivated by a concern for the 
collective interest, was generally a more important criterion for inclusion in relationships of 
cooperation among opposition groups. 
 Based on the close analysis of opposition movements in Burma and the Philippines 
presented in this chapter, it is evident that participants in both armed and non-armed 
groups share a large degree of common experience and understanding of their political 
goals and activities. The web of mutual recognition between armed and non-armed 
organisations in this context is so dense that an analytical distinction between the two 
seems more of a barrier than an aid to understanding the situation. If an analytical 
distinction is to be maintained between global civil society and armed organisations, it must 
be recognised that in practice there is often considerable overlap between the two. 
However, for situations of social conflict of the kind discussed in this paper, it may be 
more fruitful to consider both armed and non-armed organisations as participants in global 
civil society.  
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5 
Legitimacy is Learnt: Processes of 
Political Change 
 
Learning processes contribute to political change by reconfiguring the expectations, 
practices, and conceptual framing of actors. Opposition organisations in Burma and in the 
Philippines make extensive use of formal and informal learning processes in their projects 
for political change. Learning processes are formally incorporated into alternative education 
programmes that seek to transform existing systems of schooling and higher education. 
Informal learning processes are also a key component of many areas of opposition activity, 
from human rights documentation to political organising.  
 The case studies of opposition movements in Burma and the Philippines are used below 
to illustrate both the political character of education and the pedagogical character of 
politics in these contexts. Even if education has no explicit political content or aims, any 
form of collective learning still necessarily involves either transforming or reinforcing 
particular social practices and relationships. Changes in the form and content of education 
have widespread political effects which are hard to predict in a linear fashion, since the 
education process is by definition intersubjective. In the extreme case, the extension of 
education to sectors of a population who have not previously had access to formal learning 
is a process of major and complex transformation of everyday politics. Sociologists of 
education have shown how intense debates in developed countries over the form and 
content of education are linked to competing sets of social norms, in which education is 
seen as deeply implicated in political, economic, and social development (e.g., Lowe 1997, 
47-80). In developing countries where the state plays a strong role in education, such as 
India, the debates over the form and content and education are even more politicised and 
intense (Kumar 1998). This is because education is seen as a vital strategic tool that the 
state can use to achieve social goals, whether contributing to economic development, 
advancing gender equality or eroding differences in class and caste (Kumar 1998; Kingdon 
and Muzzamil 2001). In this context, criticism of particular governments for failing to 
deliver on progress in education can be seen as a recognition of the importance of the state 
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role in education. 
 As has been pointed out by Biro (2007), when non-state actors take on state functions 
in providing public goods, they constitute alternative forms of governance and challenges 
to state power. The argument in this chapter is that one of the ways this shift occurs is 
through the emergence of new political norms which favour the alternative political project 
of the opposition. In the course of providing public goods, including access to education, 
opposition groups create new political expectations. This much is true of all public goods 
provided by opposition groups, including healthcare, security, and economic opportunities, 
in that communities come to expect such public goods to be provided as a condition of 
political legitimacy. But where the act of providing a public good involves learning 
processes, as is the case in both formal education and informal training, the potential exists 
for much greater changes in the political expectations, habitual practices, and cognitive 
framing of the participants. 
 This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section examines the complex dynamics of 
‘educating’ in political terms – learning processes that take place within social movements 
for political change in Burma and the Philippines. In the second section, I discuss the 
importance of ‘documenting’ in each case study, as activist organisations learning a very 
specific norm of political practice. In the third and final section of the chapter, I examine 
how non-state actors in Burma and the Philippines have learnt different norms of political 
organising and mobilisation, which have shaped how they engage in everyday acts of 
political resistance and contest the legitimacy of the state regime. 
Educating 
Burma 
In delivering basic education to their communities, Burmese opposition groups provide a 
public good that adds to their political legitimacy. At the same time, the learning processes 
involved in education make lasting changes to the everyday politics of the community, 
creating new norms based on the expectation and practice of education. As discussed in 
earlier chapters, education is highly valued at the community level throughout Burma. The 
inability of the state to provide access to quality education is a major factor in the popular 
illegitimacy of the SPDC regime. On the other hand, the provision of education by 
opposition groups contributes to their political legitimacy, both as non-state political actors 
and as aspirants to state power.  
 Non-state actors in Burma have a major role in the provision of basic education. Based 
on the broad cross-section of community-based opposition groups from Burma in this 
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study, it seems that most of these groups are involved in the direct provision of basic 
education in their communities. Education is seen as a good in itself, and the provision of 
education is a primary goal for families and community organisations in Burma. As has 
been discussed in detail in chapters two and three, the absence or sub-standard quality of 
state-provided education leaves a gap which opposition groups attempt to fill through their 
basic education programmes.  
 These efforts are driven by beliefs in the importance of education in general, and 
education in the native languages of minority peoples in particular. Opposition groups 
describe many of their goals, including democratic political change and economic 
development, as being dependent on raising the education of their communities. Education 
in general terms is therefore seen as the most basic aspect of capacity building for 
development. In particular, a recurring theme for participants in the fieldwork for this 
study was a concern for the preservation of their indigenous languages and cultures. 
Providing education for their community in their native language and cultural practices was 
identified as a priority by all of the CBOs based in non-Burman ethnic minority 
communities. As a spokesperson for the AKSYU put it: 
…some Kachin people, I mean the younger generation they do not know the 
Kachin language, even [though] they are Kachin. They speak other different 
language, maybe Thai, Burmese. They don’t know their mother language. So we 
want to develop their language, their mother language (interview 9, 2006). 
Although this particular group had identified education in the Kachin language and culture 
as a priority for their work, they had been unable to secure funding for the education 
projects they wanted to undertake. They were left feeling that international donors did not 
share their priorities for the kind of education they felt was needed (interview 9, 2006).  
 Complaints about the insufficiency of state-provided education in Burma are also linked 
to problems connected with a perceived lack of political knowledge among the general 
population. For the opposition groups from Burma, the education system in the country is 
broken and offers no preparation for the requirements of a democratic society. A 
spokesperson for the Mon Youth Progressive Organisation (MYPO) explained this lack: 
the students inside Burma graduate from university, but they don’t know about the 
articles of  human rights or anything at all about human rights. So it’s difficult for us 
to build the democracy country, when they don’t know the basics about human 
rights (interview 32, 2006). 
This quote makes clear an assumption that is not always voiced so explicitly by opposition 
activists advocating for the importance of an educated population: that it is not just 
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education per se that is important, but a particular kind of education. In this case, the 
MYPO spokesperson was making the judgements, widespread among opposition groups 
from Burma, that human rights are the necessary building blocks of democracy, and that 
knowledge of human rights is lacking among the general population. Referring to the 
articles of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ‘basics’ of human rights 
establishes a minimum criteria of knowledge for a democratic citizen and a clear education 
goal for opposition movements to meet. The above quote also indicates that a particular set 
of learning processes has already taken place, by which certain activists in the opposition 
movement have become convinced of the importance of human rights knowledge.  
 In areas where state-provided education already exists, but is seen as substandard, 
opposition groups are responding to an existing community expectation of education as a 
public good and an entitlement that is not being met by the state. In these areas, opposition 
groups have responded by setting up parallel education systems which are more responsive 
to the existing needs and expectations of the community. An example of this dynamic is 
the establishment of the Mon schools under the leadership of the NMSP (interviews 30 
and 33, 2006). The gaps in the state education system are so large, however, that in many 
cases the establishment of a parallel education system is the first experience that a 
community has of formal education (interview 21, 2006). Opposition groups sometimes 
work with religious groups who provide basic community education services. There is a 
tradition in Burma of primary education being provided by religious organisations, whether 
Buddhist monasteries or Christian churches. Religious organisations continue to provide 
basic education, especially in language and literacy. In some areas, religious organisations 
provide the only available education in the native languages of minority ethnic groups. 
Christian churches in Kachin state provide literacy education in the Kachin language, while 
Buddhist monasteries in Arakan and Mon states run classes in the respective local 
languages. Where possible, opposition groups cooperate with religious groups in their areas 
to support these educational activities (interviews 11, 23, 30, 2006). The educational activity 
of the opposition groups therefore either creates or reinforces exisiting local norms of non-
state provision of education. 
 From an outside perspective, the extent of the involvement of political opposition 
groups in providing basic education is often surprising. In the absence of state-provided 
education, organisations ranging from trade unions to armed resistance groups take 
responsibility for educating the children of their members and communities. For instance, 
soon after the formation of the ABSDF as a student guerrilla army, the organisation 
established an education department and opened Yaung Ni Oo primary school in the 
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border camp it controlled. Since its inauguration in 1989, the school has expanded to 
include middle school students in 1994 and high school students in 1998. In 2006, Yaung 
Ni Oo comprised 431 students, 82 of whom were boarders, taught by 25 teachers 
(interview 3, 2006). In a similar response to a situation of need, the local branch of the 
FTUB in Mae Sot on the Thai-Burma border established a school for the children of the 
large population of Burmese migrant workers in the town. Because Burmese workers in 
Thailand generally lack formal residency documents, at best holding temporary work 
permits, they are unable to access state-funded services, including education for their 
children. Local union organisers found that the lack of education for children was a core 
concern for the workers and so worked to find solutions. From ad hoc classes conducted 
in a spare room at the union office, the FTUB education program had grown by 2006 to 
accommodate over 100 primary school students. In addition to classes run directly by the 
union, the FTUB provided support to a nearby independent school for the children of 
migrant workers (interview 15, 2006). 
 To the extent that education is available to Burma’s ethnic minority peoples on the 
country’s borders, it is largely through the combined efforts of opposition organisations 
and other CBOs. Education efforts are coordinated by ethnic nationality organisations, 
with the cooperation of youth groups, women’s organisations, and others, including trade 
unions, church organisations, and even armed groups. Organisations like the Karen 
National Union (KNU) and New Mon State Party (NMSP) have established education 
departments to coordinate international aid with local resources to organise schools 
providing basic education in their communities. Other opposition organisations based in 
the communities contribute to the provision of education in different ways. Women’s 
organisations take direct responsibility for education projects, such as an early childhood 
centre run by the KWO, as well as providing support to women and children to enable 
them to participate in education (interview 25, 2006). Teachers in the schools run by 
opposition organisations are usually activists themselves and may move back and forward 
between their roles as schoolteachers and their roles as soldiers or community organisers 
(interviews 3, 15, 16, 30 and 31, 2006). Opposition-aligned youth groups coordinate labour 
and donations to build and maintain school buildings in remote villages and areas under 
opposition control (interviews 11 and 28, 2006). In doing so, opposition groups have 
created a patchwork system of alternative education that operates in parallel to, and extends 
beyond, the state education system. 
 The alternative education system created by the opposition groups makes a major 
contribution to their project of political change. Altogether, opposition groups make a 
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massive contribution of material support and human resources to the provision of basic 
education in Burma. They do so without support from the state and in the face of intense 
military and political repression. The educational practices initiated by opposition groups – 
establishing and maintaining schools, training and supporting teachers, encouraging and 
supporting students to pursue education – create permanent change in the everyday politics 
of their base communities. Community members who become teachers or students gain 
expectations of education for future generations, and these expectations become 
conditions of political legitimacy. Experiences of education also affect the framing of 
political issues by communities. By promoting education on indigenous culture and 
language, or on human rights, opposition groups are able to influence gradual change in the 
framing of political issues. 
The Philippines 
Like the groups from Burma, opposition groups in the Philippines are engaged in 
education programmes which contribute to the emergence of new norms by changing 
expectations, practices, and conceptual framing. While state-provided schooling is more 
widely available than it is in Burma and generally of a much higher quality, there are still 
gaps in the ability of ordinary people to access education. Opposition groups focus not 
only on improving access to basic education, but also on contesting the purpose and 
content of education. As noted in earlier chapters, opposition groups criticise the state 
education system for being oriented towards the needs of international capital rather than 
the national development needs of the Philippines. The alternative model of education 
proposed by the opposition groups is based on the principles that education should be 
‘nationalist, scientific and pro-people’ (interview 1, 2008). Opposition groups pursue this 
end through their own programme of political education, which seeks to set a practical 
example of learning that serves the interests of the people and the country. Through 
political education, opposition groups also seek to raise expectations amongst students and 
community members of an education system that works in the public interest. The learning 
processes involved in the activism of opposition groups, whether connected to the existing 
formal education system or in the context of broader social activism, contribute to the 
emergence of new political norms through changed expectations and practices.  
 For the opposition organisations in the Philippines, the focus of their educational work 
is on political organising rather than formal education. The activities of the youth 
organisation Anakbayan are consistent with this pattern, but because the context of the 
organisation’s work is with students and youth, its activities overlap to a greater extent with 
the learning processes of formal education. As the spokesperson for Anakbayan put it, the 
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organisation has an alternative programme of education, some of which is ‘within the 
framework of the academe’ and some of which is outside the framework of existing formal 
education: 
we have various courses in our own curriculum that we give to our members and 
also non-members, the student masses who are in the universites and high schools. 
So I think this is one way of  promoting this kind of  [alternative] education and 
culture. Because it will not just begin when the state performs its role, so we have 
our own initiatives and activities that we do now (interview 1, 2008). 
This way of expressing the practice of alternative education makes clear the role it plays in 
parallel to existing state education. Alternative education plays both a complementary and 
prefigurative role in relation to existing processes of formal education. Opposition groups 
organise extra-curricular education programmes which seek to provide the political analysis 
that is seen as lacking in state-provided education. At the same time as complementing 
existing education processes, alternative education prefigures transformation of the 
provision of core state education. Opposition groups are not content to play the 
complementary role envisioned for non-state actors by liberal theories of civil society. 
Rather, their programmes of education are aimed at building a political project which 
would supplant the current apparatus of the state and transform the education system 
along the lines prefigured in the present programmes of alternative education.  
 The priorities of the alternative education programme in the Philippines are therefore 
synonymous with the agenda of the opposition groups for transformation of the education 
system and society more generally. These priorities are identified by Anakbayan as learning 
about ‘Philippines society and revolution’, ‘culture and arts’, and ‘Imperalism’ (interview 1, 
2008). The first priority reflects the need for opposition organisations to present an analysis 
of social conflict that is at odds with the official version taught in schools and covers topics 
not dealt with in the official curriculum. Discussions led by Anakbayan members 
acknowledge the protracted civil war in the Philippines, portraying it as a revolutionary 
struggle (interview 1, 2008). Framing the analysis in this way, even without expressing 
explicit support or alignment with the underground communist forces, represents a radical 
break from the kinds of learning that would be possible within the conventional 
curriculum. The second priority, promoting Filipino culture and arts, has just as political an 
aim. Opposition groups in the Philippines make widespread use of popular cultural forms 
such as song and theatre to communicate political messages and build collective identities 
around political resistance. Political theatre and song performances at community events 
such as Cordillera Day represent historical struggles, tying memories of resistance to 
continuing political commitments and linking local and national struggles (interview 3, 
110 
 
2008; fieldwork notes, 2008). Cultural work of this kind is both a learning and a learnt 
process. By including a focus on culture and arts in their alternative programme of 
education, Anakbayan builds the personal connection that participants feel to political 
resistance as well as increasing their capacity to engage in cultural work themselves. Lastly, 
the focus on imperialism is designed to promote an understanding of the social and 
economic problems of the Philippines in the context of geopolitical dependence on the 
United States. The internationalisation of political analysis, together with the promotion of 
a view of the United States as a neo-colonial and oppressive power, is seen as a key goal of 
political learning processes by the opposition groups in the Philippines (interviews 1, 5, 6, 
2008). 
Documenting 
When political organisations want to make local issues known to an international audience, 
they may seek to do so by producing various kinds of reports and documents that explain 
the local situation. Processes of documentation therefore make aspects of local 
communities knowable to international outsiders. In this respect, documentation is an 
outwardly focused process in which it is outsiders doing the learning. But in order to make 
this international learning possible, the process of documentation must itself be learnt at 
the local level in a form that renders the information intelligible to the international 
audience. 
 The documentation of human rights abuses, for instance, links the everyday experience 
of state violence to international human rights norms. Human rights documentation is a 
learning process, in that it involves researching and disseminating information about 
communities in a way that allows outsiders to learn about certain aspects of their situation. 
It is also a learnt process, in that the forms of communication and interaction necessarily to 
document abuses in terms of human rights must themselves be learnt. Framing state 
violence as an abuse of human rights has the effect of changing expectations and practices 
at the local level as well as affecting outcomes at the international level. By framing appeals 
for international attention and pressure in terms that align with international human rights 
norms, opposition groups are able to add legitimacy to their claims and gain access to 
established mechanisms of international politics (Sikkink 1993). This argument – that 
international norms are strategically adopted by local actors to gain access and standing in 
international contexts – is developed more fully in the following chapter. The related 
argument that will be developed in this section is that in local contexts, international 
human rights norms function as framing concepts which are adapted to meet the needs of 
local circumstances.  
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Burma 
The work of community-based groups in documenting violence and abuses by the military 
in terms of human rights norms is a different, though connected, process from the efforts 
detailed above to educate the population in Burma about human rights.  While human 
rights education aims to change the ways that local people think about the world and frame 
political demands, human rights documentation aims to take existing grievances and frame 
them in terms of human rights norms for an international audience. The purpose for doing 
this is to gain access to international fora and to established mechanisms by which the state 
can be held accountable and pressured to abide by norms of human rights. In other words, 
while human rights education is an attempt to influence the normative conceptions of the 
population, activism based on human rights documentation is an effort to normalise the 
practices of the state.   
 Documentation of human rights abuses in Burma is a major effort oriented towards 
providing the raw material required for lobbying international organisations and states to 
put pressure on the SPDC regime. These international lobbying efforts, which are detailed 
in the following chapter, require reports based on up-to-date and specific data of human 
rights violations. As the spokesperson for the FTUB put it, these lobbying efforts require 
the ‘year round work of the human rights documentation’ (interview 14, 2006). Local 
organisers for the FTUB and its affiliates described the difficulty and expense of collecting 
these reports, which require regular dangerous trips into territory controlled by the SPDC 
military (interview 15 and 16, 2006). As an organiser for the FTUB described, the process 
of human rights documentation had to be learnt from scratch, initially using forms adapted 
from a Swiss human rights NGO: 
they gave six forms, about the perpetrator, the victim, which is very good, also 
complete  I think. But also too long and a bit complex. They want to find the 
victim’s story and update it and also who is the perpetrator. But the reports we do 
are just general and villagers will not know who is the perpetrator and the rank, the 
age, or even what battalion it is (interview 15, 2006). 
The problem here is not that villagers are unobservant or ignorant, but rather that the 
distinctions which are important for the process of human rights documentation are 
irrelevant to the everyday politics of the community. While it is important from a human 
rights perspective to identify specific offenders who can be held accountable for violations, 
local communities may understand the same incidents as the acts of a generic enemy, in 
this case the SPDC or the Tatmadaw.  
 Documentation of human rights abuse in Burma generally involves translating 
grievances which are framed in different terms and with substantive differences in 
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emphasis to those of international norms of human rights. When asked about the terms in 
which grievances were expressed, the spokesperson for the Karen Women’s Organisation 
said that: 
Actually [the grievance is] not because they understand that it’s against their rights 
or it’s a violation. They say it’s not fair, it’s not good to come when we live 
peacefully, to come and destroy and you want to be the superior, try to take over 
everything, want to be the boss, like dictator. We live peacefully. Why they come 
and kill us? Why they come and take over our village, take over our place? 
(interview 25, 2006). 
The normative content of this expression links the expectation of the local community that 
they should be allowed to live in peace with their rejection of imposed hierarchy, 
domination, and state violence. Variations on these themes are repeated by activists from 
diverse CBOs in reporting the reactions of their communities to state repression. If one 
theme can be generalised across these responses, it is the desire to be left in peace which 
comes through so clearly in the above quote. There is an appeal to norms here which are 
distinct from the norms of the ‘rule of law’ and ‘responsibility to protect’ assumed in 
human rights frameworks, where the state is expected to be the guarantor of liberty and 
held accountable for lapses in this role. In the everyday norms of communities in Burma 
however, the state is viewed as an external threat to the well-being of the community. A 
Shan proverb quoted by Tannenbaum (1991) states that ordinary people should fear five 
‘enemies’: fire, flood, drought, famine, and government officials.  
 As detailed in Chapter Two, communities in Burma experience the state through the 
encroachment into their daily lives of military expansion, predatory tax collection, and 
corrupt regulation. The norms of everyday politics are oriented towards the assumption 
that the state is an oppressive force that is best avoided and evaded. The best that can be 
expected of agents of the state is that they can be persuaded or forced to leave the 
community alone to live in peace. Where agents of the state persist in interfering with the 
daily life of the community, people find ways to resist, accommodate, or escape the 
demands that the state puts on them. The documentation and presentation of these 
grievances against the state in the form of violations of human rights norms should 
therefore be understood as a strategic form of resistance to state power as it is experienced 
by the community. Documentation of human rights violations implies a certain recognition 
and acceptance of international human rights norms. But the meaning that these norms 
take on in local contexts and the political values that underlie their adoption depend on the 
everyday politics of the local situation.  
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The Philippines 
Opposition organisations in the Philippines have been active in documenting human rights 
violations by the state, while emphasising that these violations should be understood within 
a wider context of oppression. As the secretary-general of BAYAN puts it: 
The human rights side of  the Philippines has been quite prominent, so we want to 
show a link with the underlying basis which are the economic conditions and 
establish a logical link with the incidence of  abuses and the extreme situation of  
poverty and exploitation in the country (interview 2, 2008). 
The documentation of state violence and political repression in the Philippines is therefore 
undertaken by opposition organisations in a way that makes use of a human rights 
framework while also constantly making links to broader issues of oppression. Opposition 
organisations share the view that drawing attention to human rights abuses by the 
Philippines state is important in order to bring international pressure to bear on the 
government. However, opposition groups also see it as important that documentation and 
reporting of human rights abuses situates the abuse within the context of systemic 
inequality and state violence (interviews 2, 3, 4, 2008). For instance, as the spokesperson 
for GABRIELA puts it, women’s rights need to be understood within the particular social 
contexts in which women live: 
When we talk about women’s rights we talk about women’s rights vis-a-vis the 
situation that they face. ... Even though they are gender-based issues, you can look 
at the analysis and discover that it’s worsened by certain government policies that 
put people in the position where there is so much poverty (interview 4, 2008). 
This view, that women’s rights need to be understood in their political and economic 
context, mirrors the general statement about human rights made by the BAYAN 
spokesperson above. The argument being made here is not that human rights should be 
linked to politics and economics in an abstract sense, but that the concrete experience of 
gender oppression and political oppression more generally cannot be separated from the 
political and economic aspects of the situation in which it occurs. Advocacy for human 
rights is also placed in the context of social relationships in that improvements in human 
rights are understood to be a result of collective struggle and mobilisation.  
 Documentation of human rights violations is seen by the Philippines opposition groups 
as a process which requires an engagement with the everyday politics of communities as 
well as an analysis of broad patterns of oppression. This view is shared by Karapatan, the 
largest national human rights organisation in the Philippines, formed by an alliance of 
social movements and human rights organisations. Karapatan takes a firmly political 
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approach to the documentation of human rights abuses, arguing that ‘[t]he struggle of the 
Filipino people for national liberation and social emancipation provides the framework for 
human rights advocacy’ (Karapatan 2007). The involvement of Karapatan alongside the 
BAYAN-affiliated organisations in international efforts to pressure the Philippines over its 
human rights record, which are reviewed in more detail in the following chapter, show a 
recognition of international human rights norms. However, in speaking to an international 
as well as a domestic audience, Karapatan consistently emphasises the connection between 
human rights and broader struggles. In a statement condemning the continuation of ‘state 
terrorism and impunity’ under the newly elected government of Benigno Aquino, 
Karapatan described itself as ‘crying out for justice with the mass of the Filipino people’ 
(Karapatan 2010). The statement levels political criticism at President Aquino, describing 
his government as the ‘U.S.–Aquino Regime’ and comparing his start in the Presidency 
unfavourably to the early gestures made by his mother, former President Corazon Aquino, 
who released political prisoners upon coming to power. The statement by Karapatan goes 
on to describe the continuation of state violence under Aquino as ‘horrendous’ and 
‘appalling’. With this kind of language, human rights organisations are speaking primarily to 
a popular audience, whether domestically or internationally, rather than to the international 
elite of UN diplomats and officials. This shows that the strength of human rights advocacy 
in the Philippines lies as much in popular organising as in appeals to international elites.  
 The political values and corresponding ideas about ‘the good life’ that can be drawn 
from the analysis presented in this study show that local participants engage with human 
rights norms in ways that differ from international assumptions. In particular, the 
normative assumption that the state can and should be an enabling force for liberties and 
entitlements is an element of human rights norms which is at most a distant ideal within 
the everyday politics and experiences of many communities. More proximal to the everyday 
politics of the communities are values of independence and autonomy, expressed in terms 
of a vision of a good life in which communities would be left alone by the state. When 
opposition activists from Burma document abuses by the SPDC regime and call for 
international pressure on the basis of these reports, they are acting on the need of their 
communities for respite from attacks by state forces. There is no expectation that the state 
in Burma can immediately be transformed into an enabling and protecting force for human 
rights. Rather, the hope is that certain elements of the state can be persuaded to withdraw 
or ease the oppressive pressure on communities, with a consequent amelioration of the 
suffering that these communities experience. The ideal of a state that enables and protects 
human rights is a longer-term goal of political transformation.  
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Organising 
Political organising, from first contact to mobilisation to action, involves collective learning 
processes. The processes by which a community is mobilised for political resistance are 
referred to by many authors as ‘repertoires of contention’ (Tarrow and Tilly 2008). In the 
social movement literature, it is commonly recognised that repertoires are learnt patterns of 
collective behaviour (see McAdam 1995, 236). However, in looking for explanations for 
the diffusion and reproduction of repertoires, social movement theorists tend to focus on 
the macro-historical processes involved in the emergence of social categories and objects 
of contention (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001, 144-159), or on individualised explanations 
of social and political ‘entrepreneurship’. 
Burma 
Opposition activists from Burma make deliberate use of learning processes to build the 
capacity of their organisations and communities. In discussing education in terms of 
capacity building, participants referred to various aspects of their communities’ collective 
development as being enhanced by the education and training efforts of their organisations. 
In their relations with their communities, opposition groups from Burma place a great deal 
of emphasis on political education oriented towards building the capacity of the people for 
political action. The political education programmes undertaken by opposition groups can 
be analysed in different ways and are discussed below in terms of political mobilisation and 
norm diffusion. The description of these educational projects in terms of capacity building 
implies that often the primary purpose and effect of these programmes is to introduce their 
participants to new forms of political subjectivity and political action. Indeed, the 
transformation of Burma’s political culture and the introduction of ordinary people to new 
forms of political action are widely cited as motivations for political education programmes 
by opposition groups. 
 There is a widespread feeling among opposition activists from Burma that the general 
population lacks knowledge about politics and that this is a major barrier to political 
change. Variations on this idea were specifically expressed in their own words by 
participants in at least 16 of the 35 interviews conducted for this study. This opinion seems 
to be a matter of consensus across the opposition movement, as it was expressed 
independently by members of all the categories of groups in the study, with no 
contradictory opinions expressed (interviews 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 13, 14, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28, 
30 and 32, 2006). 
 For many activists, their concern with the lack of political education in Burma is based 
on their own experience of the difference that political education and training has made in 
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their personal outlook and commitment to political change. As a result of their own 
experience of feeling enlightened by education, they are concerned for those they see as 
unenlightened due to their lack of education. As one leader of the BWU put it: 
Before training I didn’t know everything, even though I was involved in politics, 
even though I was outside Burma. Later when I got the training, it changed a little 
bit and so myself  is like “have to do something, have to involve in our nation to 
change something, bad government or situation”, I realised this (interview 13, 
2006). 
As well as demonstrating a strong commitment to the transformative power of political 
education, this statement conveys the sense of collective duty attached to education in this 
context. The effect of the training offered by opposition groups is to create a sense of 
belonging and attachment to a nation and a duty to get involved in efforts to change the 
government and the political situation.  
 Youth groups in Arakan state were active in organising what they called ‘political 
defiance training’ in their state (interviews 1, 11, 2006). The manner in which political 
defiance training was discussed by the spokesperson for the AASYC demonstrated the 
importance of this learning process in the organisation’s vision of political change. 
Referring to the effect of repression and poverty on the level of popular political 
consciousness, the spokesperson said that for ordinary people: 
For their daily survival they are always thinking. They have nothing in their mind. 
That’s why we say they don’t have any knowledge of  politics. So we have to, for the 
inside people, we have to get some sort of  political defiance tactics, some sort of  
knowledge of  political defiance. Only the people who are connected to the 
organisations in the liberated area know about that, but ordinary people don’t know 
(interview 1, 2006). 
This statement clearly connects the need for training in political defiance tactics with the 
perceived lack of political knowledge amongst the general population, to the point where 
their minds are claimed to be literally empty. There is a significant distinction made in this 
quote between people connected to opposition organisations and ordinary people who lack 
these political connections and consequently lack knowledge about politics. This distinction 
is mapped onto a spatial separation between those living in areas under the control of 
opposition groups, described as the ‘liberated area’, and the population of central Burma 
who are described as ‘inside people’. This particular mapping of zones of knowledge is 
common in the political expression of opposition activists from Burma, with the same 
distinction often drawn between ‘inside’ as a zone of repression and ignorance and 
‘outside’ as a zone of freedom and knowledge. The border between inside and outside in 
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this collective perception is particularly porous and corresponds to overlapping zones of 
political influence, of the SPDC regime and opposition groups respectively. As in the 
above quote, this distinction often comes with an expression of the need to extend the 
freedom and knowledge represented by the ‘outside’ political organisations into the ‘inside’ 
of the country, in this case in the form of tactics of political defiance.  
 The use of the term ‘political defiance’ in Burma has an interesting and relatively short 
history, which can be traced directly to the activity of a retired US soldier and non-violence 
trainer, Colonel Robert Helvey. Helvey, who was the US military attaché to Burma from 
1983 to 1985, first delivered training on non-violent resistance in the KNU headquarters at 
Manerplaw in 1992. He coined the term ‘political defiance’ as a more palatable term to 
appeal to KNLA General Bo Mya, who found the concept of non-violence too soft 
(Bacher 2003, 10; Spencer 2008, 13). The training delivered by Helvey was based on the 
strategic non-violence approach developed by Gene Sharp and was delivered in association 
with the Albert Einstein Institute (AEI) established by Sharp. Sharp also made visits to 
Manerplaw and took a personal interest in developing the capacity of Burmese opposition 
groups to engage in strategic non-violent resistance (Sharp 2003, ix). Since the initial 
contacts made by Helvey and Sharp, the involvement of their organisations in delivering 
non-violence training has expanded considerably. They have directly provided ‘political 
defiance’ training for over 700 activists in the Burmese opposition groups on the Thai-
Burma border and Bangkok, Delhi and Oslo (AEI 2000, 7). These programmes have been 
supported by funding from private donors (Bacher 2003, 10) and from the National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED). As discussed in the previous chapter, opposition 
groups from Burma have found that international support has shifted away from 
organisations connected to armed struggle. The promotion of non-violent political 
resistance by organisations like AEI, and the support that these programmes are receiving 
in official aid, are part of learning processes driven by this shift in international priorities. 
 The political defiance training provided by AEI appears to have had a significant effect 
on the political practice of the Burmese opposition groups. The terminology and tactics of 
political defiance and strategic non-violence have been widely adopted by the opposition 
groups, even by those who also engage in armed resistance, such as the Arakan Liberation 
Party (ALP) and All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) (interviews 2, 10, 2006). 
The establishment of a political defiance committee by the National Council of the Union 
of Burma (NCUB) umbrella group in 1993, and the fact that this group continues to meet 
and coordinate activities among the opposition groups (AEI 2010) is also significant. While 
some of this effect may be explained by groups using new terms to describe existing 
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activities, the techniques of political defiance promoted by Helvey and Sharp appear to 
have been picked up enthusiastically by several groups, most notably the Arakanese youth 
groups (interviews 1, 11, 2006).  
Because we have some people, trained people, like trained youth or students. So we 
will have to give training in the border areas, or inside, very secretly. From that 
trained people we can directly mobilise the students through their network, through 
their friends. After that, step by step, we have to go to the political defiance 
campaigns (interview 1, 2006). 
The activity described by these groups in terms of political defiance included both political 
activism and further training. In other words, opposition activists are actively engaged in 
political defiance themselves, as well as in training others to join the campaigns. This is 
significant because it shows how the learning processes by which norms of practice are 
established can have a multiplier effect, in this case when participants are motivated and 
equipped to deliver further training themselves.  
 The learning processes by which political defiance tactics have become established as 
norms of practice in certain opposition groups show the impact that international 
connections can have on local practice. But even in this case, the influence of GCSOs in 
promoting normative change is not absolute and should not be overstated. Ultimately, the 
success or failure of the learning processes required to institute normative change depend 
on the willingness of local actors to engage. Local actors judge the learning opportunities 
offered by international engagement on the basis of their existing political goals. Learning 
processes and outcomes are embedded within the existing political and social relations of 
local actors, as are the norms that emerge from learnt practice. In the case of political 
defiance, training programmes for villagers are often more a matter of encouraging and 
coordinating existing patterns of resistance than of introducing alien forms of political 
practice. The kinds of tactics discussed in terms of political defiance follow a familiar 
pattern of everyday resistance, turning acts of expression like singing, joking, or praying 
into acts of resistance, defacing government posters, ignoring orders, or delaying 
compliance (interview 1, 2006). These ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott 1985) are employed in 
similar forms across Burma and the wider region, independent of international engagement 
(Scott 1986; Malseed 2009). The argument here is not that international engagement 
produces local practice ex nihilo. Rather, norms of practice and resistance are seen as 
emerging from a combination of local social relations and international influences. The 
example of ‘political defiance’ in Burma shows how learning processes initiated and 
influenced by an outsider can have a framing and legitimating effect in relation to particular 
local practices. International influence did have an effect in this case, in encouraging 
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political activists to pay attention to the potential for ordinary people to engage in everyday 
forms of resistance. Somewhat paradoxically, one of the main effects of outside influence 
in this case was to make visible the political potential of existing local practices.  
The Philippines 
 The mass community-based organisations in the Philippines, led by the affiliates of 
BAYAN, describe themselves collectively as a ‘national liberation movement’ committed to 
nationalist, anti-imperialist, and ‘pro-people’ goals (interview 1, 2008). While the nationalist 
and anti-imperialist aspects are often given most prominence in articulating the specific 
goals of the movement (e.g., interviews 2 and 5, 2008), it will be argued here that the pro-
people orientation of the movements is the most significant factor in shaping the stategies 
of political resistance found in the Philippines. This is because the pro-people orientation 
of the organisations includes a commitment to learning from the everyday experiences of 
the people, and to incorporating this learning into the process of developing the goals and 
strategies of the organisation. One of the ways this is done is through the practice of ‘basic 
masses integration’ in which activists are encouraged to spend time living and working with 
ordinary people in different parts of the country and in different economic sectors. The 
spokesperson for the Anakbayan youth organisation explained the importance of this 
process: 
The basic masses integration is very effective in terms of  how we could really 
strengthen our commitment and belief  and how we could really begin to 
understand our analysis of  our society. Because we could not really grasp our 
theory if  we are not integrated with the actual practice from which the theory was 
developed. So I think we will be able to have a better grasp of  what we are fighting 
for and of  our analysis if  we can actually see or learn from the actual experiences 
of  the people, of  the basic masses. So it’s not a theory in itself, but a theory based 
on the practice of  our people, the practice of  the basic masses, their everyday life 
and their everyday struggle... (interview 1, 2008). 
The significance of the learning processes involved here is not in the organisation’s claim 
to be ‘pro-people’; after all, no political organisation would admit to being ‘anti-people’. 
The more significant aspect is the set of practices that go along with the claim, in which 
activists follow through on their pro-people commitment through a sustained engagement 
with the everyday politics of their organisation’s base communities. The above quote 
illustrates two main organisational strengths of the learning processes associated with ‘basic 
masses integration’. Firstly, the learning experience for the activists is an opportunity for 
consciousness raising, deepening their commitment to the work of the organisation. 
Activists from more privileged backgrounds are exposed to the realities of life for the 
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majority of the population and are able to supplement their intellectual commitment to the 
goals of the organisation with first-hand experience of the everyday lives of ordinary 
people. Activists from less privileged backgrounds are also able to experience the 
similarities and differences of life in other regions or sectors and are consequently better 
equipped to generalise from their own experience.   
 The second benefit of the learning processes described in the above quote is that the 
political theory and analysis of the organisation becomes strongly connected to the 
everyday politics of its base communities. For Anakbayan members, spending time 
immersed in the everyday lives of poor communities offers an opportunity to re-engage 
with the political purpose of their pro-people ideology. It also allows organisers to develop 
their theory and analysis in line with the everyday politics of the community. To the extent 
that basic masses integration becomes an integral part of the ongoing learning processes of 
the organisation, it functions as an effective form of praxis as defined by Freire (Freire, 
2000, 51), connecting activists with base communities and theory with practice.  
 For the BAYAN-affiliated organisations in the Philippines, processes of mutual learning 
are built into the normal practice of community organising. The initial stages in the typical 
process of community organising, as described by the GABRIELA spokesperson, are that: 
people come to us and ask for help, so we send an organiser to the area and then 
part of  the work that the organiser does is what we call a social investigation, to 
find out the situation of  the women in the area. That's when the organising starts. 
We develop local leaders as well as local organisers to take over the work (interview 
4, 2008). 
This process of community organising contains two complementary forms of learning 
processes. The first, described here as ‘social investigation’, involves the organiser engaging 
with women in the community to learn about their situation and needs. In the process, 
women from the community are identified to be trained as organisers who will coordinate 
local social programs and political campaigns in liaison with the local chapter of 
GABRIELA. This process could be viewed as a socially embedded form of the 
participatory action research approach outlined above. The difference being, however, that 
by skipping the mediating intervention of the western(ised) academic, the political learning 
strategies followed by organisations like GABRIELA come closer to the ideal of dialogical 
education articulated by Freire (2000) than do the PAR approaches inspired by the 
Brazilian educator. The process of reciprocal political learning exhibited here by 
GABRIELA is the general model of community organising followed by each of the 
BAYAN-affiliated organisations in the Philippines. The interaction is dialogical in the sense 
articulated by Freire, not just because it is based on a dialogue, but because the effect of the 
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dialogue is to lessen rather than reinforce the differential power relations implicit in the 
learning process.  
Conclusion 
Everyday processes of political learning have an important place in the practice of 
democratic resistance groups. Based on the study of community-based opposition groups 
in Burma and the Philippines, a range of learning processes was identified, centred on 
practices of educating, documenting, and organising. Education processes range from 
formal schooling designed to replace or compensate for the absence of state-provided 
education, to extra-curricular supplementary programmes of political education for 
students, to programmes of vocational training targeted at the needs of the community. 
Documentation for the purposes of human rights reports is designed to promote 
international learning about the situation of the base communities of the organisations and 
in turn requires education of organisers and activists in techniques of documentation. 
Political actors involved in community organising also make explicit use of training 
programmes. This includes the practice of non-violence training in Burma, the more 
informal but nevertheless conscious use of the effect of education on political loyalty and 
commitment, and the deliberate use of collective and reciprocal processes of learning such 
as the Philippines practice of ‘basic masses integration’. Through these collective learning 
processes, the organisations further their integration with their base communities as well as 
promoting processes of social change in line with their democratic values. By contributing 
to change in expectations, habitual practice, and conceptual framing, learning processes 
lead to the emergence of new norms within the everyday politics of communities. While 
international actors can be influential sources of ideational and material resources which 
facilitate learning processes, these processes are situated within everyday politics and 
produce political change on the basis of already existing social relations in local contexts.  
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6 
Unequal Learning: Building International 
Legitimacy 
 
In addition to engaging with the everyday politics of their base communities, opposition 
groups fulfil specialised roles, such as advocacy, lobbying, and fundraising, which involve 
interaction with political elites at the state and international level. As outlined in the 
previous chapter, these interactions tend to require particular forms and skills of 
communication which must be learnt. This chapter emphasises the bi-directional nature of 
this learning process, in which organisations must balance the requirements of elite and 
everyday politics, while translating between international and local contexts. It also draws 
attention to the unequal and complex dynamics of power involved in the learning 
processes that are necessary for engagement with international politics. In order to 
successfully translate the needs of their communities into an international context, 
opposition activists must learn to move between radically different modes of 
communication, each with its own associated expectations, practices, and frames. Likewise, 
activists who are engaged in international contexts must become adept at translating and 
adapting international norms in a way that is commensurate with the everyday politics of 
their own communities.  
 The main themes that emerged from the research relating to international engagement 
with Global Civil Society Organisations (GCSOs) in Burma and the Philippines were 
raising international awareness; international lobbying; and support for local political 
organising. In order to investigate these different aspects of the relations between local 
community-based organisations and GCSOs, this chapter proceeds as follows. In the first 
section, I examine how community-based organisations in the two cases have engaged in 
raising international awareness through attempts at building international, issue-specific 
campaigns in the case of Burma, and ‘people-to-people’ solidarity practices in the case of 
the Philippines. The second section explores how, in both cases, non-state actors have 
engaged in international lobbying efforts which are directly targeted at influencing decisions 
and courses of action at the international level. The third section discusses how 
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community-based organisations in Burma and the Philippines have sought to attract 
international support for political organising activities. This section concentrates in 
particular on the difficulties that local organisations often face in building international 
support for explicitly political goals, and the challenge of ensuring that their particular 
political needs – such as the need for secrecy and confidentiality in the case of Burmese 
activist organisations, and the desire for ‘principled’ support in the case of the Philippines 
organisations – are understood and accepted by external actors. The chapter concludes by 
discussing the need for local community-based organisations to retain sufficient autonomy 
and control over their political practices, tactics, principles, and goals in their dealings with 
global civil society organisations; a control and autonomy which it is often difficult for 
them to sustain.  
Raising International Awareness 
Burma 
Participants from many different organisations said that raising international awareness of 
the situation in Burma is an important part of their political efforts. The spokesperson for 
the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) described getting international awareness as the 
main focus of exile activity:  
The reason that we are still here in Thailand is because we want the international to 
know what is really happening with us... So inside activity and exile activity are 
always in communication with each other, to find information inside and inform 
the international to know what is happening (interview 34, 2006). 
 Opposition groups from Burma want to show the world that the SPDC military regime 
is a ‘bad government’, as one soldier from the KNLA put it (interview 19, 2006). Activists 
want the international community to be aware of the suffering and insecurity caused by the 
SPDC regime (interviews 2, 9 and 22, 2006). Opposition groups are also motivated by a 
desire to counter what they describe as false propaganda by the SPDC by raising 
international awareness of the true situation in Burma (interviews 2, 9 and 34). The efforts 
of community-based organisations to raise international awareness are therefore, at least in 
part, an effort to undermine the legitimacy of the regime in the country. 
 Some organisations seek international awareness because of an international dimension 
to their situation, such as investment by foreign companies. Communities affected by large-
scale development may seek the assistance of GCSOs to put pressure on foreign investors. 
For instance, organisations from communities in Arakan state have combined to form a 
campaign against the exploration and development of the Shwe gas fields (interview 1, 
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2006). The development is predicted to be a major source of revenue for the regime and 
the campaign is aimed at preventing this, as well as resisting the negative effects on the 
local communities of construction work using forced labour and militarisation of the area 
(Shwe Gas Movement 2009; interview 1, 2006). A spokesperson for the Shwe gas 
campaign who had also served as a leader of an Arakanese community organisation said 
that the campaigners realised early on that they would need to enlist the help of 
international activist and advocacy groups to raise the international profile of the campaign: 
‘We don’t have experience with that, that’s why we work with Earth Rights International, 
they help us a lot ... they have a lot of experience how to lobby, how to make a big 
campaign.’ (interview 1, 2006). Working with Earth Rights International, the Shwe gas 
campaign was able to make contact with activist groups across the Asian region. Campaign 
groups were formed in Thailand, Bangladesh, and India on Burma’s borders and 
networked with groups in other countries. These included Korean International Solidarity, 
an activist network which assisted the campaign to organise protests in South Korea 
directly targeting Daewoo, a major investor in the gas fields, as well as a lobby trip in which 
members of the campaign were able to meet with Korean legislators and civil society 
groups (interview 1, 2006). 
 While it is hard to judge the success of a campaign which is ongoing and has not yet 
achieved its major goals, some aspects of the relationships formed between the 
organisations can be assessed. In terms of accountability, it is apparent that ERI made 
significant efforts to ensure that their assistance did not result in the community 
organisations losing control of their campaign. ERI's first major involvement in the 
campaign consisted of facilitating an in-depth workshop discussion with campaign leaders, 
which functioned as a mutual learning exchange and an opportunity to assess what each 
organisation could contribute. Further such meetings were held at later stages of the 
campaign and involved ERI members travelling to India and Bangladesh to meet the 
regional campaign groups. Therefore, one of the contributions of the international 
organisation was oriented towards deepening the involvement of the local community 
organisations and building their capacity to strategise and direct the campaign. In addition 
to these planning meetings, ERI organised training sessions in methods of documentation 
and reporting. These methods, based on those developed for investigating and reporting 
on human rights abuses, were familiar to ERI through their experience in international 
lobbying and legal cases (Earthrights International 2009; interview 1, 2006). In the case of 
the Shwe gas campaign, ERI’s assistance was appreciated because the local groups had 
decided that raising international awareness was an important step for the campaign. 
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Therefore, ERI’s experience with the styles of communication and documentation required 
for international campaigning was of strategic benefit. 
 Working with a loose network of international advocacy and sectoral organisations, 
Burmese trade unions have had some success with international campaigns against foreign 
investment in Burma. International campaigns have persuaded some high-profile and 
western-based multinational companies such as Pepsi-Cola, Levi-Strauss and Triumph 
International to pull out of manufacturing operations in Burma. In addition, the US state 
governments of Massachusetts, Texas, and California were for some time supporting a 
boycott of companies doing business in Burma. These campaigns were largely coordinated 
by activist coalitions such as Burma Campaign UK and the Free Burma Campaign USA, 
which were formed in the style of advocacy organisations, but relying more on volunteer 
labour than on financial contributions. Sectoral organisations, such as student associations 
and trade unions, had also supported the campaigns. After some high profile successes at 
persuading companies to withdraw from Burma, the campaign has died down. The general 
secretary of the FTUB suggested that this was due to a lack of further high-profile targets 
based in the UK and USA (interview 14, 2006). 
 The fickle nature of such international activist campaigns can be a source of frustration 
for local community-based organisations who must continue to work with the long-term 
realities of their situation while activists in western countries have moved on to the latest 
cause celebré. Trade unions working with Burmese migrant workers in the garment sector 
of Thailand had tried to raise awareness of working conditions among American NGOs 
because most of the products of the factories were destined for the US market (interview 
15, 2006). However, they had received little response, and there was a lack of international 
advocacy organisations with the capacity or commitment to engage on the local level. 
These local organisations had also had negative experiences with NGO involvement in 
community organising and felt that it was best to rely on other local organisations they 
knew and trusted (interview 15, 2006). These experiences are discussed in more detail 
below, under ‘support for political organising’. 
 As well as acting as intermediaries to reach a wider public, GCSOs are seen by some 
community groups as partners in building international networks of mutual support. For 
groups with experience of international engagement, networking with GCSOs is an 
extension of their networking with other local groups. As the spokesperson for the KWO, 
one of the more internationally active women’s organisations, said: ‘it is very important to 
network with other women’s organisations in every country so that it is stronger. If the 
network is stronger it is more powerful.’ (interview 25, 2006). The spokesperson went on 
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to describe how women’s groups in other countries can help by advocating on behalf of 
women who are suffering in Burma, lobbying their own governments to put pressure on 
the Burmese regime, and organising campaigns and demonstrations in solidarity with 
women from Burma. Organisers from the BWU described the 1995 Beijing conference as 
their first international exposure and their first opportunity to meet with ‘international 
level’ women’s groups. This was seen as an important first step in getting international 
awareness of the situation for women in Burma and for the organisation (interview 13, 
2006). 
 Smaller organisations with fewer international contacts talked in similar terms about 
their local networks, particularly the umbrella organisations which gave them an indirect 
opportunity to engage internationally. As one participant from the AKSYU put it:  
we urgently need the international community to know our problems and the 
international community to involve in Burma, to help us and to get democracy, 
working together. So it is very important in my opinion to join and cooperate with 
other student groups for democracy and peace for Burma (interview 9, 2006).  
Reaching an international audience was described as an important motivation for this 
group to join the Student and Youth Council of Burma (SYCB), which regularly released 
media statements as well as taking part in international networking and lobbying activities. 
In addition to their membership in these local networks, the AKSYU described the positive 
relationship they had formed with the regional Asian Students’ Association (ASA). The 
participants were impressed that the leadership of the ASA had specifically sought out and 
invited individual ethnic student organisations to join the association in order to broaden 
the range of their engagement with the Burmese student movement. They were also happy 
that the ASA took a political stand against authoritarian and military regimes and that this 
was applied in the case of Burma with clear support for democratic change. Finally, the 
ASA was seen as having a genuine interest in engaging with the local organisation. The 
ASA had sent a delegation to visit the local group and discuss their activities, plans for the 
future, and the most important issues to raise at the regional and international level. This 
approach had left the local youth group with a very positive impression of this international 
sectoral organisation: ‘I think they have a good understanding of the Burma issue, that’s 
why they came and approached to our organisation, what activity do we do, and plans for 
the future. Yeah, they care.’ (interview 9, 2006). 
 This willingness to engage with individual ethnic organisations on their own terms 
seemed to be unfortunately rare among international organisations involved in Burma. The 
spokesperson for the PSLF felt that NGOs preferred to deal with the umbrella alliance 
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organisations because they didn’t have time to meet with every ethnic organisation 
(interview 34, 2006). This also led to a feeling that the NGOs lacked knowledge or weren’t 
interested in finding out about the individual ethnic organisations and their particular 
issues. Similarly, the spokesperson of KWAT felt that NGOs based on the Thai border 
were not interested in learning about the language and culture of the minority ethnic 
groups. Her impression was that to the extent that locally based NGO staff were learning a 
local language, they were learning Burmese rather than other ethnic languages (interview 
23, 2006). Participants often did not distinguish between different types of GCSOs and 
used the term NGO broadly. However, these concerns apply most readily to advocacy and 
service GCSOs with a significant local presence. 
 While members of minority ethnic groups often felt that GCSOs were uninterested in 
learning about their particular issues, culture, and language, these differences were very 
important to them. Many participants from the different ethnic organisations interviewed 
felt that it was important that the international community know of the existence of their 
people. Representatives of the Mon, Karen, Kachin, Arakan, Palaung, and Zomi 
organisations interviewed all wanted the international community to know of their 
existence as well as the issues and problems they faced. This need for international 
recognition was linked for these groups with a need to maintain their own distinct language 
and culture. Members of the ethnic minority organisations interviewed saw international 
engagement as an opportunity to work against the regime’s policy of ‘Burmanisation’, 
under which the language and culture of the Burman majority were imposed at the expense 
of minority cultures. As the spokesperson for the Mon Unity League said, in discussing the 
danger of losing their culture and traditions: ‘The politics is like a forum, but when we get 
the forum we don’t have anything to show or perform on the forum, like culture, literature, 
identity, traditions.’ (interview 29, 2006). He went on to say that the lack of a political 
forum in Burma makes it important for the Mon people to have a presence on the 
international stage, but at the same time it is important for them to work on their own 
culture with their own people, so that when the representatives get to the forum, they have 
something to say (interview 29, 2006). 
The Philippines 
Each of the opposition organisations in the Philippines covered in this study is engaged in 
raising international awareness of the political situation in the country. As with the 
Burmese organisations, raising international awareness is seen as important and constitutes 
a key part of the agency of the groups. In contrast to the Burmese organisations, however, 
international awareness in the Philippines is framed in terms of a broader goal of 
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international solidarity. Members of the Philippines opposition organisations describe their 
non-state international relationships in terms of ‘people-to-people solidarity’, a concept that 
links all three types of international engagement discussed in this chapter: awareness, 
lobbying, and support. This section focuses on the agency and motivations of Philippines 
organisations for raising international awareness of the situation in the country through 
people-to-people solidarity. 
 In international campaigns like the ‘Stop the Killings Campaign’, organisations from the 
Philippines have sought to mobilise international pressure on the government of their 
country to reduce political repression. As the secretary-general of BAYAN explains, the 
first pre-requisite of such campaigns is international awareness of the situation, on the basis 
of which, solidarity actions and material support may be mobilised and pressure brought to 
bear on the government through international channels. In coordinating the international 
public awareness campaign, BAYAN sought to cast a wide net to find partner 
organisations in foreign countries: ‘We would have engagements with non-governmental 
organisations, human rights groups, other people’s organisations, unions, sectoral 
organisations, church groups also’ (interview 2, 2008). At the same time, BAYAN built 
links with international organisations, including the UN and the EU, and met with missions 
from such organisations visiting the Philippines. A similar approach was taken by the KMU 
in seeking international attention to the repression of trade unions in the Philippines. The 
KMU secretary-general reported that the organisation had raised the issue in talks with 
trade union centres in many countries, including Belgium, Germany, Canada, the USA, 
Australia, and Japan. These organisations in turn supported the issue of trade union 
repression being raised through the ITUC and ILO (interview 5, 2008). 
 Opposition organisations in the Philippines also raised awareness of their situation and 
work through exchange programmes with other political organisations, regionally and 
internationally. A spokesperson for GABRIELA explained how such ‘exposure tours’ are 
organised through international non-state networks: 
One of  the things which our network does is that they send us exposurists. They 
come here and they ask us to facilitate their visiting areas in the urban and well as in 
the rural areas, basically our chapters and other networks which we have 
nationwide. That’s how they get to know more of  our work. And when we go to 
their countries that’s also what we do, we ask them to host us in terms of  
introducing us to the people who they work with, the organisations which they 
have helped set up (interview 4, 2008). 
A typical tour includes the ‘exposurists’ receiving briefings from the host organisation, 
visiting or spending time with local communities, and taking part in public events, such as 
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conferences or protests organised by the host group (interviews 1,3, 4, 5 and 6 2008). The 
basic format was followed by each of the groups in the study in hosting visiting sectoral 
organisations from the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. The chairperson of Anakbayan 
emphasised the importance of such exposure tours, which the youth organisation runs for 
the overseas visitors it hosts: 
it is very effective in terms of  exchanging experiences and developing mutual 
cooperation. Because in reality you cannot get political or any other kind of  
support if  they do not know what kind of  struggle you are in (interview 1, 2008). 
The goal of hosting exposure visits is therefore to raise awareness in the broadest sense of 
the activities and situation of the organisation. Allowing visitors to experience something of 
the local conditions and meet the people directly affected by issues such as political 
repression and poverty makes these issues seem more real and immediate to outsiders. The 
potential for meaningful solidarity and support from outside organisations is thereby 
increased. 
 The people-to-people solidarity practices of the Philippines opposition organisations 
raise awareness for the host organisations as much as for the visitors. As stated in the 
above quote from the Gabriela spokesperson, the benefits of exposure tours can be 
reciprocated when hosts visit the home countries of their visitors. But the experience of 
hosting outside visitors also has benefits for the host organisation in terms of international 
awareness. As the secretary-general of BAYAN explained, the Philippines organisations can 
always find something to learn from engaging with members of social movements and 
opposition groups from elsewhere: 
We love interacting with the activists from abroad. We look at for example how 
organised these Korean protesters are, or how diligent some Japanese comrades 
are, or how our US comrades would organise their protest actions with big alliances 
(interview 2, 2008). 
So one tangible outcome of exposure tours is the exchange of information and tactics for 
mobilising protest action; the diffusion of repertoires of contention (Tarrow and Tilly, 
2006). Less tangible, but according to the BAYAN spokesperson just as relevant in 
motivating international contacts, is the personal inspiration and motivation gained from 
meeting with people engaged in similar struggles in different contexts. 
International Lobbying 
Lobbying can be distinguished in two respects from raising awareness in a more general 
sense. First, lobbying is communication which is strategically directed towards the 
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immediate goal of influencing a decision or course of action. Second, lobbying is 
communication directed towards political elites who are in control of decision-making. 
International lobbying therefore consists of strategic communication directed at 
international political elites or at political elites in other countries for some international 
purpose. 
Burma 
In the last two decades, international lobbying has been a major focus of the Burmese 
opposition movement’s efforts to achieve political change in Burma. In recent times, this 
lobbying work has been coordinated by the National Council of the Union of Burma 
(NCUB), an umbrella group comprising most of the organisations from Burma actively 
opposing the regime. NCUB chairman Maung Maung, a trade union official and current 
FTUB President, describes international lobbying as a vital activity for the organisations 
from Burma: ‘we have to reach out to the international movement because we could not do 
things on our own’ (interview 14, 2006). 
 As non-state organisations with no formal legal status in any country, the Burmese 
opposition groups have had to work hard to gain access to diplomatic channels of 
communication which are normally reserved for state elites. This has required a strategic 
and flexible approach, often making use of contacts with international non-state 
organisations which are able to act as intermediaries. According to Maung Maung, the most 
useful contacts for international lobbying have been trade unions and the international 
associations of political parties. Trade union contacts in Latin America made it possible to 
arrange a lobbying trip and meetings with government officials including the President of 
Brazil, himself a former trade union official. In other situations, including dealing with 
ASEAN governments, contact with international political party associations, such as 
Socialist International, Liberals International, and Congress of Asian Liberal and 
Democrats (CALD), have been important in arranging contact with politicians. Contacts 
with civil society organisations in other countries have also been important for lobbying 
foreign governments. The NCUB lobbying strategy has relied heavily on putting pressure 
on government officials through grassroots networks in the same country: 'for them to 
actually do something, they have to have the push coming from their own country and 
that’s what we had to do’ (interview 14, 2006).This strategy has concentrated on sectoral 
organisations, as these represent large voting blocs and can therefore put electoral pressure 
on politicians. To work through grassroots organisations such as trade unions, church 
groups, and student organisations, NCUB member organisations would be enlisted to 
partner up with similar organisations in the target country. Through these contacts, 
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particular politicians would be lobbied with the goal of getting the opposition movement's 
perspective considered by foreign affairs committees and government ministers (interview 
14, 2006). 
 In a similar fashion, the Burmese opposition has gained access to international 
organisations in the UN system with the assistance of supportive GCSOs acting as 
intermediaries. This is especially the case in the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
where the FTUB has achieved a unique level of access and recognition through close 
contact with the ITUC. Although the FTUB cannot be recognised as the official 
representative of Burmese labour, due to the veto of the SPDC regime, they have 
accreditation and speaking rights in the workers’ caucus and secretariat through the ITUC. 
FTUB reports on forced labour and lack of freedom of association in Burma have been 
accepted by the ILO and have led to unprecedented sanctions being applied to the SPDC 
regime. In response to pressure from the ILO, the SPDC agreed to allow an ILO office to 
open in Rangoon to investigate complaints of forced labour. Although complainants have 
been harassed and even prosecuted, and forced labour continues to be commonly practised 
by regime forces, Burmese activists say that there has been a reduction compared to 
previous years, particularly on large projects under central government control. This is a 
significant victory for ordinary people in Burma, which opposition groups attribute to 
pressure exerted through the ILO, with the support of the international union movement 
(interview 14, 2006). 
 For the trade unions from Burma, such opportunities for international engagement are 
based on a long history of involvement with the international union movement and the 
Socialist International. The unions had been active in the ICFTU and involved in taking 
complaints to the ILO under freedom of association provisions since the establishment of 
the first military regime in Burma in 1962. Unions from Burma, especially the seafarer’s 
union, had also been active in the Socialist International since the 1960s, acting as area 
representatives for Asia and engaging with their European counterparts. Burmese unions 
were therefore well known and respected in the international movement prior to the 1988 
military crackdown in Burma and were well placed to take a leading role in coordinating 
international lobbying efforts against the military regime (interview 14, 2006). 
 The international lobbying activities of the Burmese opposition movement have been 
considerably broader than these trade union contacts, however, making use of all available 
avenues to influence international decision-making. Women’s groups from Burma in 
particular have taken an active role in international lobbying. One of the BWU’s first 
actions internationally was to make submissions to the United Nations Human Rights 
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Commission (UNHRC), following on from contacts made at the Beijing women’s 
conference. This was seen as important so that general issues of human rights abuse would 
be linked to the particular abuses faced by women. Since the Women’s League of Burma 
(WLB) was formed as an umbrella organisation in 1999, this group has taken on the role of 
coordinating these international lobbying activities. Representatives of ethnic women’s 
organisations such as the Shan Women’s Action Network and Karen Women’s 
Organisation have played high profile lobbying roles, meeting state leaders and tabling 
reports on abuses against women by the SPDC regime (interviews 12, 13 and 25, 2006). 
 Gaining access to different UN agencies and fora has required a diversity of strategies to 
negotiate what NCUB leader Maung Maung described as “the most complicated 
bureaucratic mechanism in the whole world”. For instance, access to the UNHRC was 
achieved through supportive NGOs who were able to submit reports and invite Burmese 
representatives to speak. In the first instance, this was done through the International 
Society of Friends, which had existing accreditation with the UNHRC. Later, through 
discussions with state representatives, the Burmese organisations got access to the 
commission through the Human Rights Foundation, an international advocacy 
organisation with UNHRC accreditation. Contacts with sympathetic states were also 
important for lobbying state representatives and gaining access to the UN General 
Assembly. Representatives of Norway and Sweden especially played the role of 
intermediaries, hosting functions and inviting other diplomats, to give Burmese 
representatives an opportunity to lobby states. Personal contacts were also important and 
could be maintained as individuals moved from one position to another. For example, 
when Eric Schwartz moved from being President Clinton’s advisor at the UN to become 
head of Human Rights Watch he remained a key supporter of the Burmese movement’s 
UN lobbying efforts. As these examples illustrate, the kinds of contacts and networks 
required for international lobbying are often complex and cannot be characterised by a 
simple linear movement in which civil society groups act as intermediaries to reach state 
representatives. Rather, a strategic lobbying approach requires organisations to maintain 
contacts in different areas and use them for leverage on each other as required (interview 
14, 2006). 
 The Burmese representatives did not view international advocacy GCSOs such as 
human rights organisations as particularly important for international lobbying efforts. 
These organisations were seen as avoiding taking a political stand and as staying out of the 
highly politicised negotiations over the resolutions and decisions of international agencies. 
As such, international advocacy organisations were not seen as working within the political 
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movement. ‘They give out their reports, and I think that is all they do. Which may be used 
by us or by politicians in saying things to government or to the media, but they are very 
careful to say that they are non-political’ (interview 14, 2006). Sectoral GCSOs such as 
trade unions, by contrast, were seen as being more free to take a political stand on the 
issues. 
The Philippines 
As noted above, the international engagement of the Philippines opposition movement is 
based around the principle of people-to-people solidarity. As such, lobbying political elites 
is not a primary focus for any of the groups. However, there are times when the strategic 
goal of a campaign can be furthered by engaging in political lobbying, both domestically 
and internationally. When it is seen to be in the best interests of the base communities, 
opposition group leaders take a pragmatic and flexible approach to international lobbying.   
 The CPA has been involved in international lobbying since its establishment in 1984. 
Indigenous leaders had also been involved in international lobbying before that time, as 
part of campaigns against the Chico dams and Cellophil development projects. In 1985, the 
founding chairperson and secretary-general of CPA attended the first meeting of the UN 
Working Group on Indigenous Peoples (WGIP). In the following years, the CPA 
continued to actively participate in the drafting and lobbying process for the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, passed by the UN General Assembly in 
2007. In addition to lobbying for action by the UN itself to protect indigenous rights, 
meetings of the WGIP and its successor, the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
(UNPFII), have provided a forum for groups like the CPA to directly lobby government 
representatives. As the secretary-general of CPA explains: ‘we are there to expose how the 
Philippines government and international corporations are violating our rights and with 
concrete recommendations’ (interview 3, 2008). To this end, the CPA has also, along with 
other opposition groups, been a frequent participant in the UN Human Rights 
Commission and its successor the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). As part of the 
coordinated campaign against extrajudicial killings and disappearances, the CPA challenged 
the right of the Philippines government to sit on the council and lobbied government 
representatives at the UNHRC to put pressure on the Philippines government (interview 3, 
2008). In this campaign, the opposition groups focused especially on lobbying EU 
members, the EU itself, the USA, and Canada. Their efforts paid off when President 
Arroyo travelled to Europe: 
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it was not only the Amnesty International that raised this concern, even the EU 
ambassador to the Philippines and the EU members during her state visits last year 
were always confronting with these issues and concerns (interview 3, 2008). 
As this quote suggests, opposition groups from the Philippines target both government 
and non-government groups in their international lobbying efforts. The secretary-general 
of BAYAN endorsed this approach, pointing out that while NGOs can be an important 
source of political support which helps to build a campaign, when foreign governments 
speak on an issue it tends to carry more weight due to the potential for an economic 
impact on the Philippines (interview 2, 2008). 
 The opposition movements covered in this study varied somewhat in their assessment 
of their capacity for engaging in international lobbying. While most groups felt that they 
were doing a good job in their efforts to engage with international organisations, some, 
such as the NUSP, felt that they lacked the resources and experience for international 
lobbying. The President of the NUSP said that for his organisation, ‘the lack of training or 
know-how about lobbying at the UN level is something that we want to address’ (interview 
6, 2008). Reasons for this lack included the relatively high turnover of people involved in 
student politics, combined with the difficulty of retaining institutional memory given a lack 
of financial resources. The NUSP had no permanent offices or staff and so was largely 
dependent on the knowledge and experience of their executive members. One strategy the 
NUSP was following to address this problem was to build further links with overseas 
students’ associations. The NUSP had met with student organisations from Germany and 
Belgium and was keen to learn from European student organisations about their experience 
with lobbying at the UN. The NUSP president also said that he would like to work more 
closely with other movements in the Philippines to learn from their experiences in 
international lobbying. Again the main barriers to this were finding the time and resources 
amid the daily pressures of political campaigns (interview 6, 2008). 
 The KMU has also had some difficulties with international lobbying and engagement 
with international organisations, but for rather different reasons. The ability of the KMU to 
engage with the UN International Labour Organisation (ILO) is limited by the fact that the 
ILO recognises the government-approved labour centre, the Trade Union Congress of the 
Philippines (TUCP), as the official labour representative for the Philippines. Whereas the 
FTUB could manage the same situation with the support of the International Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC), in the case of the Philippines, political disagreements have 
hampered engagement with the ITUC. These disagreements generally have their origins in 
cold war rivalries between the anti-communist labour movement under the ICFTU and 
unions which are seen as pro-communist, such as the KMU. The secretary-general of the 
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KMU characterised their disagreements with labour organisations such as the AFL-CIO in 
the USA in political terms: 
We know that the AFL-CIO ... that the CIA has some influence with the AFL-CIO. 
And since the KMU has been branded as a communist organisation, or a legal 
organisation of  the communist party, we know that AFL-CIO is not friendly to the 
KMU (interview 5, 2008). 
However, even these difficulties were able to be overcome, and the KMU reported 
successful engagement with both the ITUC and the ILO, despite not being an official 
member of either organisation.  
Support for Organising and Political Activities 
Burma 
The perception that international advocacy organisations, and NGOs more generally, are 
‘apolitical’ has filtered down to the membership level of the Burmese organisations. 
Activists at the grassroots level of several organisations expressed concerns that NGOs 
didn’t understand or support the political objectives of their organisation. One member of 
the KYO was unsure if NGOs would support his organisation’s political aim of dialogue 
with the regime: ‘I don’t know. Normally the NGO are not involved in political’ (interview 
27, 2006). 
 Members of the AKSYU expressed a related concern that some NGOs were just 
focused on their own ‘main issue’ rather than on the objectives of the groups they were 
working with or funding. ‘Some NGOs do just their main issue. They don’t care about our 
ethnic organisations, I mean the ethnic organisation’s aim or goal for their future. But some 
NGO they just focus on their issue' (interview 9, 2006). For the AKSYU, an immediate 
priority for community organising was to promote Kachin culture and language among 
youth, many of whom did not speak their own language. But the organisation was 
frustrated that they had not been able to get any funding for these programs. Seeing that 
other organisations were receiving funds for environmental campaigns and reports, they 
had decided to pursue a similar project: ‘So if we apply the environment issue proposal, 
maybe they agree and support us’ (interview 9, 2006). This example reveals a downside to 
some of the success stories of environmental advocacy campaigns discussed above. While 
there are cases in which the priorities of international advocacy groups genuinely match 
with those of their local partners, it is worrying that the financial and political power to set 
these priorities seems to lie almost entirely with the advocacy GCSOs and not with local 
organisations. 
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 Similarly, several organisations reported that it was easy to get funding for human rights 
training, but harder to get funding for riskier activities such as political organising. One 
union organiser said that his union was therefore afraid to apply for funds for organising 
projects in case the project was not successful (interview 15, 2006). This is highly 
problematic as there are many challenges involved in labour organising, and no organising 
project can be assured of success. Yet international donors tend to require project 
outcomes to be predictable and delivered as proposed. 
 In addition to the risk of projects failing, several organisations reported difficulties in 
explaining the requirements of underground political organising to donors. A spokesperson 
for the AASYC, who were involved in what they called ‘political defiance’ campaigns inside 
Burma, reported some difficulty in explaining their expenses to donors (interview 1, 2006). 
For example, campaigns involving gathering information about government activities often 
required bribes to be paid to low-level officials. If activists were arrested or being followed 
by the authorities, money could also be required for bribes or for expenses incurred in 
fleeing or lying low. The need for secrecy also had implications for even the most basic 
expenses, such as printing political leaflets. These could not be copied cheaply at a local 
printer. Instead, the organisation might have to buy a computer and printer in order to 
make their own flyers in secret. Even this equipment had to be bought and stored secretly, 
incurring extra expense and time delays.  
 The need for secrecy also had implications for communications and reporting on 
campaigns, and this had at times caused problems in the relationship between local 
organisations and donor or advocacy GCSOs. For instance, at one stage the AASYC 
organised political activities, including poster and graffiti campaigns, in urban areas inside 
Burma. They had documented their activities with photos and given copies to their funding 
organisations with a request that they not be published. However, one of the international 
organisations used the photos in a report without consulting the local organisation. The 
organisation from Burma was then worried that the photographs would be passed back to 
the SPDC by intelligence agents and used to track down and arrest organisation members. 
The local organisation reported that, with time and dialogue, these issues with the funding 
organisations were able to be resolved (interview 1, 2006). It is not surprising that such 
dialogue was required to reach a mutual understanding, especially given the very different 
environments in which the two organisations were operating. What is of concern is that it 
appears that it was the local organisation which was required to put in the effort to reach 
this understanding, and that until this happened, the negative consequences of any 
misunderstanding were felt solely by the local organisation. In such circumstances, where a 
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local organisation is involved in underground political work and is dependent on 
international donors for support, the local organisation has both the least power and the 
most to lose. 
 These kinds of concerns around security and confidentiality had persuaded some 
organisations to avoid dealing with GCSOs of any kind for sensitive or underground 
political organising. One trade union organiser with a local branch of the FTUB in 
Thailand reported a problem with an NGO sending out mass emails with open addresses 
(interview 15, 2006). This was at a time when Burmese military intelligence under General 
Khin Nyunt was targeting the email addresses and websites of opposition groups for 
electronic attacks including viruses and spamming. This problem was easily solved by 
advising the organisation to use Blank Copy for the email addresses, but this kind of 
incident did not help persuade local groups that international advocacy organisations can 
be trusted with sensitive information. A different international advocacy organisation had 
published the street address of an underground union office in an article on their website, 
forcing the organisation to move to another location. This kind of open communication 
might be considered a virtue by some GCSOs who favour transparency and open 
communication, but for underground organisations it is a serious security risk. The union 
organiser said that, in his experience, NGOs were very keen to promote a certain style of 
open networking which was not appropriate for organisations opposing a strong military 
regime. Where an NGO would want to organise a big meeting to canvass an issue, and 
would invite many groups to discuss and reach agreement, local organisations had more 
low-profile ways of reaching consensus: ‘I think, we also want unity, but we have our own 
ways and own connections, which is not similar to the NGOs’ (interview 15, 2006). To 
illustrate this point, the FTUB organiser gave an example of how local workers’ 
organisations cooperated to deal with a large labour dispute in which 300 workers were 
locked out. The organisations met and talked to work out a common strategy and to decide 
who would take on what tasks. The groups were operating with a shared understanding of 
the local situation, especially the issues of security. For these organisations, it was common 
practice to arrange an informal meeting to discuss sensitive issues face-to-face and to avoid 
communicating by phone or email. The participant felt that the shared experience of 
working as part of an underground movement was an important part of what made it 
possible for the different Burmese organisations to work together and difficult to work 
with outside organisations. ‘If there is an NGO also participating, I think it will not go like 
this ... Maybe will be leaked to the media, which organisation are involving, or on their 
website. Which is, I think, we are not happy’ (interview 15, 2006). 
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The Philippines  
Opposition organisations in the Philippines share the need of the Burmese groups for 
further material support for political campaigns and organising. The secretary-general of 
BAYAN identified support for political campaigns and organisers as the two priorities of 
the organisation in seeking further financial support. The organisation has been highly 
successful in combining community organising in local areas of the Philippines, with mass 
mobilisations in the capital, Manila (interview 2, 2008). Such mobilisations give focus and 
momentum to campaigns and help to pressure the government to make concessions, but 
they are expensive to organise: ‘It’s no joke trying to mobilise people, it’s not that easy, if 
you’re mobilising people coming from the provinces, if you’re mobilising people coming 
from the urban poor’ (interview 2, 2008) . 
 The Philippines opposition organisations have the human resources and political 
capacity to mobilise large numbers of people in support of political change, but often 
struggle to find the necessary financial and material resources. In effect, political 
mobilisation is made possible by the unpaid labour of thousands of community activists, 
many of whom work full-time for political organisations and are either unpaid or paid less 
than minimum wage rates (interview 2, 5, 2008). While the willingness of activists to 
contribute their unpaid time is a demonstration of their political commitment, it is often 
not sustainable. According to the general secretary of the KMU, many activists drop out of 
active involvement in the union because of the need to find paid employment: ‘We have 
recruited a lot of activists, but we cannot retain them, because they have to find something 
to sustain the needs of their family’ (interview 5, 2008). For the KMU, the prevailing 
poverty in the Philippines was a more serious barrier to their ability to recruit and retain 
organisers than any political repression, even during the martial law period (interview 5, 
2008). The secretary-general of BAYAN identified support for political organisers as a key 
priority for further international support, suggesting that sympathetic organisations could 
‘adopt full-time organisers’ from the Philippines by contributing to their living costs 
(interview 2, 2008). 
 Although the Philippines opposition organisations are in need of financial support, it is 
important to the organisations that any funding they receive is based on principled political 
support. The secretary-general echoed the similar sentiments expressed by spokespeople of 
several member organisations in rejecting the possibility of accepting funds from ‘the 
imperialist funded organisations’. The objection to seeking or accepting funds from foreign 
foundations and government-funded bodies is as much pragmatic as principled, with the 
major objection being to the political conditions that are seen to be associated with such 
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grants. As the BAYAN secretary-general puts it, ‘they tend to tie up your hands and you 
will be restricted in the things that you can and can’t do’.  The leaders of BAYAN, 
Anakbayan and Gabriela reported that their most significant source of overseas income 
was from Filipinos abroad, through chapters formed in other countries. These leaders also 
felt that expanding the involvement and contribution of Filipinos abroad was the best 
strategy for gaining international material support for the movements in the Philippines 
(interviews 1 and 4, 2008). For the NUSP and KMU, most support came from the 
domestic membership, although both organisations reported receiving limited amounts of 
support from overseas organisations. For instance, when leaders of the KMU are invited to 
attend international union conferences, their expenses may be subsidised by the host 
organisations (interview 5, 2008).  
 Of the groups covered in the interviews, the CPA seemed to have been most able to 
mobilise international financial support. The organisation was able to do this by adopting a 
strategic approach to engaging with GCSOs, without compromising their own political 
principles. For instance, through contacts with First Nations groups in the USA, the CPA 
was able to apply for grant funding from the Tides Foundation to assist with the annual 
Cordillera Day celebrations. The CPA had also cooperated with advocacy GCSOs 
concerned with the environment and indigenous people’s rights and had successfully 
applied for funding to produce reports and attend conferences. The CPA takes a strategic 
approach in deciding on which issues and at what level of militancy to pitch a request for 
principled support. The CPA is aware that for most philanthropic and advocacy GCSOs, a 
request for support couched in the language of militant anti-imperialism is likely to ‘just go 
directly to their trash can’ (interview 3, 2008). Likewise, international organisations which 
do provide political support for the anti-imperialist stance of the CPA, such as fellow 
members of the ILPS, are often unable to offer significant financial support as ‘they have 
their own struggles in their home countries’. The solution for the CPA is to find ways to 
work with more conservative philanthropic and advocacy GCSOs in ways that are 
consistent with at least some of the CPA’s goals and principles, without violating any 
others: 
These NGOs are not anti-imperialist, but we can work with them based on broad 
indigenous issues or human rights. That’s still principled, that’s still on the level of  
respecting our culture… the challenge to us is how to package our request and our 
proposals, so that it will not be a highly political one, but it should be anticipated 
and calculated that it also works within the bounds of  indigenous peoples’ rights 
advocacy. (interview 3, 2008) 
 The experiences of the opposition organisations from the Philippines covered in this 
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study support two related conclusions. First, that the political space created by GCSOs is 
not neutral in the opportunities it provides for international support, but rather acts to 
enable some forms of political action. Second, that, notwithstanding the political 
constraints operating in and through global civil society, CBOs are able to strategically 
mobilise resources through international relationships in ways that are supportive of their 
domestic and international political agency.  
Conclusion 
In working to raise international awareness, organisations from Burma have focused on 
challenging the international legitimacy of the regime as well as on international aspects of 
their issue-specific campaigns, such as with respect to foreign investment. In doing so, local 
groups have formed relationships with GCSOs, including advocacy and sectoral 
organisations. These relationships have been generally positive and beneficial to the local 
groups, so long as efforts are made by GCSOs to ensure that the local groups retain 
control of their campaigns. However, international attention on political issues can be 
transient and fickle and local groups are careful not to rely too heavily on GCSOs for the 
success of their political campaigns.  
 Another purpose of raising international awareness is to build international networks of 
mutual learning and support between non-state organisations. These networking 
opportunities are important to local groups, who often organise their local coalitions in 
such a way that even small local groups can be connected to international networks. The 
relationships with international sectoral and advocacy GCSOs in such networks have been 
most successful where the GCSO has taken a proactive approach to initiating and 
maintaining contact; where the GCSO has taken a clear and principled stand in support of 
the local partner; and where there is a genuine commitment to learning about the culture 
and circumstances of the local groups. 
 Organisations from Burma see it as an important part of their role to influence 
international decision-making by states and international organisations, encouraging them 
to put pressure on the SPDC regime and to push for a political solution to current 
conflicts. To this end, the Burmese organisations have adopted a strategic and flexible 
approach, working through contacts with GCSOs and grassroots networks, as well as with 
sympathetic states, to gain access to international decision-makers and decision-making 
fora. Interestingly, some advocacy GCSOs, such as international human rights groups, were 
not seen by the Burmese organisations as particularly useful in this regard, because such 
organisations tend to stay independent from active political lobbying. Rather, it was 
sectoral GCSOs, such as trade unions, which were seen as the most useful contacts for 
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international lobbying, due to their willingness to take a political stand on the issues and to 
get involved in political negotiations. 
 In addition to assisting with international awareness-raising and lobbying, some GCSOs, 
including philanthropic, service, and advocacy organisations, were involved in supporting 
local political activities and organising. All of the organisations expressed a need and 
appreciation for international support for these activities. However, it was in this area of 
support for the political activities of local organisations that the most problems arose. 
There was a perception at the grassroots level of many organisations that GCSOs did not 
support the political goals of the local organisations and were only concerned for their own 
issues and priorities. This perception is supported in part by the comments of local 
organisation leaders, who reported that it was easier to get support for issues prioritised by 
GCSOs, such as human rights training and environmental campaigns, and harder to get 
support for riskier activities such as political organising. Where GCSOs did support 
political activities, there were further difficulties due to differences in styles of 
communication and organising. While these differences are to be expected and are not in 
themselves a problem, it was often the local organisations which were required to make the 
effort to overcome misunderstanding and to deal with the consequences. 
 The case studies considered in this chapter demonstrate the potential benefits of non-
state engagement for political change. There are various ways in which GCSOs can play a 
constructive role in international efforts to effect change in repressive regimes. These 
include supporting locally-based organisations in their efforts to raise international 
awareness, gaining access to international lobbying, and pursuing local political activities 
and organising. However, there is also the potential for problems in the relationship 
between local and international non-state organisations. These problems were avoided best 
by GCSOs which maintained a principled commitment to addressing the self-identified 
needs of local organisations within an equal relationship of mutual learning. 
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Conclusion 
‘People power’ – defined here in the lexicon of everyday politics – is the exercise of political 
agency by non-elite actors who are shut out of the corridors of power, and who can neither 
buy access and influence through wealth nor realise their political aspirations through the 
ballot box.  
 Everyday politics is present everywhere, in every society, but is resistant to many 
traditional research methods that are geared more towards tracing and explaining the 
changing dynamics of formal politics and towards understanding the strategies, 
motivations, and effective influence of elite actors. Everyday politics encompasses the 
exercise of non-elite agency in rich countries and poor, democratic and authoritarian, 
regardless of cultural, religious, and historical differences.  
 Despite the universality of everyday politics, the practices of everyday political actors 
vary greatly depending on the nature of their political environments. There are particularly 
large variations between societies where democratic freedoms are relatively more 
entrenched and are effectively protected through widely-accepted legal sanctions and limits 
on state power, and those where the state is the enemy of the people; where engaging in 
overt acts of political resistance necessarily entails risks to actors’ physical security, their 
livelihoods, and the welfare of their communities. In extreme environments of oppression, 
it might reasonably be expected that political resistance will most of the time be resolutely 
suppressed and muted, especially when severe asymmetries of material power exist between 
a state regime and local opposition groups.  
 Everyday resistance to political oppression, while arguably a counter-intuitive response 
when people are faced with state violence and intimidation, is more often the rule than the 
exception. Rather than reluctantly consenting to state authority – or accepting a regime’s 
dominance as ‘natural’ or ‘inevitable’ – non-elite actors in political systems characterised by 
systemic coercion and oppression instead often exhibit a multiplicity of forms of everyday 
political resistance – ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott 1985) – to challenge the legitimacy and 
authority of their rulers. As the foregoing chapters have shown, such acts of everyday 
political resistance are more often covert, indirect, and ‘hidden’ from the glare surrounding 
the machinations of formal politics, although the cumulative effects of everyday political 
actions have the potential to translate into open public campaigns and mass protests that 
occasionally achieve sweeping political transformation. Understanding the everyday politics 
of resistance therefore involves studying how non-elite actors develop strategies of political 
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contestation in pursuit of new political goals, and how the social impact of their actions can 
become magnified if the legitimacy of a regime’s right to rule is effectively undermined.  
All Politics is Local? 
This thesis has shown how everyday politics operates in subordinate conditions of political 
oppression in two country cases from Asia: Burma and the Philippines. In demonstrating 
this, I have challenged the ontological assumption common to much global civil society 
scholarship that depicts domestic social activism as fitting neatly into the category of civil 
society, defined as non-state, non-profit, and non-violent. These cases have illustrated the 
analytical limitations of this conventional definition, with community-based organisations 
in Burma and the Philippines taking a more flexible approach to the use of violent 
strategies to pursue political aims (and for more immediate purposes of community 
survival).  
 Furthermore, this study has also challenged the notion that global civil society actors are 
an essential source of inspiration, resources, and legitimacy for social actors within 
developing countries. However, this is not to claim – following Tip O’Neil (1995) – that ‘all 
politics is local’. Instead, it is to put forward the argument that all politics has two 
dimensions, formal and informal, elite and non-elite. Political action is thus somewhat like 
an iceberg, with the visible tip consisting of a combination of formal and elite politics, and 
the submerged ‘invisible’ mass of the iceberg consisting of informal and non-elite everyday 
politics.  
 Everyday politics is therefore not by definition local politics. It can be local and national, 
or just as easily global in scale. The key conceptual twist here is not necessarily the realm of 
political action that everyday actors operate in (local, national, or global), but rather: (1) the 
category into which their political activities generally fall (informal rather than formal); and 
(2) their rank position in a hierarchical political order (non-elite rather than elite).  
 The political contestation of regime legitimacy (how and why a government governs, 
rather than who is governing and being governed) comprises an essential component of the 
everyday politics of resistance. In addressing the central line of enquiry this study has 
sought to investigate – how non-elite actors contest political oppression – a large part of 
the answer that has been highlighted by these two cases is fairly straightforward: everyday 
actors use whatever covert (and where possible overt) means are available to repeatedly 
attack the bases of regime legitimacy, whether these are centred on religion, national 
identity, material resources, or political rhetoric.  
 The means used by these everyday actors may range from documenting human rights 
abuses to organising mass protests. They may include the provision of basic educational 
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needs as well as community organising to establish local decision-making and planning 
processes and to provide collective community benefits (substituting for public goods that 
are not provided by the state).  
 Furthermore, such means may encompass both violent and non-violent forms of 
resistance. These may include non-compliance with state directives (such as agricultural 
planning demands). They may also include violence, either in the form of offensive resistance 
through military battles or passive armed resistance designed to avoid open confrontation 
through acting as a ‘last line of defense’ and an ‘early-warning system’ for village 
communities. What makes these strategies of political resistance stand out in terms of 
existing accounts of political legitimacy is that they contribute to the construction of 
situational legitimacy, characterised by the emergence of socially-embedded local norms that, 
by definition, serve to hollow out the legitimacy claims of the state.  
Empirical Findings 
Why do people mobilise through social organisations to challenge the legitimacy of states? 
As Chapter 2 has demonstrated, community-based organisations attract legitimacy from 
their ‘base’ communities through the construction of reciprocal relationships that are 
developed over time in adverse political conditions and through shared experiences of 
oppression. People therefore mobilise through social organisations to resist state 
oppression, to gain assistance to meet community needs such as education, physical 
security, and to form positive channels of communication that afford both base 
communities and activist organisations greater scope to evade state intimidation and 
coercion.  
 Through community-based organisations, non-elite actors can forge strategies to 
challenge state legitimacy that are founded upon consensual legitimacy rather than 
legitimacy by proclamation. This is an important distinction both in the case of an 
authoritarian regime such as the Burmese state, and in a formally-democratic state such as 
the Philippines, where opposition groups in both cases seek to achieve political 
transformation based on popular consent rather than a mere changing-of-the-guard in the 
form of a new government.  
 As Chapter 3 has shown, regimes in both Burma and the Philippines are viewed as 
lacking popular consent in large part because of the failure of the state to provide basic 
public goods, such as competent economic management that delivers economic 
opportunities for the broader population, access to education, and physical security for 
individuals or the community. As a consequence, the forms of consensual legitimacy that 
are fostered through the everyday politics of mobilising resistance via community-based 
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organisations form not just a means of contesting state legitimacy, but also a direct 
expression of an alternative conception of legitimacy based upon consent. For this reason, 
it is common for opposition groups to strike a deliberate contrast between the qualities of 
their own relations with their base communities and the failures of the state.  
 Why do some groups choose non-violence while others take up armed struggle? In 
contrast to much of the existing literature on social activism (either within or beyond state 
borders), and especially the rapidly growing International Relations literature on global civil 
society actors, Chapter 4 has demonstrated that a clear division between political violence 
and social activism can sometimes be an artificial normative construct rather than an 
empirical analysis grounded in everyday practices. In this respect, the legitimacy of political 
violence depends less on whether an individual is a member of an armed or a non-armed 
group and more on the identified needs of the community, principled beliefs, and strategic 
choices in complex situations. What may often matter more than the tactics (violent or 
non-violent) that a particular group employs is whether a group has demonstrated a clear 
commitment to the collective interests of the community in order to generate bonds of 
consensual legitimacy and cooperation between opposition groups and their base 
communities. 
 Why do local organisations seek to engage with international state and non-state 
organisations? As Chapter 5 illustrates, external actors such as other states, 
intergovernmental organisations like the United Nations, and global civil society 
organisations can act as a form of ‘megaphone diplomacy’ to increase public awareness 
about political oppression and state violence in a society, or to magnify support for an 
issue-specific campaign that can challenge the international legitimacy of a regime. They 
can also provide influential sources of ideational and material resources that can prove 
valuable for facilitating learning processes among community-based organisations, thus 
enhancing these organisations’ capacity to contest regime legitimacy, as well as 
strengthening their roots in their base communities.  
 However, in interacting with these international organisations, community-based 
organisations sometimes struggle to translate their own immediate circumstances, their 
communities’ needs, and their political goals into the discourse commonly used by global 
civil society actors. Similarly, to be meaningful at the local level, the sources of ideational 
support offered by international actors must first be able to be situated within existing 
social relations and everyday norms. Support from global civil society actors has therefore 
been most valuable and effective for community-based organisations in Burma and the 
Philippines, as Chapter 6 illustrates, when international actors have maintained regular 
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contact with local groups, and where GCSOs have exhibited a genuine commitment to 
understanding the culture and needs of local groups on their own terms, rather than 
imposing an international ‘template’ for cooperation and political action. 
 Under what conditions are local groups influenced by international norms? As both 
Chapters 5 and 6 have shown, community-based organisations are more likely to be 
influenced by international norms when they resonate with existing social relations in the 
local context. This resonance can occur at multiple levels, from full value-based 
concurrence to the more strategic recognition that an international norm represents a 
means to gain international support and assistance for local political goals. In the Burmese 
case, for example, international human rights training and norms of documenting abuses 
proved useful for the purposes of promoting international awareness about the egregious 
acts of violence perpetrated by the state against the local population on an everyday basis.  
 However, international norms are far less likely to resonate or to be easily translated into 
local groups’ political strategies when they cut across the immediate needs and everyday 
survival mechanisms of base communities and their associated activist organisations. This 
is especially the case when the adoption of international norms, however commonly they 
may be practised in other contexts, places the safety of local communities in jeopardy.  
Broader Lessons 
Beyond the more specific findings from these two country case studies, with respect to 
why non-elite actors resist state oppression; why they use or do not use armed force; why 
and when they seek international support; and when international norms have an influence 
on domestic political struggles; the research illustrates wider points that are significant for 
understanding the politics of normative change and political resistance on a broader 
canvas. This thesis suggests three significant broader lessons from the cases of everyday 
political resistance in Burma and the Philippines.  
Legacy issues 
 First, and perhaps most obviously, the legacies of the past often continue to cast a long 
shadow over contemporary forms of political resistance and state power in particular 
societies. In Burma, the military regime has continued practices of oppression and 
intimidation inherited from the country’s former colonial rulers. On the other hand, 
opposition groups’ everyday strategies and political practices are also informed by earlier 
periods of struggle, such as the 1988 mass democracy protests, and both their judgements 
about the lack of regime legitimacy and their goals for political transformation are informed 
by memories of the failings of previous forms of government.   
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Structural patterns 
Second, the structural pattern of relations between a state and the international community 
shapes the definition and articulation of opposition groups’ ambitions for political change. 
In the Burmese case, the regime’s isolation from the international community has fostered 
a comparatively greater willingness on the part of Burmese opposition groups to seek and 
accept international assistance for their goals, with the common thread between the 
political ambitions articulated by different groups being a change in the regime towards 
something approximating a liberal state. In contrast, the structural conditions of economic 
dependence between the Philippines and the international financial institutions (until fairly 
recently the IMF, and now especially the World Bank) have prompted Filipino opposition 
groups to view the contemporary architecture of global economic governance as a 
straitjacket on the country’s policy-making autonomy, which has hampered its ability to 
foster broad-based economic growth, increased living standards, and greater employment 
opportunities. Moreover, the military alliance between the United States and the 
Philippines government is seen as a key source of regime illegitimacy by opposition 
movements, especially since the US-led Global War on Terror has been adopted as a 
smokescreen for the government to gain increased military aid and resources from the US. 
This US assistance has been partly directed towards cracking down on the leaders and key 
activists within democratic opposition groups. As a consequence of these patterns of 
economic and military dependence between the Philippines regime and international actors, 
Filipino opposition organisations are more readily opposed to a transition to a fully-
functioning liberal democratic state with a market-based economy, and have articulated 
different goals oriented towards economic independence and greater state intervention in 
the economy to increase development, alleviate poverty, and enhance employment 
opportunities.  
Consensual legitimacy 
The third main broader lesson emerging from this research is the importance of 
reincorporating consent-based theories of legitimacy within the study of political change, 
political legitimacy, and democratisation. While the broad thrust of the existing literature in 
these fields in recent years has been focused on the importance of procedural legitimacy – 
not least in studying questions of democratic transition, electoral design, accountability, and 
‘good governance’ – the rule of law and efficient procedures for electing and dismissing a 
government are not sufficient in and of themselves for social legitimacy. Instead, broad-
based social legitimacy for political institutions and a particular form and style of 
government can only be conferred through popular consent. Rather than consent being 
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construed narrowly in terms of individual or group definitions of self-interest (cf. Cabrera 
2010, 43), consensual power can constitute a potent and durable source of political 
legitimation. 
Implications for Future Research 
The argument and findings in this thesis have important implications for recent debates 
over the legitimacy of nonconventional forms of social activism – including the use of 
violence for political ends – and for the study of the role of non-state actors in Political 
Science and International Relations more broadly. Understanding the informal and non-
elite dimension of political activism can also contribute to the wider literature on 
democratisation, by helping to incorporate a greater range of political actors and forms of 
political action without ‘black boxing’ non-elite politics as ‘social forces’, ‘societal 
pressures’, ‘interest groups’, or ‘sectoral interests’, and without relying on exogenous 
political dynamics (such as the ‘third-wave’ democratisations after the end of the Cold War) 
as the main explanatory variables. Of particular importance here is the need for more 
studies of political activism and global civil society actors to avoid inadvertently 
downgrading the everyday politics of non-elites as marginal in comparison with the more 
visible forms of political influence exercised by higher-profile social actors (including elite 
social actors, such as many GCSOs). Such studies would also help to ensure that research 
does not simply disregard the political dynamics that occur outside the realm of formal 
politics and at the sub-state level in developing countries.  
 More broadly, by paying greater attention to the everyday sources of political change 
and normative contestation, it becomes possible to carry out a more comprehensive 
analysis of how big political and policy changes can sometimes originate in ‘small’ actions, 
including the everyday survival strategies used by community-based organisations who lack 
access to the formal sources of wealth and power in a society. The emerging literature on 
‘informal institutions’ (Helmke and Levitsky 2004), ‘everyday politics’ (Hobson and 
Seabrooke 2007), and ‘everyday life’ (Langley 2009) has already paved the way for more 
studies of the non-elite sources of big processes of political change, across both developed 
industrial economies and developing economies, as well as democratic and non-democratic 
political regimes. This thesis suggests that a great deal more can be gained from linking 
studies of the everyday politics of resistance to more conventional studies of processes of 
democratisation, economic development, and international assistance in oppressive 
regimes.  
 A final avenue for future research suggested by this study is to explore in greater detail 
the impact of social learning processes in political mobilisation. Learning processes at the 
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local and international level can potentially be important drivers of change in expectations, 
habitual practice, and conceptual framing, especially when learning interacts with local 
political norms to enhance existing repertoires of political resistance. In particular, the 
existing broad literatures on political activism in democratic states, transnational social 
movements and political change, and democracy activism in non-democratic states could 
potentially benefit from incorporating a greater focus on the learning dimension of 
community organising, political mobilisation, and regime opposition.  
 In the cases of Burma and the Philippines, non-state political opposition movements are 
still a work in progress, and in neither case have community-based organisations yet 
achieved their substantive goals of political transformation (in Burma, political change 
towards a more liberal state, and in the Philippines, political change towards a more 
socialist and economically-independent state). The everyday politics of political resistance 
in Burma and the Philippines has instead concentrated on gradually challenging the sources 
of regime legitimacy, while simultaneously developing more consensual forms of political 
legitimation between activist organisations and their base communities. In both cases, the 
state has failed to provide a range of basic public goods, including access to education, 
economic opportunities, and physical security, while in the case of Burma in particular the 
state is blamed for generating a systemic climate of fear among the population.  
 In this thesis I have advanced the argument that non-elite opposition groups contest 
state legitimacy through everyday political actions that take place outside the realm of 
formal elite politics, but which are nonetheless powerful and significant forms of political 
resistance in themselves. In doing so, non-elite actors help to create locally situated norms 
of political legitimacy. State authority, even in authoritarian and oppressive democratic 
regimes, is neither absolute nor immune from challenges by everyday actors, who make use 
of ‘weapons of the weak’ to pursue their political, economic, and social goals.
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Appendix A: Interview Participants 
(01) Spokesperson, All Arakan Student and Youth Congress (AASYC), October 27, 2006 
(02) Spokesperson, All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF), October 22 
(03) member 1, ABSDF, October 21 
(03) member 1, ABSDF, October 21 
(04) member 2, ABSDF, October 19  
(05) member 3, ABSDF, October 22 
(06) member 4, ABSDF, October 22 
(07) member 5, ABSDF, October 19  
(08) Spokesperson, ABSDF, October 3 
(09) All Kachin Student and Youth Union (AKSYU), October 17 
(10) Spokesperson, Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), October 30 
(11) Spokesperson, Arakan Youth Network Group (AYNG), October 29 
(12) Spokesperson, Burmese Women’s Union (BWU), October 10 
(13) members, BWU, October 27 
(14) Spokesperson, Federation of Trade Unions of Burma (FTUB), November 6 
(15) Organiser,  FTUB, October 31 
(16) Spokesperson, Federation of Trade Unions of Kawthoolei (FTUK), October 31 
(17) Spokesperson,  Joint Action Committee (JAC), November 1 
(18) Spokesperson, Karen Education Workers’ Union (KEWU), November 2 
(19) member 1, Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), October 26 
(20) member 2, KNLA, October 26 
(21) Spokesperson, Karen National Union (KNU), October 7 
(22) Spokesperson, Kachin Women’s Association of Thailand (KWAT), October 12 
(23) Interns, KWAT, October 13 
(24) Spokesperson, Karen Student Network Group (KSNG), October 30 
169 
 
(25) Spokesperson, Karen Women’s Organisation (KWO), October 20 
(26) Members, KWO, October 20 
(27) member 1, Karen Youth Organisation (KYO), October 26 
(28) member 2, KYO, October 26 
(29) Spokesperson, Mon Unity League (MUL), November 14 
(30) Spokesperson, Mon Women’s Organisation (MWO), November 9 
(31) member, MWO, November 10 
(32) Spokesperson, Mon Youth Progressive Organisation (MYPO), November 9 
(33) Spokesperson, New Mon State Party (NMSP), November 9 
(34) Spokesperson, Palung State Liberation Front (PSLF), October 16 
(35) Spokesperson, Zomi Student and Youth Congress (ZSYC), October 27 
 
Table 1: Participants in the study – Organisations from Burma 
 
Table 2: Participants in the study – Organisations from the Philippines 
(01) Spokesperson, Anakbayan, April 2008 
(02) Spokesperson, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (New Patriotic Alliance) – (BAYAN), 
April 2008 
(03) Spokesperson, Cordillera People’s Alliance (CPA), April 2008 
(04) Spokesperson, General Assembly Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, 
Leadership, and Action (GABRIELA), April 2008 
(05) Spokesperson, Kilusang Mayo Uno (May First Movement) – (KMU), April 2008 
(06) Spokesperson, National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP), April 2008 
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Appendix B: Interview Guide 
The following questions were used to guide interviews in both cases. Wording and order of 
questions varied depending on the interview.  
Goals 
1. What are the primary goals of your organisation? 
2. What first got you involved in the movement? 
3. What keeps you involved? What’s most important to you? 
4. How is your community (eg Karen) organised to be part of your group? 
5. (How do you encourage participation of your community/membership? How are 
they involved?) 
6. What issues or problems are most important at the moment for the situation of the 
community? 
7. Are you involved in working with people from outside your community? (or do 
you know someone who does?) 
8. Do outsiders understand the situation of your people? Do they understand what 
you want, what you are trying to do? 
9. What about international or overseas groups? NGOs or other international 
organisations? Do you work with them? 
10. Do these international groups understand the situation and what you are trying to 
do? 
11. Do they talk about it in the same way? Do you have to change the way you explain 
yourself when talking to outsiders or a foreign NGO? 
12. What is your view of the SPDC regime/government? Why? 
13. What would you like to see change? (including form of the state: constitutional 
structure, processes) 
Actions 
1. What are the most important activities of your group? 
2. What kinds of things does your group do in your member communities? 
3. Have you been involved in these, what is your role? 
4. Are any of these activities funded by or in partnership with other organisations? 
(international/local NGO, government organisations) 
5. How would you describe your relationship with these organisations? 
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6. Are you able to communicate easily, do they understand what you are doing and 
trying to achieve? 
7. Are there activities you don’t have support for? Why not? 
8. What interaction, if any, do you have with state authorities in Burma? (local, central, 
different branches) 
9. Have you taken action in opposition to state policies or the regime? (including any 
aspect of campaigning, protest, resistance, lobbying, providing information and 
support for such, etc) 
10. Have your actions been supported by other groups? (international/local NGO, 
government organisations) 
11. How would you describe your relationship? 
12. Are there activities you don’t have support for? Why not? 
Effectiveness 
1. To what extent are you able to meet the needs of your community? 
2. What activities have been most successful? Which haven’t been? How do you 
judge? 
3. Have you been able to affect state policies? The status of the regime? 
4. What would be necessary to have more effect? 
5. Have you been able to work effectively with other local groups? With international, 
overseas groups? 
 
 
 
